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Abstract 
The maritime delimitation in the former disputed area between Norway and Russia was agreed upon 
in 2011. It is therefore probable that the area will be opened for petroleum exploration in the near 
future. A blowout represents one of the most severe threats associated with petroleum exploration. 
This thesis has investigated the risk involved with such an activity through a case study, by 
considering geology and well specific conditions for this area. Currently, no wells have been drilled in 
the nearby area. Therefore, there is a lot of uncertainty related to reservoir and well conditions. 
The blowout risk was determined in a well specific manner by employing several computer modeling 
tools. Determination of blowout probability, flow rate and duration was emphasized. This thesis also 
assessed the associated environmental risk through a methodological study. The main objective of 
this thesis was to investigate how available computer modeling tools allowed the uncertainty to 
propagate throughout an environmental risk assessment. This is done by observing how the applied 
tools could communicate probabilistic elements. 
The blowout probability was determined through two different approaches. Both methods applied 
statistics as basis. A pure statistical approach attempted to reduce the historical blowout probability 
by considering recent trends in kick statistics. The computer modeling tool BlowFAM adjusted the 
historical probability by considering reservoir and well characteristics, and through an evaluation of a 
wide range of risk elements. The latter was also used to identify certain risk reducing measures. 
BlowFAM was considered to yield the most well specific result of the two approaches, and was 
therefore chosen as the most appropriate model for this case study. BlowFAM has yielded a blowout 
probability of 7.58 × 10-5. 
BlowFlow is a computer modeling tool used to determine flow rate and duration of a potential 
blowout in a probabilistic manner. This tool determines flow rate based on a consideration of 
reservoir and well conditions. The duration is a function of different types of blowout killing 
mechanisms. BlowFlow considers the uncertainty in input parameters, and reflect these 
uncertainties in the final results. The results are presented by means of probability distributions for 
several different scenarios. BlowFlow has yielded a mean flow rate of 1 200 m3/d, and a mean 
duration of 10 days. The implications of several risk reducing measures was also investigated.  
OPERAto is a computer based tool used to determine the environmental risk related to a possible 
blowout. The risk is determined based on the area of influence, and presence of specific valued 
ecosystem components (VECs). The model does currently not include data collected from the former 
disputed area of the Barents Sea. Oil drift simulations and environmental data have been collected 
from Norne; an oil field in the northern part of the Norwegian Sea. Consequently, the environmental 
risk presented will not be correct for this case study. OPERAto was applied as a methodological study 
to determine the compatibility between the different modeling tools, and their ability to reflect 
uncertainty in input parameters. Also, the effect of implementing risk reducing measures was 
observed. 
Through the methods applied it was possible to determine blowout probability, flow rate and 
duration in a well specific manner. However, it was not possible to determine the environmental risk 
in a relevant manner, within the frames of this thesis. Still it was possible to study how these tools 
communicated, and how the uncertainty was allowed to propagate through the environmental risk 
II 
assessment. It was concluded that the tools were able to communicate some probabilistic elements, 
but that there is still a lot of work to be done before a unified probabilistic methodology exists. 
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ALARP  - As low as reasonably practicable.  
Annulus - The ring-shaped space between the outside of the drill pipe and the wellbore. 
Bbl  - A barrel is a common unit of expressing oil volume, and corresponds to 0.159 m3. 
BOP  - Blowout Preventer. 
CECS  - Canada East Continental Shelf 
DNV  - Det Norske Veritas. 
EMW  - Equivalent mud weight. 
GLR  - Gas/liquid ratio. 
GOR  - Gas/oil ratio. When oil is produced and brought to the surface, gas will come out of 
the solution as pressure and temperature is reduced. GOR is the ratio of the volume 
of gas that comes out of solution, to the volume of oil at standard conditions in 
Sm3/Sm3. 
HPHT  - High pressure and high temperature. 
IPR  - Inflow performance relationship. 
IRIS  - International Research Institute of Stavanger. 
LNG  - Liquefied Natural Gas. It consists mainly of methane and some ethane cooled below 
its condensing temperature. The volume is reduced by a factor of 600, thus it can be 
transported or stored effectively. 
Ma  - Million years ago. 
MIRA  - Method for Environmental Risk analysis. 
MSm3  - Million cubic meters at standard conditions. 
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NPD  - Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. 
OLF  - The Norwegian Oil Industry Association. 
Open hole - Well bore were the drill string has been withdrawn. 
OSPRAG - Oil Spill Prevention and Response Advisory Group. 
OSRL  - Oil Spill Response Limited. 
Permeability - A measure of the ease with which fluids will flow though a porous rock, sediment, 
or soil. 
XVI 
Porosity - The ratio of the volume of openings (voids) to the total volume of material. Porosity 
represents the storage capacity of the geologic material. 
PSA - Petroleum Safety Authority. 
PVT  - Pressure-Volume-Temperature. 
RT  - Rotary table. 
Scf  - Standard cubic feet, or cubic feet at standard conditions. A cubic feet correspond to 
0.0283 m3 in volume. 
SG  - Specific gravity refers to the ratio of the density of a substance to the density  of a 
reference substance. Air is used as the reference substance for gas, while water is 
used as reference substance for oil or mud. 
Shale  - A fine-grained, usually laminated, clastic rock of compacted clay or mud particles. 
Sm3  - Cubic meters at standard conditions. 
STB  - Stock tank barrel. A barrel of oil that has expanded to standard conditions. It 
contains less dissolved gas than oil at reservoir conditions.  
SWRP - Subsea Well Response Project. 
TVD MSL - True vertical depth to mean sea level. 
TVD RT  - True vertical depth from rotary table. 
UKCS  - British Continental Shelf. 
US GoM OCS - United States Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental shelf. 
VEC  - Valued ecosystem components. 
VLP  - Vertical lift performance. 
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1. Introduction 
This thesis aims to analyze the blowout risk related to exploration drilling in the former disputed area 
southeast in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea. This is done in a probabilistic manner, where the 
uncertainty related to different parameters is emphasized. The blowout risk is determined in a well 
specific manner by employing several computer modeling tools. Determination of blowout 
probability, flow rate and duration is emphasized. This thesis will also assess the associated 
environmental risk through a methodological study. The main objective is to investigate how 
available computer modeling tools allow the uncertainty to propagate throughout an environmental 
risk assessment. This is done by observing how the applied tools can communicate probabilistic 
elements. A high level of detail is important to provide a good basis for making sound risk 
management decisions. Thus, the applicability of these models as decision support tools in risk 
management is investigated. 
1.1 Background 
The maritime delimitation in the former disputed area between Norway and Russia was agreed upon 
in 2011. It is therefore likely that this area will be opened for petroleum exploration in the near 
future. The southeastern Barents Sea has not yet been thoroughly explored for hydrocarbon 
resources. As of today, there are no wells drilled in this area. Collection of geologic data through 
seismic surveys have been initiated, and will be continued in 2012 (Nyland et al., 2011). If the 
processed data indicate that there might be recoverable hydrocarbons, it is likely that on ore more 
exploration wells will be drilled.  
A blowout represents one of the most severe threats associated with petroleum exploration. Even 
though much effort is put into describing how a blowout occurs and how to prevent it, the risk of a 
blowout remains a threat to the industry. To enlighten the risk involved with the drilling activity, an 
environmental risk assessment can be performed. This is especially important in environmentally 
vulnerable areas, where the potential consequences are high and oil spill contingency planning 
require extra attention (Arild et al., 2008). Since there are currently no wells drilled in the former 
disputed area, there is limited information available about geological conditions. Whether this region 
contains any recoverable oil or gas resources is still uncertain. Preliminary data indicate that it may 
be primarily a gas province. If there are oil reservoirs present, these are likely to be characterized by 
poor reservoir conditions. The Barents Sea is generally governed by low pressures (pers. comm. Høy). 
Due to these factors, it is crucial to take well specific conditions into consideration, to present a 
reasonable risk level. 
As of today, ERAs are commonly based on statistics and experience data, rather on conditions of the 
well or field in question. Through such an approach, it becomes difficult to incorporate the 
uniqueness of each well into the analysis. It is also common to use conservative estimates in an ERA, 
due to the limited ability of different methods to reflect uncertainty. Today’s environmental focus 
has generated a need for improved cross disciplinary tools within blowout risk management. As a 
result, risk assessment tools have become more sophisticated (Arild et al., 2008). The Norwegian Oil 
Industry Association (OLF) has developed a “Method for Environmental Risk Assessment” (MIRA) 
(Brude, 2007). It presents standardized guidelines on how to perform an ERA. Fig. 1 shows a 
simplified summary of the ERA process. 
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Figure 1: Environmental risk assessment process and propagation of uncertainty (Arild et al., 2008, Brude, 2007). 
A blowout probability assessment is one of the main activities in quantifying the risk related to 
drilling and well operations. Determination of blowout probability has often been based on statistics. 
However, this does not reflect recent trends in statistics. Nor does it include recent technological or 
operational improvements. The blowout probability might be considerably reduced in recent years, 
compared to the early records of historical databases. The probability will also vary greatly from well 
to well, due to well specific characteristics. This is not reflected in statistical probabilities. 
As of today, there is no common standardized methodology among oil companies for the calculation 
of blowout rate and duration. Today’s practice still varies greatly with respect to level of detail, 
handling of uncertainty, terminology, level of documentation and traceability. OLF has produced 
guidelines on how to calculate flow rates and durations for use in an ERA (Nilsen et al., 2004). 
According to the OLF guidelines the results should be presented in a probabilistic manner, to reflect 
uncertainty. It is important to be able to reflect uncertainty throughout the ERA process. Otherwise, 
the uncertainty will not be reflected in the final results, and the level of detail will be compromised. A 
higher level of detail will yield more accurate result. It is therefore necessary to communicate these 
probabilistic elements through the different steps of the ERA, as illustrated in Fig. 1. 
1.2 Goals 
This thesis will investigate the blowout risk related to drilling of an exploration well in the former 
disputed area of the Barents Sea. It will attempt to determine the risk in a probabilistic manner, by 
considering uncertainty in different parameters such as geological conditions. Several computer 
modeling tools are applied in this assessment. Some tools will incorporate the uncertainty of input 
parameters in the analysis, while others only allow use of deterministic data. The ability of each tool 
to reflect uncertainty will be discussed. The uncertainty in one step of an ERA should ideally be 
allowed to propagate and be reflected in each of the following steps. This is illustrated in Fig. 1, 
where the environmental risk and recovery times are presented as a probability distribution. Ideally, 
each step should reflect the same level of detail, and the same amount of uncertainty as the 
previous. The main objective of this thesis is to investigate whether available computer modeling 
tools allow propagation of uncertainty throughout an ERA.  
A complete environmental risk assessment will not be performed in this case study, as there is 
limited time and resources available. Determination of blowout probability, flow rate and duration is 
emphasized in this thesis. One could say that the focus is on the upstream aspects of the blowout. 
This means that assessing the probability and dimensions of a possible blowout is of priority, rather 
than the environmental consequences. This is illustrated in Fig. 1, where the first two steps of the 
ERA have been highlighted. It is desirable to be able to assess these parameters in a more 
mechanistic way, which is specific to each case analyzed. Therefore, it will be attempted to 
3 
incorporate the uniqueness of the well in question into the analysis. To determine whether these 
tools are able to reflect well specific conditions is an important aspect of this thesis. 
Two different blowout probability assessment methods will be investigated. This constitutes the 1st 
step of the ERA process in Fig. 1. The 1st method is a purely statistical approach that adjusts the 
historical blowout probability to reflect recent trends in kick statistics. The 2nd method involves the 
computer tool BlowFAM, which is developed by Scandpower. This model also has a statistical basis. 
Here the blowout probability is adjusted by considering well configuration and reservoir conditions, 
and through an evaluation of equipment, management and procedures. This tool allows to identify 
which parameters contribute to an increased risk through a sensitivity study. It can also identify 
possible risk reducing measures through an evaluation of risk elements. The two different 
approaches will be compared with respect to the resulting blowout probability, incorporation of well 
specific conditions, and their applicability as risk management tools. Their (in)ability to reflect 
uncertainty will also be assessed. 
BlowFlow is a tool developed by IRIS which will be used to assess the flow rate and duration of a 
potential blowout. These values will be presented as probability distributions, to reflect uncertainty 
in input parameters. The flow rate is presented for a range of different blowout scenarios. This tool 
constitutes the 2nd step of the ERA process and Fig. 1. It is desirable to include a high reflection of 
uncertainty in the analysis to achieve a high level of detail. BlowFlow allows a detailed reflection of 
uncertainty. Therefore, it is important to allow these probabilistic elements to propagate through the 
following steps of the ERA. By altering input parameters through a sensitivity study the tool can 
reveal which factors contribute most to an increased risk. Measures that will reduce the duration of a 
blowout can be initiated, to mitigate the environmental consequences of potential blowout. 
DNV’s computer model OPERAto is used to determine the environmental risk associated with a 
possible blowout. This is done by assessing environmental damage and recovery time for specific 
valued ecosystem components (VEC). Due to the time restrictions of this thesis, environmental 
consequences have received limited attention. OPERAto is run based on oil drift forecasts and 
environmental resources present in a given area. Since this is only a case study, oil drift forecasts and 
collection of environmental data will not be performed. A worksheet run for Statoil’s field Norne will 
therefore be applied in this thesis. This means that the resulting environmental risk will not reflect 
the conditions of specific for this case study. The tool will be applied as a methodological study to 
determine the ability of these tools to allow the uncertainty to propagate. The compatibility of the 
different tools applied is assessed. This thesis will investigate how these tools can communicate 
probabilistic elements. OPERAto’s ability to reflect uncertainty in parameters is the main focus of this 
thesis. This is determined by investigating how applicable the results from the previous models are as 
input in OPERAto.  
It is important to incorporate risk management in the ERA. OPERAto can demonstrate the effect of 
implementing different risk reducing measures. This is done by observing the relative implications on 
the environmental risk, when altering input parameters. Different measures will be identified 
through both BlowFAM and BlowFlow. The blowout risk is defined as a function of both probability 
and consequences of a blowout. Measures identified through BlowFAM will work to reduce the 
probability of a blowout occurring. These are referred to as preventive measures. Measures 
identified through BlowFlow can reduce the duration of a blowout, and thus mitigate the 
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environmental consequences. The implication of both preventive and consequence mitigating 
measures on the environmental risk will be investigated through OPERAto. An objective of this thesis 
is to evaluate the ability of these tools to aid decision making in a risk management process. Does the 
combined use of these tools provide a common platform for risk based decision making? But the 
main objective is to investigate the reflection of uncertainty through the entire assessment, and also 
through the implementation of risk reducing measures. 
1.3 Structure 
Chapter 2 includes a theoretical background that gives the reader basic knowledge about the 
subjects addressed. It introduces different aspects of a blowout. Definitions regarding risk and 
environmental risk are discussed shortly. This section also presents information about the activity in 
the Barents Sea, as well as physical conditions of the former disputed area southeast in the 
Norwegian part of the Barents Sea. 
Chapter 3 includes a methodology description of the three different computer modeling tools 
applied in this thesis. It introduces input categories and some basic calculations. 
Chapter 4 presents the case study, which is a short description of the activity, location, focus of the 
thesis, as well as different assumptions made. 
Chapter 5 presents two different approaches to determine blowout probability. A statistical 
approach attempts to reduce the probability by considering recent kick statistics. The computer 
modeling tool BlowFAM attempts to adjusts the risk by considering reservoir and well characteristics, 
and through an evaluation of a wide range of risk elements. Both approaches are used to assess 
which blowout scenarios are possible. BlowFAM is also used to identify certain risk reducing 
measures. 
In chapter 6, BlowFlow is used to determine oil spill scenarios by means of flow rate and duration, in 
a probabilistic manner. The sensitivity of the flow rate to uncertainty in input parameters is 
investigated. The tool is also used to identify risk reducing measures that can reduce the duration of 
a blowout. 
In chapter 7, OPERAto is used to address the environmental risk as a function of blowout probability, 
flow rate and duration through a methodological study. The effects of the identified risk reducing 
measures on environmental risk are also investigated. 
Chapter 8 includes a discussion of the results from the chapter 5, 6 and 7. It also investigates the 
compatibility of these models, and the propagation of uncertainty. Chapter 9 presents the conclusion 
which can be drawn from the discussion.  
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2. Theoretical background 
During the last decade there has been an increased interest in the relatively unexplored areas in the 
North, from the oil and gas industry. The Barents Sea has proven to contain producible amounts of 
hydrocarbons, and there are now several fields in the planning and development stages. 
Optimistic estimates suggest that 24 % of the world's undiscovered petroleum resources 
are located in the Arctic (Ahlbrandt et al., 2000). The delimitation between Norway and Russia in the 
southeastern part of the Barents Sea was agreed upon in 2011. Therefore, this area is believed to be 
opened for petroleum activity in the near future. It is still high uncertainty related to whether this 
new region contains any producible oil resources. Seismic surveys have been initiated to map 
possible resources. If these findings indicate that hydrocarbons may be present, exploration drilling 
will follow (Nyland et al., 2011).  
There is always some risk associated with exploratory activity. If an exploration well is to be drilled an 
environmental risk assessment must be performed. There are several reasons for this (Brude, 2007): 
- To comply with national regulations 
- Evaluate if the operators acceptance criteria will be met 
- Manage and reduce the environmental risk 
- Internal and external decision support 
- Form a basis for choosing risk reducing measures, such as dimensioning oil spill response and 
preparedness 
Petroleum resources are complex mixtures of hydrocarbons. They are found in geologic formations 
beneath the Earth's surface. Hydrocarbons are formed by degradation of organic material. If clay and 
minerals are deposited with 5 % or more organics to form shale, a hydrocarbon source rock can be 
formed. The organics will be degraded as new layers form on top. Oil maturation requires high 
temperatures (60 -120 ᵒC) and high pressures, which is represented by an “oil window”. Formation of 
gas has a corresponding “gas window”. If the conditions of the rock layers reach this window, the 
organics can mature into hydrocarbons. This maturation takes millions of years (Selley, 1998). 
As most hydrocarbons are lighter than rock or water, they will eventually leak from the source rock 
and migrate upward. Some of these resources can be captured in closed structures called 
hydrocarbon traps. A trap is a geologic structure capable of retaining hydrocarbons. The 
hydrocarbons are contained in porous and permeable structures (mostly sand- or limestone) called 
reservoirs. For the hydrocarbons to be retained, they must be trapped beneath an impermeable cap 
rock (typically shale and/or salt structures). When hydrocarbons are concentrated in a trap, an oil 
and/or gas field is formed. These resources can be extracted by drilling a well (Selley, 1998).  
A blowout is among the most serious incidents that can occur during exploration drilling. Even 
though much effort is put into describing how a blowout occurs and how to prevent it, the risk of a 
blowout remains a threat to the industry (Arild et al., 2008). Therefore, the risk related to a blowout 
will be investigated in this thesis. 
  
6 
2.1 Blowouts 
A blowout can be defined as an uncontrolled release of reservoir fluid to the surroundings. A 
blowout occurs when all defined technical barriers or operation of these has failed. It can consist of 
crude oil, natural gas and/or water. Such events can occur in both complex HPHT wells and simple 
shallow wells. A blowout is considered to be the most harmful event that can occur during 
exploration or production of petroleum resources. It has the potential to severely damage 
equipment, people or the environment. It might also lead to huge financial losses and cause damage 
to the responsible company’s reputation (Arild et al., 2008). A blowout can occur during drilling, well 
testing, completion, production, or workover operations. Blowouts during exploration drilling are 
according to statistics the most frequent (Haugsvold, 2011, Holand, 2010), and will be focused on in 
this thesis. There is always a risk that a blowout can be ignited. This can happen through sparks from 
rocks exiting the well, or by heat generated by friction (Adams and Kuhlman, 1994).  
In addition to a blowout, there are several other incidents that can lead to release of reservoir fluids 
to the surroundings. A well release can be defined as unintended flow of oil or gas from the well, 
which was stopped by use of the barrier system. This barrier system used must have been available 
on the well at the time the incident started. In other words, it is a blowout that was successfully 
diverted by use of well barriers. Well releases are therefore associated with smaller volumes than 
blowouts. A well release incident is however much more probable than a blowout (Holand, 2010). 
The overall risk related to well releases might therefore be higher than for blowouts. Smaller and 
more frequent events might pose a bigger threat to the environment. If addressing risk related to oil 
spills in a broader sense, well releases would be of interest. However, with respect to single events a 
blowout yields a higher risk and will therefore be the focus of this study. 
A shallow gas blowout can occur if a gas zone is penetrated prior to installation of the BOP. Drilling 
before setting of the BOP usually involves drilling of the top hole with water or water based mud, 
which can be directly discharged to sea. During this initial drilling process it is possible to encounter 
an unexpected gas pocket (Murray et al., 1995). The only difference between a shallow gas blowout 
and a shallow gas well release is that well releases are per definition successfully diverted. These are 
the typical Norwegian classifications and might now be correct in other countries. The term "deep" is 
often used when referring  to well operations performed after the BOP is installed (Holand, 2010). 
Since shallow gas pockets contain lighter hydrocarbon components, it is not as harmful as an oil 
blowout. Shallow gas will therefore not be discussed in further detail. 
2.1.1 Well control 
To prevent a blowout from occurring, the well is equipped with pressure control equipment and 
barriers. According to North Sea standards, the well must at all time be equipped with two 
independent well barriers during drilling or other well operations (Vestre, 1995). In order for a 
blowout to occur, both well barriers must fail at the same time. This situation can be expressed in a 
fault tree, as shown in Fig. 2. 
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Figure 2: Fault tree for loss of well control (Brandt et al., 2010). 
The primary barrier in a drilling operation is the hydrostatic pressure of the drilling mud inside the 
well. The hydrostatic pressure can be defined as the pressure exerted by a column of fluid. 
Sometimes there is also a pressure contribution from pumping of mud into the well, called 
equivalent circulating pressure. The pressure in the well must never be lower than the pressure of 
the pores in the reservoir. Otherwise, an influx might result. An influx is the flow of reservoir fluids 
into the well. This is often referred to as a kick. The density of the drilling fluid is used to obtain the 
appropriate well pressure. The density is controlled by varying the concentration of high specific 
gravity solids within the fluid, such as barite. Reliable mud monitoring equipment is necessary to 
prevent kicks from occurring (Adams and Kuhlman, 1994). 
The well pressure must always be higher than the pore pressure of the formation. In addition, it must 
be sufficient to prevent a collapse of the well bore. However, the collapse pressure is usually lower 
than the pore pressure, thus an influx would occur before well collapse. But at the same time, the 
well pressure must be lower than the fracture pressure. A too high mud weight might fracture the 
reservoir. This can result in loss of well fluids to the formations, which in turn can cause a kick. The 
overburden (lithostatic) pressure is the pressure exerted by the weight of overlying formation. This 
pressure must not be exceeded. However, this is usually higher than the fracture pressure. These 
curves are commonly presented in a pore-pressure plot as shown in Fig 3. The curves are given as 
specific gravity (SG) or pressure gradients, as a function of depth. This plot is used to determine the 
appropriate mud weight at each depth. In this simplified model, the collapse pressure is not included 
(Jincai, 2011). 
 
Figure 3: Pore pressure plot presenting specific gravity gradient as a function of depth (Jincai, 2011). 
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An essential part of well control is to maintain the appropriate mud weight throughout the drilling 
process. If the pore pressure of the formation increases, the mud density must be increased 
accordingly, to keep the well in balance. An imbalanced well can result in an influx, potentially 
leading to a blowout. The mud weight must be kept between the pore pressure and fracture 
pressure gradients at all time. The window between the pore pressure and fracture pressure gradient 
is often referred to as the drilling window. The mud weight must be altered and monitored 
continuously as the well is drilled. As the casings are set, the overlying formations are secured from 
collapse or fracture, and the mud weight can be increased. 
A more detailed loss of well control scenario is shown in the fault tree diagram below. It shows the 
correlation between different initiating events, as well as the different constituents of the secondary 
barrier. The diagram is significantly simplified with respect to initiating events. These will be further 
discussed in next section. If the primary barrier is lost, it is crucial that the secondary barrier is 
functioning and can seal the well. If not, a kick can easily escalate into a blowout where reservoir 
fluids flow from the well and into the surrounding sea. The secondary barrier always consists of a 
blowout preventer (BOP), casings, cement and wellhead seals. The casing and cement seal the well 
from the outer well bore, preventing well collapse or fracture of overlying formations. The wellhead 
connections seal the well from the surface, along with the BOP. 
 
Figure 4: Fault Tree model – Loss of Well Control (Brandt et al., 2010). 
On a subsea well, the BOP is located at the seabed, between the wellhead and the riser. During a 
drilling operation, the BOP will close immediately if an influx is detected. The device is designed to be 
a failsafe device. When the BOP is closed, the drilling mud density can be increased to restore well 
balance. After well control has been retrieved, the BOP can be reopened. BOPs must be tested at 
regular intervals depending on local practice, legal requirements and the probability of well control 
problems of the specific well. Testing intervals can vary from daily on critical wells, to monthly, or 
even less frequent. BOPs come in a variety of sizes and pressure ratings. The BOP stack includes 
several types of individual BOPs, either annular or ram preventers. A ram preventer consist of two 
steel plates (rams) fitted with packers, that are forced together to seal the well. There are several 
types of ram preventers (Adams and Kuhlman, 1994): 
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- Blind rams is the simplest type that is used to seal the well above the open well bore. 
- Pipe rams will seal the well around the drill pipe, to prevent fluids from flowing through 
annulus. It does not however, prevent flow through the drill pipe. 
- Variable bore rams are applicable for a wider range of pipe and tubing diameters than pipe 
rams. 
- Shear rams are equipped with a steel-cutting surface, that enables them to completely shear 
through the drill pipe and/or casing. 
- Blind shear rams are designed to seal the well while shearing the drill pipe in the process. 
Annular preventers consist of a donut-shaped rubber packing that is squeezed inward to seal the 
well. It has the ability to close around a wide range of pipe diameters. It can also seal the open 
wellbore, but is generally not as effective as ram preventers at maintaining a seal on the open hole. 
The rubber packing it is then subject to high stresses, and this can result in a shortening in the 
lifetime of the preventer. Annular preventers are positioned above ram preventers, since they are 
not typically rated to working pressures as high as those of the ram preventers. A BOP stack typically 
includes 2 (dual) annular preventers installed above 4 or more ram preventers (Adams and Kuhlman, 
1994). The BOP system also includes kill and choke lines, with hydraulically operated valves (McCrae, 
2003). A simplified sketch is shown in Fig. 5. 
 
Figure 5: Blowout preventer schematic (McAndrews, 2011). 
2.1.2 Causes 
A blowout can occur if both the primary and secondary barrier is lost, as the fault tree diagrams in 
Fig. 2 and 4 show. A blowout can also be caused by human error or external causes, such as storms 
or collisions. According to the SINTEF offshore blowout database, incidents related to external causes 
are associated with production. Since this thesis addresses an exploration wells, external causes will 
not be discussed further. A kick is often the initiating event of a blowout. The SINTEF database 
includes detailed information about common causes of a kick. Blowout causes for deep exploration 
drilling are listed below in ranked order of occurrence (Holand, 2010): 
- Annular losses (4) 
- While cement setting (4) 
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- Too low mud weight (3) 
- Gas cut mud (2) 
- Improper fill up (2) 
- Swabbing (2) 
- Unexpected high well pressure (2) 
- Unknown (2) 
- Disconnected riser (1) 
- Trapped gas (1) 
- Reservoir depth uncertainty (1) 
- Poor cement (1) 
- Packer leakage (1) 
Annular losses involve loss of well fluids to surrounding formations. This can lead to a reduced 
hydrostatic head of the mud column, and a kick can result. A high gas-cut in the mud will only cause 
small reductions in bottomhole pressure. But the gas expands as it moves toward the surface. The 
effective weight of the fluid can then be reduced, resulting in a reduced well pressure. If an 
unexpected pressure zone is encountered, the well pressure might become too low compared to the 
reservoir pressure. Improper fill up can lead to a temporarily reduced well pressure, and cause a kick. 
Swabbing is a result of failure to keep the hole full when withdrawing well equipment. Withdrawal of 
the drill string is referred to as a tripping operation. If the volume of the withdrawn equipment is not 
filled fast enough, a kick can result. If an influx occurs, the well pressure can be reduced even further 
as the reservoir fluids typically have a lower density than the mud. When a kick is detected, heavier 
mud must be circulated into the well in order to regain pressure control (Adams and Kuhlman, 1994). 
To avoid kicks, thorough well monitoring is necessary (Grace and Cudd, 2003). 
2.1.3 Release points 
Loss of well control can result in a blowout of several different scenarios. For one thing, the reservoir 
fluids flowing from the well can have several different release points. The most common release 
points are topside blowouts and subsea blowouts. At fixed platforms the wellhead and pressure 
control equipment is located at the platform above the sea surface. For such platforms a blowout will 
in most cases be a topside blowout, through the well head. A subsea well on the other hand has its 
wellhead on the seabed. Then the blowout can either be topside or subsea. For a subsea well, it is 
also possible for a topside blowout escalate into a subsea blowout. An example is the Macondo 
accident, where the entire rig sank and the riser was bent (McAndrews, 2011). If possible, the riser 
might be disconnected and the floating rig moved to a secure location. The well would then continue 
to flow at the seabed, rather than at the sea surface. It can be difficult to retrieve control over deep 
subsea wells, because of limited accessibility from the surface. There is limited experience with such 
events. Whether the oil is ignited or not is of great significance to the consequences. 
Underground blowouts can also occur, but these are less common. It can be a result of a failed 
casing, due to high pressures in the well. During an underground blowout the reservoir fluids will 
typically flow from a high pressure deep zone, to a more shallow formation of lower pressure. These 
blowouts do not necessarily reach the sea or the surface, but they can be difficult to get control over. 
If the blowout is not stopped it might eventually reach the surface (Holand, 2010). 
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2.1.4 Flow paths 
A blowout can flow through several different flow paths. The flow path of the blowout will partly 
depend on the equipment present in the well. If a drill string is present, the blowout can flow 
through annulus, the drill string or both. To be able to flow through the drill string, there would have 
to be an influx from the reservoir at the same time as the drill float valve fails. The drill string float 
valve is supposed to prevent back-flow of fluids into the drill pipe. This is also less likely since the drill 
string constantly is filled with mud. The annulus typically has much less resistance. Thus an annulus 
blowout is the predominant flow path, especially for topside blowouts (Holand, 2010). 
If the drill string has been withdrawn, the blowout would be an open hole blowout. This could be the 
case if an entire section has been drilled, where the drill pipe has been removed before setting and 
cementing of the casing. However, it is unlikely that such a blowout should occur if the mud weight is 
maintained. 
It is also possible to have a blowout outside the casing. This can occur if there is a failure of the 
cement or casing. Such a blowout will flow outside the casing wall and through the formations 
toward the surface. The fault tree above shows that if the casing or cement fails, the blowout cannot 
be stopped by a BOP because other constituents of the secondary barrier have failed. This is a more 
common flow path for subsea blowouts (Holand, 2010). 
2.1.5 Duration 
The duration of a potential blowout is among the most crucial factors regarding the amount of 
reservoir fluids released, and hence the degree of environmental damage. The blowout duration will 
be a function how long it takes to kill the well. Different killing mechanisms are discussed in appendix 
A. Some mechanisms are naturally occurring. Examples are natural depletion, coning and bridging. 
These occur as a result of pressure changes in the vicinity of the well bore. Other mechanisms are 
active measures which are initiated by crew. Examples of crew interventions are capping and relief 
well drilling. 
There are several factors and challenges that can complicate a killing operation. If the well is on fire, 
it might have to be extinguished to regain access. It might also be necessary to clear the debris 
before a killing operation can be initiated. At the same time, extinguishing the fire can lead to build-
up of flammable gases and H2S. For some cases, the blowout might even be ignited to avoid an 
explosion, or exposure to H2S. Fire and explosion can affect the time necessary to perform a killing 
operation, but will not be assessed in further detail here. 
Emergency preparedness is crucial if a blowout should occur. Keeping equipment for a killing 
operation available near the well can reduce the mobilization time. If drilling a relief well, a drilling rig 
will have to be mobilized. If deploying a capping device, the device and an appropriate lifting crane is 
necessary. Whether this equipment is available near the field or not, will have a great impact on the 
time it takes to perform the operation.  
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2.2 Risk 
Risk is defined as a combination of the probability of a specific hazardous event and the severity of 
the consequences of the event. The formula shown below can be used to calculate the risk 
quantitatively, by summing all potential accident sequences (Vinnem, 2007). 
( )
Accidents
i i
i
R p C   
Where: 
R = Risk 
p = Probability of an accident occurring 
C = Consequence of the accident 
i = Accident sequence 
Though it is not possible to completely eliminate risk, it is desirable to reduce it as much as possible. 
This is stated in the Framework Regulations (2010). The term ALARP (As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable) is often used when discussing whether a risk level is acceptable or not. The Framework 
Regulations state that the ALARP principle is required in order to reduce risk. The regulations also 
state that risk reduction shall follow the cost-benefit principle. The cost of risk mitigating measures 
must be carefully considered to find a balance in a cost-risk-benefit manner. The responsible party 
shall choose the technical, operational and organizational solutions that offer the best results 
provided the costs are not significantly disproportionate to the risk reduction achieved.  
2.2.1 Environmental risk assessment 
Environmental risk is potential threat that a specific activity poses to living organisms, populations, 
habitats, etc. This is commonly investigated by means of an environmental risk assessment. The 
different steps in an environmental risk assessment were shown schematically in Fig. 1. Fig. 6 
presents a more detailed overview of an ERA. The probability of a blowout must first be determined, 
and distributed between different scenarios. Flow rates and duration must be determined, and used 
as input to the oil drift forecasts. The oil drift simulations determine the area of influence by 
consideration of wind and current conditions at the release point. Data on vulnerable recourses is 
collected to determine the abundance in the area of influence. Consequently, the environmental 
damage and restitution time of exposed resources can be determined. 
An ERA includes the identification of risks, and evaluating these against the environmental risk 
acceptance criteria of the operator. It might also include examining and implementing risk reducing 
measures. Accordingly, it contains both risk analysis and management (Brude, 2007). Whether risk 
reducing measures should be implemented should be evaluated with respect to cost and benefits. If 
the risk constitutes more than 50 % of acceptance criteria, risk reducing measures should be 
considered. This is often referred to as the “ALARP region”. However, this region can vary from 
company to company (Brude, 2007). 
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Figure 6: Schematic overview of an environmental risk assessment process (Brandt et al., 2010). 
2.2.2 Acceptance criteria 
Acceptance criteria are used to define an acceptable level of risk. The Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate has issued a regulation related to risk analysis in the petroleum industry (The Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate, 1995). It states that the operator must define the acceptance criteria based 
on company environmental policy and goals, before performing a risk analysis. These criteria should 
comply with governmental regulations. When evaluated against the overall risk, they are used as a 
decision support in risk mitigating measures. 
According to the “Integrated Management Plan for the Lofoten-Barents Sea Area”, human 
intervention and activities should not harm the function, structure, productivity or dynamics of the 
ecosystem (The Ministry of the Environment, 2011). Common acceptance criteria for an 
environmental risk assessment are shown in Table 1 below (Aaserød et al., 2011). The degree of 
environmental damage is categorized in 4 different levels of severity, with respect to recovery time 
of the environmental resource. The acceptance criteria define the highest acceptable risk level for 
each of these categories. The criteria in Table 1 are used as basis for many operators, such as GDF 
Suez and Statoil (Bjørnbom et al., 2008, Aaserød et al., 2011). They are determined based on the 
policy: “The recovery time after environmental damage for the most vulnerable resource should be 
negligible compared to the expected time between such events” (Brude, 2007). A high environmental 
vulnerability will lead to a longer recovery time. To meet the acceptance criteria for a more 
vulnerable area, the risk per operation must be correspondingly lower. All of the given criteria must 
be met simultaneously. 
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Table 1: Environmental risk acceptance criteria for petroleum activity (Aaserød et al., 2011).  
Degree of 
environmental 
damage 
Recovery time Field specific 
risk per year 
Installation 
specific risk per 
year 
Operational 
specific risk per 
operation 
Minor  (< 1 year) < 2.0 × 10-2 < 1.0 × 10-2 < 1.0 × 10-3 
Moderate  (1-3 years) < 5.0 × 10-3 < 2.5 × 10-3 < 2.5 × 10-4 
Considerable  (3-10 years) < 2.0 × 10-3 < 1.0 × 10-3 < 1.0 × 10-4 
Severe  (>10 years) < 5.0 × 10-4 < 2.5 × 10-4 < 2.5 × 10-5 
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2.3 Petroleum activity in the Norwegian Barents Sea 
The Norwegian part of the Barents Sea was first opened for petroleum exploration in 1980. From 
1980 to 2001 a total of 61 exploration wells were drilled, and 21 discoveries were made. In 2001 
there was a sudden halt in the exploration activity, as the “Impact Assessment for Year-Round 
Petroleum-related Activity in the Lofoten-Barents Sea” was executed. In 2004 the Barents Sea was 
reopened for year-round petroleum production, with exceptions of areas considered especially 
vulnerable to oil spills (Hasle et al., 2009). These areas are shown in Fig. 7.  
 
Figure 7: Overview of geographical restrictions on petroleum activity on the NCS outside Northern Norway (Nyland et al., 
2011). 
The Snøhvit gas field was discovered in 1981, and given development permission by the Norwegian 
Government in 2002. The development was subject to political debate, both since the development 
was the first one in the Barents Sea and because the LNG facilities were powered by gas turbines. In 
2007 the first gas was piped from the subsea facilities offshore to the LNG processing plant onshore. 
The Goliat field was discovered in 2000 (Ulfsnes et al., 2010). When it starts producing in 2014 it will 
be the first oil producing field in the Barents Sea (Bjørnbom et al., 2010, Hasle et al., 2009). 
In 2011 several promising new discoveries were made in the Barents Sea. Among them are Norvarg, 
Skrugard and Havis. Statoil has described the Skrugard-Havis finding as a breakthrough in the Barents 
Sea and one of the most important events on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) during the past 
decade. This, even though the recent Johan Sverdrup discovery in the North Sea may contain as 
much as twelve times the reserves of Skrugard. These new discoveries lead to an increased optimism 
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in the North, which will have large implications on the development of infrastructure. It puts the 
Barents Sea region on the map as a future large scale energy basin (Offerdal, 2011). 
The maritime delimitation between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea and Arctic Sea have been 
subject to negotiation for roughly 40 years. In April 2010 an agreement was finally reached. The 
treaty was signed in Murmansk in September 2010, ratified in June 2011 in Oslo, and finally took 
effect at July 7th 2011. This allowed for cooperation and the possibility of opening the area for future 
petroleum exploration and production. If oil or gas deposits were to extend across the boundary line, 
the treaty specifies detailed rules and procedures aimed at ensuring their responsible and cost-
effective administration. The treaty divided the former disputed area into two roughly equal parts. 
The area is shown in Fig. 7 above by a grey dash line, while the new boundary is shown by the blue 
dash line representing the boundary line for the NCS. The NPD regards this new area as interesting 
with respect to petroleum discoveries. Hopes are raised by the fact that petroleum resources have 
been found both to the east and west of this area. Geological data in this area have been very 
limited. Seismic surveys are initiated by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate in the new Norwegian 
part of the Barents Sea. These were conducted from July 8th to September 13th 2011. The collection 
of seismic data is planned to continue the summer of 2012. This is assumed to provide sufficient 
information to be able to map hydrocarbon resources in the area (Nyland et al., 2011). A preliminary 
map of possible resources is shown in Fig. 8.  
 
Figure 8: Overview of Barents Sea geography, with possible findings in the former disputed area (Moe, 2011). 
When updating the “Integrated Management Plan for the Lofoten-Barents Sea Area”, it was decided 
to initiate an impact assessment for opening of the former disputed area in the Barents Sea South for 
petroleum activity (Ministry of the The Ministry of the Environment, 2011). One aim of this 
assessment is to award production licenses. The opening of this area for petroleum exploration and 
production will be up for discussion in the Parliament in the spring 2013 at the earliest (Nyland et al., 
2011). 
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2.4 Physical conditions 
Whether an accidental oil spill will be more serious in the Arctic region compared to further south, is 
a much discussed topic. The main differences in physical conditions include (Rekdal, 1987): 
- Proximity of the sea ice 
- Relatively frequent formations of polar lows 
- Risk of sea spray and atmospheric icing 
- Reduced visibility and long dark winters 
- Remoteness and limited infrastructure 
- Vulnerable marine and coastal environment 
These conditions might complicate different types of operations, or oil spill preparedness. In relation 
to environmental resources, the Barents Sea has a low species diversity. But these species have a 
high abundance, and the biomass production is high. Conditions such as oceanography and geology 
of the southeastern part of the Barents Sea are discussed briefly below. 
2.4.1 Oceanography 
There is no significant difference in wind, wave or current conditions in the Barents Sea, compared to 
further south on the NCS. But the wave height in the eastern Barents Sea, is significantly lower than 
in the west. The most prospective areas of the Barents Sea are located at water a depth of 200 - 400 
m. The seabed is characterized by a number of iceberg plough marks. However, certain areas are still 
relatively unexplored (Rekdal, 1987). 
The dominating currents along the coast are the North Atlantic Current and the Norwegian Coastal 
Current. The NAC splits in two at the entrance to the Barents Sea, one entering the Barents Sea and 
one continuing northwards. The NCC follows the Norwegian continental shelf northward along the 
coast (Hjermann et al., 2007).  
2.4.2 Geology 
There is little data available on geological structures and possible hydrocarbon resources in the 
southeastern part of the Norwegian Barents Sea. The NPD has commissioned collection of seismic 
data, which will be completed in 2012. Preliminary data indicate a predominance of gas in possible 
hydrocarbon traps. The bedrock beneath the Barents Sea is a complex mixture of sedimentary rocks 
deposited through the Mesozoic (251.0 – 65.5 Ma) and early Cenozoic era (65.5 – 2.6 Ma). The 
Mesozoic era can be further divided into the geological periods Triassic (250.0 – 200.0 Ma), Jurassic 
(200 – 145.5 Ma) and Cretaceous (145.5 – 65.0 Ma). Due to glacial periods in more recent time, the 
bedrock has been significantly eroded, and has experienced uplift (Faleide et al., 1993). 
Recoverable hydrocarbons are typically found in Jurassic or Triassic sediment layers. Jurassic layers 
are often characterized by good reservoir properties, with a high porosity and permeability. 
However, there is great uncertainty to whether Jurassic shale layers in this area are buried deep 
enough for oil maturation to take place. These structures have also been significantly eroded through 
glacial periods, thus any recoverable resources might have leaked out. Possible hydrocarbon 
reservoirs in this area are therefore believed to be contained in Triassic rocks or deeper layers. 
However, these structures typically have poorer reservoir quality. They are characterized by a low 
porosity and permeability. It is not uncommon for oil reservoirs to be trapped beneath a salt 
structure (pers. comm. Høy), as shown in Fig. 9. These structures might penetrate and deform 
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surrounding sediments, and form traps able to retain hydrocarbons (Dore, 1995). Gas is shown as a 
red column within the Triassic reservoirs, while oil are smaller green columns beneath the gas. 
 
Figure 9: Schematic representation of hydrocarbon reservoirs beneath a salt structure (Ramberg et al., 2008). 
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3. Methodology 
Today’s practice in ERAs varies greatly with respect to level of detail, handling of uncertainty, 
terminology, level of documentation and traceability. Different companies use different approaches. 
There is an increasing number of computer models available for determining risk related to a 
blowout. This is a result of increased focus on environmental concerns, especially as the oil industry 
is moving further north. There is an increased interest in such models, and more and more 
companies employ them in ERAs. 
Several different computer models have been applied in this thesis to predict the risk related to a 
blowout. This thesis emphasizes determination of blowout probability, flow rate and duration. It will 
also investigate the effect of these parameters on the overall environmental risk. It is desirable to be 
able to assess these parameters in a more mechanistic way, which is specific to each case analyzed. 
When performing environmental risk assessments, these are commonly based on statistics and 
experience data and not on conditions of the specific well or field in question. BlowFAM will be used 
to determine the blowout probability. BlowFlow is used to determine flow rate and duration. These 
models are both mechanistic, which means that they can determine the risk based on well specific 
conditions. OPERAto is used to determine the environmental risk based on input from these models, 
through a methodological study. This thesis will also evaluate how well these models can 
communicate with each other, where the main focus is on their ability to allow the uncertainty to 
propagate through the steps of an ERA.  
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3.1 BlowFAM 
The Blowout Frequency Assessment Model (BlowFAM) is a tool used to assess the blowout 
probability related to specific activities. If performing an ERA, it is necessary to determine the 
blowout probability. The different steps in an ERA are shown in Fig. 1, where BlowFAM constitutes 
the 1st part of the process. The computer tool was developed by Scandpower in 1995 in cooperation 
with several oil companies (Statoil, BP, etc). It is based on historical data from the SINTEF database. 
The historical blowout probability is adjusted through several steps by considering well configuration, 
reservoir characteristics, crew, procedures and equipment. A high number of risk elements are 
evaluated. It determines blowout probability for activities such as drilling, production and well 
interventions for a well or field. BlowFlow also presents well release and shallow gas probabilities. 
BlowFAM can be applied during the design phase of a platform, or for future well operations on 
existing units. This can help aid the identification of risk reducing measures prior to development.  
By defining specific flow rates for the different scenarios, BlowFAM can present duration and oil spill 
quantities. This will not be applied in this thesis as BlowFAM includes a higher number of scenarios, 
compared to BlowFlow. Thus, BlowFAM would require more detailed input on flow rate than what is 
supplied by BlowFlow. 
3.1.1 General information 
The general information includes the type and number of wells or operations. The possible activities 
are listed below. Drilling before the BOP is set refers to shallow drilling, where a possible blowout will 
lead to a shallow gas incident. Drilling after setting of the BOP refers to deep drilling. 
- Drilling before the BOP is set 
- Drilling after the BOP is set 
- Completion 
- Production 
- Workover 
- Wireline 
Drilling activity can further be categorized as exploration or developmental drilling. Whether the well 
is a HPHT or a normal well is crucial to the related risk, since a HPTH well involves a higher risk. A 
HPHT well typically has a small drilling window, which makes it difficult to maintain the appropriate 
mud density (see section 2.1.1). The well can contain either oil or gas. The installation can be 
classified as a floating, fixed or tension leg platform (TLP). This will result in a basic blowout 
probability specific for the type of well, fluid and installation. This is done by excluding irrelevant 
accidents based on input data. I.e. for a normal well, HPHT incidents can be excluded. 
3.1.2 Reservoir and well design 
Formation properties and well design are important contributors to the blowout probability. 
Implications of these factors can be assessed by evaluating different blowout causes. The blowout 
probability is divided between different blowout causes. The cause distribution from the SINTEF 
database is used as a starting point. This distribution is given in Table 12, as the historical fraction. 
Different reservoir and well characteristics will affect the chance of a specific blowout cause to occur. 
For instance, a narrow drilling window will increase the risk of annular losses. A range of parameters 
related to formation characteristics, pressure profiles and well design must be defined and entered in 
the model: 
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- Water depth 
- Well depth 
- Reservoir temperature 
- Pore pressure 
- Drilling window 
- Mud weight 
- Length of horizontal section 
- Height of drill floor above sea 
- Drill pipe diameter 
- Open hole diameter 
- Casing inner diameter 
- Gas/oil ratio (GOR) 
- Mud circulation rate 
- Seawater density 
The well must also be classified with regards to several other reservoir and well characteristics. This 
includes: 
- Risk related to drilling too deep 
- Well testing to be performed 
- Risk of drilling into neighboring wells 
- Gas cap above the oil 
- Reservoir segmentation 
- Reservoir productivity 
Some elements may be excluded if they are not applicable for the specific activity. If parameters are 
classified as normal or unknown, the risk level will be left unchanged. Otherwise, the classification of 
each of these parameters can either increase or reduce the risk. A high reservoir productivity will for 
example yield a higher risk. If the casing shoe is close to the reservoir, there is a risk of drilling too 
deep. The cap rock beneath the reservoir might have a higher pressure than the reservoir. If so, the 
mud weight can become too low, and a kick might result. A high reservoir segmentation indicates 
poor pressure communication between zones of the reservoir. If the communication is poor, this 
increases the chance of encountering an unexpected pressure zone. If gas is injected into the 
reservoir, this risk is especially high. 
The listed parameters are compared to the average well. Based on experience from blowout studies, 
the implication of different parameters on each blowout cause can be assessed. The sum of the 
historical cause distribution is equal to 1, per operational phase (drilling, production, etc.). When 
input is entered into the model, the cause distribution is adjusted according to algorithms built into 
the model. An adjustment is determined for each specific blowout cause. This adjustment is 
multiplied with the historical fraction of each cause (see Table 12). The sum of the adjusted cause 
contributions is equal to the adjustment factor. This is referred to as adjustment factor 1, and can 
either be higher or lower than 1. This factor is applied to the basic blowout probability. An 
adjustment factor greater than 1 yields a higher risk, and opposite. 
22 
3.1.3 Risk elements 
This is the main part of BlowFAM and comprises an evaluation of risk elements associated with 
equipment, crew and procedures. The database consists of more than 300 risk elements that 
contributes more or less to the blowout risk. These elements are distributed in several different 
categories (Dervo and Blom-Jensen, 2004), as listed below. Some of them are explained in further 
detail in Fig. 10.  
- Production 
- Wireline 
- Completion 
- Drilling management 
- Frame conditions 
- Operational procedures 
- Drilling 
- HPHT 
 
Figure 10: Sketch of elements contributing to the blowout risk (Dervo and Blom-Jensen, 2004). 
Which risk elements are relevant will depend on the activity. For deep zone operations elements 
related to shallow gas can be disregarded. If performing only drilling activity, production, wireline 
and completion can be disregarded and so on. Elements considered irrelevant for the specific well 
can be excluded, and set to not applicable. The user chooses which elements that are considered to 
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be applicable for the specific well or operation. All the applicable risk elements are then evaluated to 
determine whether they pose an increased or reduced risk. Risk elements that increase the risk are 
assigned a negative score, while risk reducing elements are assigned a positive score. Elements that 
are not considered to yield any change in risk compared to an average well are left unchanged. 
Guidance for each element is available in the tool to aid the evaluation process. All elements have a 
default value or a maximum score. If the maximum score is 3, the score can vary between -3 and 3. 
An explanation for the dedicated score should be given for each element. The implication of all the 
applicable elements on the blowout risk is calculated by the following formula, to find adjustment 
factor 2: 
                     
        
  
 
Where: 
∑X = Total number of applicable risk elements. 
∑W = Worse; added up score of all the risk elements contributing to an increased risk. 
∑B = Better; added up score of all the risk elements contributing to a reduced risk. 
These figures are given as absolute (positive) values. The adjustment factor will be a function of the 
total score of modified risk elements, as well as the total number of applicable risk elements. This 
means that the number of applicable elements will influence the relative importance of each 
element. If only a few elements are applicable for the activity, then a higher score for one of them 
will give a greater impact on the blowout probability than if there were many applicable elements. It 
is therefore important to exclude elements that are not applicable. The adjustment factor calculated 
from the formula above is applied to the basic blowout probability, resulting in a new probability for 
the specific well or activity.  
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3.2 BlowFlow 
Assessing blowout rate and duration is an important part of an environmental risk assessment (ERA). 
However, there is no standardized method for calculations of these values which can easily be 
communicated and compared between different parties. BlowFlow is a tool that evaluates blowout 
scenarios by enabling a risk-based quantification of blowout rates and duration. It allows for 
comparing of results from field to field, as well as communication among geologists, drilling- and HSE 
engineers (Arild et al., 2008). It is developed by IRIS and builds on the OLF guidelines for calculation 
of flow rates and duration for use in environmental risk assessment (Nilsen et al., 2004). The 
different steps in an ERA are shown in Fig. 1, where the BlowFlow model constitutes the 2nd part of 
the process.  
The model uses a wide range of defined blowout scenarios as a basis for the analysis. The sequence 
of events following a blowout is described in a probabilistic manner, where the uncertainty related to 
the blowout rate, duration and volume is described by means of probability distributions. The 
BlowFlow model constitutes three different phases; determining input parameters, computer 
modeling and evaluating the result (output) (Arild et al., 2008). The three processes are represented 
in Fig. 11, and discussed in further detail below. 
 
Figure 11: BlowFlow work process (Arild et al., 2008). 
The first phase of the work process is finding and determining accurate input parameters, which is 
the most time-consuming part of the analysis. Here, parameters such as well geometry, reservoir 
parameters, killing mechanisms and probabilities of different blowout scenarios must be assessed. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the different input parameter categories. These data must be carefully 
considered to achieve as accurate results as possible. Blowout killing mechanisms can be a result of 
natural processes or human intervention. Pre-defined mechanisms covered by the model are 
capping, coning, bridging and relief well drilling. 
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Table 2: Input parameter categories (Arild et al., 2008). 
Category Sub-category Input parameters related to 
Reservoir input Fluid Type of fluid 
Impurities 
Temperature 
GOR 
Gravity 
Influx data Permeability 
Skin 
Well location 
Well design Platform Depth references 
Wellhead 
Architecture Riser 
BOP 
Casings 
Open hole section 
Drill string Drill string run 
Drill string description 
Drill string element description 
Survey Trajectory 
Duration Active measures Capping 
Relief well Relief well 
Bridging Bridging 
Natural cessation Coning 
Scenario Release point Topside probabilities 
Subsea probabilities 
Scenario Flow path 
Penetration depth 
BOP opening 
 
Each input category will not be discussed in further detail here, due to the large amounts of input. 
Parameters with high uncertainty can be presented by means of probability distributions. The 
different distributions available in the model are depicted in section 3.2.1, and further described in 
appendix B. PVT models and multiphase flow correlations are models within BlowFlow used to 
calculate PVT data and predict multiphase flow in wells. They are discussed further in section 3.2.2 
and 3.2.3, respectively. 
After entering all input, it is simply a matter of clicking “run”. A pre-defined number of blowout 
scenarios are simulated, and what happens in each scenario is recorded. The number of simulations 
can be chosen depending on the required accuracy. 10 000 simulations is considered to be sufficient 
in most cases. Such a large number of simulated scenarios are often referred to as a Monte Carlo 
simulation. The Monte Carlo simulation combined with a fast steady-state solver for the calculations, 
is the underlying engine for propagating uncertainty in input parameters to the end results in 
BlowFlow. Flow rates are determined by pre-generating IPR and VLP curves, and interpolating 
between these curves. Interpolation gives more accurate results, but can only be used for single 
reservoir zone cases. IPR and VLP curves are explained further in section 3.2.4. 
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3.2.1 Probability distributions 
Parameters with high uncertainty, such as reservoir pressure, should be presented by means of 
probability distribution. Uncertainty can then be expressed on a relatively detailed level, thereby 
easing the probability assessment process. These uncertainties will propagate and be reflected in the 
final results of BlowFlow. There are a number of different distributions available in the model for 
uncertain input values. These distributions are depicted in Fig. 12. Each distribution described in 
further detail in appendix B. 
 
Figure 12: Sketches of single value, uniform, triangular, piecewise linear, discrete, generic, Gaussian, exponential, 
Weibull, trapezium and tailed triangular distributions, respectively, from BlowFlow. 
3.2.2 PVT models 
Reservoir fluids expand as they leave the reservoir, and approach the surface. Both pressure and 
temperature will typically decrease, while the volume increases. Parameters related to pressure, 
volume and temperature (PVT) must be determined, to be able to predict flow rate. Ideally, PVT 
properties are measured experimentally in the laboratory. When such direct measurements are not 
possible, these physical properties can be estimated from a PVT correlation from literature. There 
are a number of available PVT correlations (Zahaby et al., 2012). In BlowFlow, such PVT correlations 
are used to predict several different properties of the well fluid. These properties are bubble point 
pressure (Pb), solution gas-oil ratio (Rs), oil formation volume factor (Bo), oil viscosity (µo) and gas 
viscosity (µg). Six correlations are included in BlowFlow, and these will be further described in 
appendix C, along with definitions of relevant PVT properties.  
The accuracy of the results will depend on using each correlation within the specified range of 
applicability. Thus, which model should be used will depend on reservoir and fluid properties such as 
temperature, gravity and pressure. The gathering of data used to develop the PVT models should be 
performed in an area similar to the area in question. 
3.2.3 Multiphase flow 
It presents a challenge to accurately determine pressure drops and flow patterns of multiphase flow 
in wells. The well stream from an oil well typically contains oil, gas and water. There are a number of 
models or correlations available to predict multiphase flow and pressure profiles in the wellbore. 4 
such models are included in the BlowFlow. The applicability of these models depend on several 
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factors such as tubing diameter, inclination, oil gravity, gas-liquid ratio and water content (Pucknell et 
al., 1993). The 4 available models are discussed briefly in appendix D. 
3.2.4 Reservoir productivity 
Productivity index (PI) is a mathematical means of expressing the ability of a reservoir to produce 
fluids to the wellbore. It is given in m3/bar∙d, which means volumetric flow (qo) per drawdown 
pressure. The drawdown pressure is the difference between the reservoir pressure (Pr) and the 
flowing bottomhole pressure (Pwf). This relation is expressed in the formula below. The productivity 
will depend on reservoir parameters, but also on the degree of formation damage (skin) in vicinity of 
the wellbore. If the formation has been severely damaged during drilling, this can result in a lower 
productivity.  
   
  
        
 
The BlowFlow tool has 4 different models available for the determination of the productivity index: 
- Oil – Basic 
- Oil – Fractured well 
- Gas – Deliverability 
- Explicit 
The different methods are applicable for different types of fluids and reservoir characteristics. The 
explicit method involves entering the reservoir productivity directly, without calculation. The other 
methods use different reservoir parameters to calculate the productivity. The calculations will not be 
explained in further detail. 
The inflow performance relationship (IPR) expresses the flow rate into the well as a function of 
flowing bottomhole pressure. It is a function of the mean values for productivity index, pressure, 
thickness (net pay) and bubble point pressure. IPR curves are necessary to predict the flow rate of a 
potential blowout, and are therefore a crucial part of BlowFlow. Based on input data, the tool 
constructs IPR curves for three different reservoir penetration depths; 5 m, 50 % and 100 %.  As the 
penetration depth increases more of the reservoir is exposed, which leads to an increased flow rate 
to the wellbore. Since the IPR curve is a function of the bottomhole pressure, it is independent on 
flow path or release point (Liao and Stein, 2002). 
The vertical lift performance (VLP) is the ability of a well to produce fluids at a given bottom hole 
pressure. A VLP curve is often constructed to predict the pressure drop of the well. The pressure 
drop is caused by several different factors, such as hydrostatic and frictional pressure loss as the fluid 
flow up the well bore. The VLP curve will vary with different release points and flow paths. This is 
because it depends on friction and vertical distance. It also depends on the gas-liquid ratio (GLR), as 
high amounts of gas tend to change the flow regime and generally increase flow. 
The IPR and VLP curves are constructed to determine the flow rate of a well. One can say that the IPR 
curve represents well inflow (from reservoir to the bottom of the well), while the VLP curve 
represent well outflow (from the bottom of the well to the release point). The intersection point 
between the IPR and VLP curve represents an equilibrium condition, which determines the actual 
flow rate (Liao and Stein, 2002). This relation can be seen in section 6.4.1. 
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3.3 OPERAto 
OPERAto (Operational Environmental Risk Analysis tool) is a computer based tool developed by DNV 
to assess the blowout risk related to a specific activity. It is an excel worksheet that presents 
environmental risk based on input from the customer. Fig. 13 presents the chain of events embedded 
in OPERAto. For simplicity, the uncertainty is presented as normal distributions. The environmental 
risk is determined by assessing the consequences of a blowout to valued ecosystem components 
(VECs). The risk is compared to acceptance criteria for several different severity levels. Each severity 
has a given restitution time. OPERAto can be used for a range of activities such as drilling, 
completion, workover, wireline, production and water injection.  
 
Figure 13: Propagation of uncertainty in the chain of events of an ERA (Nilsen et al., 2004). 
The tool is also able to quantify effects of risk reducing measures. This can be done by varying input 
such as blowout probability, flow rate or duration, and observing the effect this has on the overall 
environmental risk. It can also include consequence mitigating measures, such as oil spill 
preparedness (Brandt et al., 2010). Oil spill preparedness will not be considered here as probability, 
flow rate and duration is in focus.  
The worksheet used in this thesis based on Statoil’s field, Norne. Since input data are specific for the 
Norne field, the resulting risk level will not reflect the correct environmental risk for the former 
disputed area. The objective is to investigate the compatibility between different computer models, 
and investigate the environmental risk on a relative level. OPERAto’s ability to reflect uncertainty is 
the main focus. 
3.3.1 Flow rate and duration 
A number of flow rates and duration are determined as a result of calculations performed by Statoil, 
for the Norne field. The 7 different rates and 6 different durations used in the simulations are 
presented in Table 3. The flow rate and duration can be distributed between these values for each 
considered activity (drilling, production, etc.). 
Table 3: Flow rates and duration used in the OPERAto simulations. 
Flow rates (m3/d) Durations (days) 
200 0.5 
600 2.0 
1 200 5.0 
2 300 14.0 
5 000 28.0 
8 000 84.0 
12 000 
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 3.3.2 Oil drift simulation 
OPERAto includes data from oil drift simulations. It is assumed that the gas evaporates, and does not 
contribute to any particular damage to seabirds. When constructing the specific worksheet for the 
Norne field, OS3D was employed to calculate the oil drift simulations. The influence area is a function 
of several factors: 
- Flow rate 
- Duration 
- Oil type 
- Wind and current systems 
- Release point 
- The season in which the activity is carried out 
The released volume is a function of the flow rate and duration. The oil gravity and composition will 
determine how the oil spill dissipates. These factors, as well as wind and currents systems will be of 
great importance to oil drift. Wind and current patterns will vary throughout the year, depending on 
the season. Whether the oil is released at the sea surface or seabed will also be of relevance. Based 
on this, OS3D determines the area of influence.  The open sea influence area is presented as a 
probability function. It is given by the total number of grid cells (10 x 10 km) with ≥ 5 % probability of 
being hit by ≥ 1 ton of oil. The area is divided into several probability ranges. For beach exposure, it 
presents the time of beaching and amount of stranded oil, both as probability functions. 
3.3.3 Environmental risk 
The extent of damage is determined as a function the environmental resources present in the area of 
influence. Environmental data from the Norne field is collected and entered into OPERAto. For this 
field, seabirds are considered the most valued ecosystem components (VECs). Based on the 
environmental data, a given number of seabirds are assumed to be present in the influence area. The 
number of seabirds present will vary with different seasons. The oil type, amount of oil, and number 
of individuals present in the habitat determines how many seabirds that will be harmed or die from 
the exposure. The extent of damage is determined for 3 different habitats: open sea, coastal and 
beach. 
The restitution time of a seabird population will depend on the number of harmed/killed individuals, 
as well as the population dynamic. The severity of an incident is characterized according to 
installation specific acceptance criteria, based on the restitution time. As can be seen from Table 1, 
an incident with a restitution time of less than a year is characterized as minor. A restitution time of 1 
– 3 years is characterized as moderate, 3 – 10 years as considerable and more than 10 years as 
severe. The environmental risk is presented as a percentage of the  acceptance criteria, for each of 
these severity levels. 
The risk is also presented as an environmental risk index. This index is a function of the percentages 
in each severity level. It is calculated as follows: 
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The more severe categories are weighted more as they have greater environmental consequences. 
Since it gives on absolute number, rather than 4 percentages, it can be a good means of comparison. 
This index is often used to compare the risk from case to case or field to field. 
3.3.4 Variable input of OPERAto 
The OPERAto worksheet is constructed based on the simulation results from the Norne field. Results 
from the oil drift simulations and collection of data on environmental resources are included in the 
model as basis for the calculations. These parameters therefore cannot be altered in the OPERAto 
worksheet. However, probabilistic data and activity level can still be defined by the user. 
The blowout probability must be established for each type activity. The release point distribution 
must also be specified, with given probabilities for both subsea and topside blowouts. The activity 
level is set by means of number of operations or wells per season. The activity can also last through 
several seasons. An activity can be excluded if it is not relevant for the assessment.  
Flow rate and duration is presented as probability distributions, where each flow rate and duration 
have a given probability. Since oil drift simulations have been performed based on given rates and 
durations, these cannot be altered. However, the probability distribution between these given values 
can be changed. The distributions for flow rate and duration can be different for a subsea scenario 
than for a topside scenario. However, OPERAto does not distinguish between different flow paths. 
  
31 
4. Case study 
This thesis will determine the blowout risk related to exploration drilling in the former disputed area 
in the southeastern part of the Norwegian Barents Sea. This is done in a probabilistic and well 
specific manner, where uncertainty is emphasized. Ideally the probabilistic elements should be 
reflected in each step of an ERA, following the calculations of flow rate and duration, as illustrated in 
Fig. 1. A high level of detail is important to provide a good basis for making sound risk management 
decisions. This thesis will investigate the ability of available computer modeling tools to allow the 
uncertainty to propagate through an ERA. Their ability to manage risk and work as a decision support 
tools will be investigated. 
There is an increasing number of computer models available for determining the risk related to a 
blowout. As a means of assessing the risk related to a blowout, a variety of computer models have 
been employed. These all have different purposes, and will here be used together to yield the final 
results. All these models are developed by different suppliers, and therefore might have limited 
compatibility. Results from one model might be used as input in another. This might present a 
problem if the results from one model are presented as a probability distribution, while another 
model needs a deterministic value as input. In such cases the level of detail might have to be 
comprised. This study will investigate the ability of these models to allow the uncertainty to 
propagated through the chain of events/models. 
Some of these models have the possibility to assess which parameters contribute most to the risk. By 
altering input parameters, the effects on the end results can be observed. Thus, these models might 
serve as a tool to determine risk reducing measures. Some of the models present the results as 
deterministic values, while others present probability distributions. The compatibility of the results 
will be investigated, and the effect of using deterministic values instead of probabilistic is observed. 
The main objective of this thesis is to examine how the uncertainty propagates through the chain in 
the different approaches taken. 
There are several different types of wells, which might pose a risk of a blowout. These wells can be 
drilled for developmental or exploration purposes. Developmental drilling is performed to produce 
recoverable hydrocarbons through a production well. Exploration wells are drilled for exploratory 
purposes, to collect information in a new area. There are several different types of exploration wells. 
A wildcat well is drilled to find out whether a prospect, where seismic surveys have indicated a 
presence of recoverable hydrocarbon resources, contains oil or gas. It is drilled outside of, and not in 
the vicinity of any known fields. An appraisal well on the other hand, is drilled to determine the 
extent and size of a petroleum deposit that has already been discovered by a wildcat well. This is the 
NPD’s definition and may not apply everywhere (The Norwegian Petreoleum Directorate, 2012). 
When determining blowout frequencies, wildcat and appraisal wells will for simplicity not be 
distinguished between. They will simply be referred to as exploration wells. 
According to historical data, exploration wells involve a greater blowout risk than production wells 
(Haugsvold, 2011, Holand, 2010). This is mainly due to the fact that there is more uncertainty with 
respect to pressure profiles and possible hydrocarbon traps for an exploration well. When a 
developmental well is drilled, both a wildcat and an appraisal well have usually been drilled 
beforehand to collect information. The blowout risk for an exploration well will be assessed in this 
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study. Since the former disputed area have not yet been opened for petroleum activity, and no wells 
have been drilled to date, an exploration well will be the first type of well to be drilled. 
The exploration well of the case study will be drilled from a semisubmersible drilling rig. Thus, the 
well will be a subsea well. There are several winterized rigs available for such activity. Transocean 
Arctic is an example of a semi-submersible drilling rig capable of drilling in harsh environments, and 
water depths up to 500 meters. This rig was used for drilling the first exploration well at the Goliat 
field. It can withstand the wave heights up to 32 m (pers. comm. Holen). Because a blowout from 
deep drilling (after setting of the BOP) is the most environmentally harmful (see section 2.1), this is 
chosen as the study objective. Both shallow gas and well release will be disregarded as they have 
limited environmental consequences for a single incident compared to a blowout from deep drilling. 
It has been questioned whether the former disputed area is merely a gas province, or if it also 
contains recoverable oil reserves. The NPD has recently collected large amounts of seismic data 
within this area. The seismic acquisitions will supposedly be continued in the summer of 2012. These 
data have yet to be processed, thus there is still insufficient information available to be able to 
predict possible hydrocarbon traps. However, preliminary data have indicated that there might be 
several fields containing oil, though gas discoveries are most likely. Possible oil and gas reservoirs are 
shown in Fig. 8. This risk assessment is based on a blowout release point located, according to this 
map, at coordinates 73.4 ᵒN 34.1 ᵒE. From Fig. 8 this point can be seen as the largest green dot, 
representing an oil field. It located is approximately 300 km from shore. 
There is little knowledge available about the geology and reservoir conditions in the area. Thus, data 
have to some degree been based on assumptions. However, these assumptions have been discussed 
with several experts to be able to predict conditions as accurately as possible. According to senior 
geologist Tore Høy at the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, a possible oil reservoir in this region is 
believed to be relatively shallow with poor reservoir conditions. The Barents Sea is generally 
recognized by its low pressures. This low pressure and the poor reservoir quality will result in a less 
productive reservoir, accompanied by a lower risk (pers. comm. Høy).  
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5. Blowout probability 
There are number of approaches commonly used for determining the blowout probability related to 
drilling. Many are based on historical data from the SINTEF database and Scandpower report. 
Blowout probabilities from this historical data may be applied directly in a quantitative analysis, 
without further adjustments. But this approach presents and average blowout probability and does 
not consider recent technological and operational improvements. The most commonly used method 
in the industry today is a statistical approach that evaluates recent improvements to assess whether 
the basic blowout probability can be reduced. This can include evaluating recent kick statistics, BOP 
reliability or other technological or operational improvements. A typical blowout probability 
assessment process is shown in Fig. 14. 
 
Figure 14: Schematic overview of the evaluation of risk reduction (Brandt et al., 2010). 
A statistical approach is applied in this thesis that attempts to adjust the basic blowout probability to 
reflect recent improvements. Due to time restrictions and limited availability of reliable information, 
technological or operational advances have not been given any credit here. However, this method 
will incorporate an evaluation of recent trends in kick statistics. Since a kick is often the initiating 
event of a blowout, a reduced kick frequency is considered to reduce the blowout probability.  
BlowFAM is a blowout frequency assessment model developed by Scandpower in close cooperation 
with drilling and well engineers from several oil companies. This is also based on statistics, but takes 
well specific conditions into consideration. This includes equipment, well configuration, operating 
procedures, planning/organization and formation properties. However, this model requires an 
understanding of risk elements, as well as competence in drilling and completion, to obtain detailed 
input data and accurate results (Dervo and Blom-Jensen, 2004). This tool can also aid the risk 
management process by identifying possible risk reducing measures. These are preventive measures 
that can reduce the probability of a blowout occurring. 
The blowout probability can be distributed for different blowout scenarios. Both subsea and topside 
releases are possible for a subsea well. In addition these release points can be further divided into 
different flow paths. 
The ability of both these approaches to reflect conditions of the specific well in question will be 
assessed. Limitations and advantages of each will also be discussed, along with their (in)ability to 
reflect uncertainty. 
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5.1 Statistical approach 
This statistical approach is based on historical data from the SINTEF database and Scandpower 
report. Technological and operational improvements will not be quantified in this approach, due to 
both time restrictions and the limited availability of reliable data. However, recent trends in kick 
statistics will be taken into consideration, to assess whether this can yield a reduced blowout 
probability. The kick frequency is directly related to the ability to control the primary barrier. Thus, 
improved mud control will manifest itself in the kick frequency. 
5.1.1 SINTEF Offshore Blowout Database 
The SINTEF database publishes historical data on blowout and well release frequencies annually. Per 
December 2010 the SINTEF database includes information on 584 offshore blowouts and well 
releases that have occurred world-wide since 1955. It contains 51 different fields describing each 
blowout and well release. The fields are categorized in six different groups (Holand, 2010): 
- Category and location 
- Well description 
- Present operation 
- Blowout causes 
- Blowout characteristics 
- Other 
The database also includes drilling and production exposure data from various areas, as shown in 
Table 4. 
Table 4: Overview of exposure data included in the SINTEF database (Holand, 2010). 
Country Drilling exposure data Production exposure data 
Norway Yes Yes 
United Kingdom  Yes Yes 
US GoM OCS Yes Yes 
The Netherlands Yes No 
Canada East Coast Yes No 
Australia Yes No 
US Pacific Yes Yes 
Denmark Yes No 
 
With the SINTEF database as a basis, relevant and irrelevant accidents are evaluated. For risk analysis 
on the NCS, only incidents from the deep-water areas in the US Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental 
Shelf (US GoM OCS), the Netherlands, the NCS and British Continental Shelf (UKCS) are considered. 
This is because in these areas, North Sea standards are required, which means that two well barriers 
must be present during all drilling operations. Thus, only incidents reported in these areas are 
considered. The SINTEF database is searchable with respect to different fields and criteria. Based on 
an evaluation of relevant incidents, the blowout probability can be found.  
5.1.2 Scandpower report 
Scandpower annually releases a report presenting blowout and well release probabilities based on 
the records in the SINTEF database. The latest report presents frequencies based on data from the 
areas of US GoM OCS, Canada East Continental Shelf (CECS) and the North Sea (British, Dutch and 
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Norwegian sector) in the period of 01.01.89 – 31.12.08. All these areas fulfill the North Sea standard 
requirements. Thus, Scandpower report is widely used by the industry when performing risk 
assessment on the NCS. An overview of blowout probabilities for exploration drilling collected from 
the Scandpower report is shown in Table 5. It represent average probabilities from 1989 to 2009, 
which can be used as basis values for risk assessments of well operations of North Sea standards. 
Table 5: Summary of blowout and well release probabilities (Haugsvold, 2011). 
Operation Probability, 
average well 
Probability, 
gas well 
Probability, 
oil well 
Unit 
Exploration drilling, 
deep (normal wells) 
1.12 × 10-4 1.02 × 10-4 1.23 × 10-4 Per well 
Exploration drilling, 
deep (HPHT) 
6.92 × 10-4 6.32 × 10-4 7.65 × 10-4 Per well 
 
These numbers will be used as basis when determining blowout probability of the well in question. 
As can be seen from Table 5, the risk related to HPHT wells is significantly higher than for a normal 
well. The geology in the Barents Sea indicates reservoirs with pressure and temperature well within 
the limits of a normal reservoir. This has been supported by more than 80 drilled wells so far (Brandt 
et al., 2010). It is therefore unlikely to find HPHT reservoirs in this area. Based on the table, the basic 
probability for an oil blowout from an exploration well with normal reservoir pressure and 
temperature is 1.23 · 10-4 per well drilled (Haugsvold, 2011). That is equal to one blowout per 8 130 
drilled wells. 
Both well characteristics and technical solutions will affect the blowout probability related to drilling 
of an exploration well. The type and reliability of the applied technology is detrimental, as well as the 
number of safety barriers. One of the most important improvements over the last decade is the 
increased ability to control the primary barrier. The BOP reliability has also been significantly 
improved in recent years. Most of these improvements are difficult to quantify for a hypothetical 
situation. It is obvious that better contingency planning, more knowledge and awareness, higher BOP 
reliability, etc. has had a significant impact on blowout probability. Such recent improvements are 
not reflected in historical data. There is little reliable information about what kind of effects these 
improvements have had on the blowout probability. A thorough evaluation of these factors would 
also be time-consuming, and due to the limitations of this thesis these factors will not be given any 
attention in this approach. 
5.1.3 Kick statistics 
In this example the only improvement that will be quantified in the blowout probability assessment 
is the kick frequency. There is a clear correlation between the kick frequency and the probability of a 
blowout. A kick will usually be the initial trigger that potentially can result in a blowout. Several of 
the previously mentioned technological advances has directly manifested itself in the kick frequency. 
Some examples are better control of the primary barrier and more up-front information about e.g. 
pore pressure. The reduced kick frequency can here be justified based on available data. Despite 
more difficult drilling operations, such as deepwater drilling and HPHT wells, the kick frequency has 
been significantly reduced in the last decade (Brandt et al., 2010). 
According to SINTEF’s report “Deepwater kicks and BOP performance”, the average kick frequency of 
an exploration well in the North Sea was approximately 25 kicks per 100 in the period 1984 - 1996 
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(Holand and Skalle, 2001, p. 22). This frequency includes both normal and HPHT wells. As discussed 
earlier, the kick frequency is significantly lower for a normal well than a HPHT well. This is evident in 
the historical data on kick frequencies (Holand and Skalle, 2001). HPHT wells typically have a much 
smaller drilling window than normal wells (see section 2.1.1). If the drilling window is less than 0.12 
SG, which is the case for HPHT wells, there is a high risk of both well influx and reservoir fracture. The 
well in question is within the normal range. 
There is a considerable amount of data on kick frequencies collected each year. As mentioned, recent 
kick statistics show a much reduced kick frequency. The Petroleum Safety Authority’s (PSA) annual 
report on “Risk level in the petroleum activity” present the number of well control incidents (kicks) 
per year. It analyzes incidents that possibly could have lead to a blowout if the secondary barrier 
were to fail. The latest report include frequencies from 1996 – 2010 for both exploration and 
production wells (Årstad et al., 2011, p. 60). The kick frequency from 1996 - 2010 for exploration 
drilling is presented as a bar chart in Fig. 15. The average value for 1984 - 1996 is also included 
(Holand and Skalle, 2001). Despite more complex drilling operations in later years, the trend of the 
diagram indicates a reduced kick frequency. However, the kick frequency increased in 2010 
compared to previous years. As for the SINTEF report, these recent kick frequencies comprise both 
HPHT and normal wells. As both reports are based on same type of wells, the frequencies are 
assumed to be comparable.  
 
Figure 15: Well incidents for exploration drilling 1996 – 2010  (Årstad et al., 2011, Holand and Skalle, 2001). 
5.1.4 Results 
The average kick frequency over the past 15 years is approximately 15.3 per 100 drilled wells. This 
can be seen from the diagram shown above. In this assessment, a frequency of 20 kicks per 100 
exploration wells drilled will be used as a slightly conservative approximation. It is also taken into 
consideration that the kick frequency in 2010 was 20 kicks per 100 exploration wells drilled (see 
above). 15 is only a mean value, and using this could yield and underestimated risk. Still, the kick 
frequency has been reduced from 25 to 20 kicks per 100 exploration wells drilled, which is a 20 % 
reduction. It is assumed that the kick frequency will be directly correlated to the blowout probability. 
Thus, the 20 % reduction in kick frequency can be directly applied to the generic blowout probability 
found from the Scandpower report. Since kick frequency is the only factor quantified in this study, 
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this yields a 20 % reduction in blowout probability. The modified blowout probability becomes 9.84 × 
10-5. The basic and modified probabilities are summarized in Table 6. 
Table 6: Summary of resulting blowout probabilities. 
Basis Blowout probability 
Scandpower data 1.23 × 10-4 
Modified kick statistics 9.84 × 10-5 
 
The modified blowout probability does not involve a considerable risk reduction. If an evaluation of 
BOP reliability, technology, human and organizational factors were conducted, the risk could 
potentially have been reduced even further. 
5.1.5 Scenarios 
Historical data can also be used to find release point and flow path distributions. Table 7 presents 
historical data on release points and flow paths for deep exploration drilling, collected from the 
SINTEF database. These data are based on blowout data from US GoM OCS, UKCS and NCS in the 
period 1980-2008. The SINTEF data does not include open hole as a possible flow path (Holand, 2010, 
p. 27). As the study objective is a subsea well, releases from the wellhead or BOP have in Table 7 
been categorized as subsea incidents. The data have been converted to express probability 
distributions rather than number of incidents. The BlowFlow tool used to calculate flow rate and 
duration does not include all the flow paths from the historical data. Therefore, the flow paths inside 
drill string and inside test tubing are merged into one category in the below table. This is also done 
for the flow paths annulus and outer annulus. This is seen as reasonable, since these flow paths are 
closely related. 
Table 7: Flow path and release point distribution for exploration drilling  (Holand, 2010, p. 27). 
Flow path Release point 
Subsea Topside 
Outside casing 26.1 % 4.3 % 
Annulus 52.2 % 8.7 % 
Inside drill string 0.0 % 8.7 % 
Total 78.3 % 21.7 % 
 
Table 8 presents historical data on release points, flow paths and flow restrictions for subsea wells, 
collected from the Scandpower report. It is based on blowout data from the US GoM OCS and NCS in 
the period 1980 - 2008. Because this database is collected from a slightly different area, it might 
contain fewer blowout incidents. The Scandpower data does not differentiate between exploration 
and developmental drilling (Haugsvold, 2011, p. 44-45). The data in Table 8 are converted to express 
a probability distribution rather than frequencies. 
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Table 8: Flow path and release point distribution for drilling activity for floaters (Haugsvold, 2011, p. 44-45). 
Flow path Subsea Topside 
Fully open 
BOP 
Partially closed 
BOP 
Fully open 
BOP 
Partially closed 
BOP 
Outside casing 22.3 % 4.9 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 
Annulus 17.4 % 35.8 % 4.9 % 4.9 % 
Open hole 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 4.9 % 
Inside drill string 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 4.9 % 
Total 39.7 % 40.7 % 4.9 % 14.7 % 
80.4 % 19.6 % 
 
Based on these historical data, it is concluded to use a release point distribution with a 80 % chance 
of a subsea blowout, and 20 % chance of a topside blowout. This distribution corresponds well to 
both tables, and is listed in Table 9 below. 
As can be seen from Table 7 and 8, there is a considerable difference in the flow path distribution 
depending on whether the release point is subsea or topside. For subsea blowouts, a considerable 
amount of blowout data is related to flow at the outside of the casing. However, this flow path is not 
included in BlowFlow, and will therefore be excluded from the flow path distribution. Thus, incidents 
related to flow outside the casing are instead considered to flow through annulus. There is no subsea 
blowout data related to flow through the drill string or open hole. This leaves annulus flow as the 
only possible flow path. Consequently, subsea blowout will have a 100 % chance of flow through 
annulus. This yields an overall probability of 80 % of a subsea annulus blowout, as shown in Table 9. 
Table 7 and 8 indicate that all the different flow paths are possible for a topside blowout. Here, there 
are some deviations between the SINTEF and Scandpower data. The flow paths included will be the 
ones included in BlowFlow. These are drill string, annulus and open hole. Since the SINTEF data does 
not include flow through open hole, the Scandpower data have received most focus. An evaluation of 
the historical data has resulted in a flow path distribution as shown in Table 9. The scenario 
distributions found here will be used as input in BlowFlow. Table 8 also includes data on BOP opening 
distribution, which will be further discussed in section 6.2.4. 
Table 9: Flow path and release point distribution as input to BlowFlow. 
Release point Distribution Flow Path Distribution 
Topside  
20 % 
Drill string blowout 5 % 
Annulus blowout 10 % 
Open hole blowout 5 % 
Subsea  
80 % 
Drill string blowout 0 % 
Annulus blowout 80 % 
Open hole blowout 0 % 
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5.2 BlowFAM 
BlowFAM is used to determine the blowout probability related to a specific activity. This can be done 
for several different operations such as drilling, completion, production, workover or wireline. 
BlowFAM differs from the more traditional statistic approach in several ways. The basic frequency 
can here be modified by defining well configuration and reservoir parameters, and evaluating a wide 
range of risk elements. This tool can also easily be used as a risk reduction tool, by identifying risk 
reducing measures from the list of risk elements. Consequently it can be used as decision support in 
risk management. 
5.2.1 General information 
The study objective is, as described in chapter 4, a single exploration well drilled from a 
semisubmersible rig. It can therefore be characterized as a floating platform. When drilling before 
setting of the BOP, there is a chance that shallow gas can be encountered. However, shallow gas will 
be disregarded in this assessment (see section 2.1). The objective is to determine the blowout 
probability related to deep exploration drilling. Thus, activities such as completion, production, 
workover and wireline operations will also be disregarded.  
The reservoir of this case study is assumed to contain oil, with an adjacent gas cap. As mentioned, it 
might look like this area is mainly a gas province. But there is also a chance that oil reservoirs can be 
found. Since an oil blowout is most detrimental to the environment, and thus of most concern, it is 
chosen as the study objective. Oilfields with adjacent gas caps are common in the western parts of 
the Barents Sea, and are assumed possible also in the east. These decisions are based on 
recommendations from Tore Høy (pers. comm. Høy). The reservoir is assumed to have pressures and 
temperatures well within the normal range. Thus, the well is not HPHT. The well classifications can be 
summarized as follows: 
- Exploration well 
- Oil well 
- Floating platform 
- Not HPHT well 
This information has resulted in a basic blowout frequency of 2.1 × 10-4. The Scandpower report 
yields a basic blowout frequency of 1.23 × 10-4 for an exploratory oil well. This deviation is caused 
lack of updated statistics in BlowFAM. This inconsistency will be further discussed in section 5.2.4. 
5.2.2 Reservoir and well design 
In this section, well design and reservoir characteristics are used as a basis to determine whether the 
blowout risk is higher or lower than for an average well. This results in a blowout frequency 
adjustment factor, which is referred to as adjustment factor 1. Reservoir parameters have been 
determined based on discussion with Tore Høy, and through comparison with other fields. Goliat will 
be the first oil producing field in the Barents Sea, and is therefore considered to be the most 
appropriate field for comparison (pers. comm. Høy). Data from this field have been obtained from 
published reports, and through communication with Lasse Holen, working for Eni Norge with Goliat 
subsurface. Well design and diameters of drill pipes and casings have been determined through 
discussion with drilling professor at the University of Stavanger, Kjell Kåre Fjelde. 
40 
The water depth in the area of our case study has been determined through a consideration of 
seismic data. Travel time of seismic waves have indicated a water depth of approximately 330 m 
(pers. comm. Høy). However, the seismic data have not yet been interpreted to give detailed 
information on possible reservoir depths. By a consideration of the geology in the area, it is 
concluded that a possible oil reservoir is most likely to be found in Triassic layers, at a well depth of 
approximately 2000 m. Such a reservoir could be hidden beneath a salt structure (pers. comm. Høy). 
The Kobbe reservoir of the Goliat field is also found in Triassic layers, and is located at a depth of 
1 800 m (pers. comm. Holen). 
Common temperatures at the seabed in the southeastern Barents Sea is approximately 2.0 - 3.0 ᵒC 
(pers. comm. Høy). The temperature for this specific area has been set to 2.5 ᵒC. The reservoir 
temperature can be calculated based on the geothermal gradient. For the Barents Sea, this is 
typically in the range of 25.0 - 30.0 ᵒC/km. For the well in question a gradient of 30.0 ᵒC/km is 
assumed (pers. comm. Høy). The reservoir temperature is calculated from the following formula: 
          
  
  
          
       
 
                    
Where: 
T = Temperature, ᵒC 
  
  
 = Temperature gradient, 0.030 ᵒC/m 
∂h = Vertical distance from the seabed to the reservoir, m 
This results in a reservoir temperature of 52.5 ᵒC. This is quite close to the temperature of the Kobbe 
reservoir at the Goliat field, which is 48.0 ᵒC (pers. comm. Holen). 
The formation pressure tends to increase with depth according to the hydrostatic pressure gradient. 
However, hydrocarbon traps usually have an elevated pore pressure compared to the hydrostatic 
gradient. The Kobbe reservoir at the Goliat field has a pore pressure gradient of 1.1 SG (pers. comm. 
Holen). The pressure gradient varies from reservoir to reservoir, and the pore pressure is therefore 
associated with some uncertainty. Since BlowFAM input must be given as single values, it does not 
reflect the uncertainty of input parameters. Thus, a pressure gradient of 1.2 is seen as reasonable to 
avoid underestimating the risk involved. This is slightly conservative, compared to the Kobbe 
reservoir. The pore pressure in BlowFAM is given by specific gravity (relative to water density), rather 
than bar (see Fig. 3). This corresponds to the equivalent mud weight (EMW).  
As explained in section 2.1.1, the drilling window is the difference between the pore pressure and 
fracture pressure gradient.  The Kobbe reservoir at the Goilat field has a fracture pressure gradient of 
2.0 SG, and consequently a drilling window of 0.9 (pers. comm. Holen). As there is little knowledge 
available on pressure profiles in this former disputed area, the drilling window is difficult to predict. 
The drilling window is set to 0.8 SG, which corresponds to a fracture pressure gradient equal to that 
of Kobbe (pers. comm. Fjelde). This is considered to be sufficiently conservative to cover the 
uncertainty related to this parameter. The mud density must always be within the drilling window 
(between the pore pressure and fracture pressure gradient). For a narrow drilling window, it can be 
difficult to obtain the right mud weight throughout the drilling process. The drilling window is 
therefore a crucial parameter with respect to blowout risk. A mud weight of 1.55 SG is here 
considered appropriate, seeing that it is in the middle of the range. 
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On an exploration well, the inclination is usually small or negligible (pers. comm. Fjelde). The 
objective is then to explore for any recoverable resources, and not to drain the reservoir.  Thus, for 
simplicity the well trajectory is assumed to be vertical, with a horizontal section of 0 m. Rigs used for 
arctic drilling typically have a drill floor height of 25 m. Drill pipe diameter, open hole diameter, and 
casing diameter have been set to 5.0, 8.5 and 9.6 inches, respectively (pers. comm. Fjelde). 
The GOR at Kobbe is 215 (Bjørnbom et al., 2008). The GOR of this reservoir is for simplicity set to be 
200. This is considered a slightly conservative measure, seeing that an oil spill containing more oil 
and less gas is much more environmentally hazardous. The mud circulation rate and seawater density 
are assumed equal to the BlowFAM default values. All these reservoir and well data are summarized 
in Table 10. 
Table 10: Reservoir and well design characteristics for case input to BlowFAM (pers. comm. Høy, pers. comm. Fjelde). 
Variable Value 
Water depth 330 m 
Well depth to TVD 2000 m 
Reservoir temperature 52.5 ᵒC  
Pore pressure (EMW) 1.20 SG 
Drilling window (EMW) 0.80 SG 
Mud weight 1.55 SG 
Length of horizontal section 0.00 m 
Height of drill floor above sea 25.0 m 
Drill pipe diameter 5.00 in 
Open hole diameter 8.50 
Casing inner diameter 9.62 
GOR 200 
Mud circulation rate 0.0500 m3/s 
Seawater density 1.03 kg/dm3 
 
Several other factors related to the reservoir and drilling activity will also affect the risk in BlowFAM. 
This includes reservoir productivity, segmentation, neighboring wells and presence of gas cap. It will 
also depend on whether there is a risk of drilling too deep, or whether well testing is to be 
performed. The well is classified according to the state of the well in Table 11.  
Table 11: State of formation/well, as case specifications in BlowFAM 
State of well Classification Comment 
Risk related to drilling too deep Possible Little knowledge of reservoir and drilling 
program 
Well testing to be performed Yes Well testing is performed to determine 
characteristics of the reservoir 
Risk of drilling into neighboring 
wells 
No No wells in the area 
Gas cap above the oil Yes Oil with adjacent gas cap 
Reservoir segmentation Unknown Little knowledge of reservoir 
Reservoir productivity Low Poor flow conditions 
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This data on reservoir and well design will adjust the historical blowout cause distribution collected 
from the SINTEF database. Some blowout causes might be excluded. Others might be given higher or 
lower probabilities, while some are left unchanged. This results in a new cause distribution and an 
adjustment factor, as shown in Table 12. 
5.2.3 Risk elements 
BlowFAM consist of almost 300 risk elements that is evaluated to enlighten their effect on the risk 
level. Based in this evaluation, an adjustment factor for the blowout frequency is determined. This is 
called adjustment factor 2. Only elements related to deep drilling (after setting of the BOP) is 
included in this evaluation, since a blowout from deep exploration drilling is the study objective. The 
risk elements considered applicable are listed in appendix E, under risk elements and evaluations. 
Elements that are considered not applicable for this specific case can be excluded, and are labeled 
“NA”. 
Elements considered to increase the risk level are given a negative implication in appendix E. These 
are mostly related to challenges of arctic drilling and limited geological information. Risk elements 
considered to reduce the risk are given a positive implication. These are to a large degree related to 
recent technological improvements. Elements that are not considered to have any increased or 
reduced implication to the overall risk are left unchanged. Many of the elements are difficult to 
assess due to limited available information. Ideally, the BlowFAM analysis should be performed in 
cooperation with operators and drilling experts. Adjustment factor 2 is calculated in the next section. 
5.2.4 Results 
Based on the conditions given in section 5.2.2, the blowout cause distribution is adjusted to reflect 
field characteristics. Both the historical and the adjusted blowout cause distribution is shown in Table 
12. The historical cause distribution is collected from the SINTEF database from 2003, and will 
therefore deviate from the cause distribution given in section 2.1.2. It should be noted that the 
distributions concern drilling activity only. Cause distributions for production, completion, workover 
or wireline are not presented, since an exploration well is the study objective. 
Table 12: Blowout cause distribution for drilling activity from case analysis in BlowFAM. 
Cause Historical 
fraction 
Factor Adjusted 
fraction 
New 
fraction 
Annular losses 0.087 0.127 0.011 0.014 
Drilling into neighboring well 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Gas cut mud 0.051 0.972 0.050 0.062 
Improper fill-up 0.025 1.000 0.025 0.031 
Poor cement 0.120 0.984 0.118 0.147 
Swabbing 0.076 0.053 0.004 0.005 
Too low mud weight 0.214 0.915 0.196 0.244 
Trapped gas behind casing 0.025 1.000 0.025 0.031 
Tubing plug failure during well test 0.011 0.800 0.009 0.011 
Unexpected high well pressure 0.134 0.890 0.119 0.149 
Well test string failure 0.047 1.200 0.056 0.070 
Unknown 0.199 0.955 0.190 0.237 
Total/adjustment factor 1.000  0.803 1.000 
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Each historical fraction is multiplied with the adjusted probabilities in the column “Factor”, and the 
products listed in the column “Adjusted fractions”. The sum of all these adjusted fractions yields an 
adjustment factor of 0.803. This is called adjustment factor 1, and is applied to the basic frequency in 
Table 13. A new cause distribution is found by dividing each of the adjusted fractions by the 
adjustment factor. This new distribution is shown in the rightmost column, and has a sum of 1.  
An adjustment factor of 0.803 is smaller than 1 and will therefore contribute to a reduced the 
blowout risk. The blowout probability is reduced by almost 20 %, as a result of the defined reservoir 
and well conditions. This seems reasonable, as the reservoir is assumed to have a low productivity. If 
more knowledge was available it might be possible to reduce the risk even further. Input parameters 
such as pore pressure and drilling window are set slightly conservative, due to lack of knowledge and 
a high uncertainty. If a risk assessment were performed in cooperation with operators and drilling 
experts, prior to drilling of the well, more detailed information would assumingly have been 
available. By gaining more knowledge, the uncertainty can be reduced. This could yield a lower 
adjustment factor, and consequently a lower blowout probability. As BlowFAM does not reflect 
uncertainty, the adjustment factor becomes a result of several assumptions. This is further discussed 
in the section 5.2.8. The effects of varying different parameters are shown in Table 15 in section 
5.2.6, through a sensitivity study. 
The adjustment factor resulting from Table 12 should be equal to the one supplied by BlowFAM. 
However, BlowFAM states that adjustment factor 1 is 0.613. This is presumably due to a bug in the 
calculation. BlowFAM has not included the last blowout cause “unknown” in the calculation. This 
error will be further discussed in section 5.2.8. The adjustment factor of 0.803 found from the table 
will be used from now on.  
To find adjustment factor 2, the total number of applicable risk elements is counted from the list in 
appendix E. This yields a total of 163. The total positive score, B (better), is found by adding up all the 
positive elements. This yields a score of 47. The same is done for the negative score, W (worse). This 
results in a (absolute) score of 9. Adjustment factor 2 is then found from the following formula: 
                    
        
  
 
        
   
       
This calculation results in an adjustment factor of 0.767. By applying this to the basic blowout 
probability, it can be reduced by approximately 23 %. This is a considerable risk reduction. But if 
more knowledge was available, and relevant experts were included in the evaluation, it might be 
possible to reduce the risk even further. BlowFAM states that adjustment factor 2 is 0.749, which 
again does not correspond to the calculated value. This is discussed further in section 5.2.8. The 
number calculated from the formula will be used from now on, and is applied to the basic frequency 
in Table 13. 
It is also possible to adjust the frequency manually in BlowFAM. This can be desirable if there are 
known changes in the frequency which are not implemented in the model; i.e. if there are 
technological improvements that has not been accounted for. In this study the manual adjustment is 
used to reflect recent changes in blowout statistics, which have not yet been included in the model. 
Since the BlowFAM worksheet is based on blowout data from 2003, there are considerable changes 
to the basic frequency. According to Table 5, the basic blowout probability for an exploratory oil well 
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is  1.23 × 10-4. This is much lower than the basic blowout probability of 2.1 × 10-4, given by BlowFAM. 
To account for these recent changes, a manual adjustment factor is implemented. 
                  
                    
                      
 
         
         
 0.586 
This manual adjustment is applied to the basic blowout frequency in Table 13. The table presents the 
adjustment factors and blowout frequencies. The basic frequency is the statistic blowout frequency 
for a well with the given classifications, found in section 5.2.1. The different adjustments are applied 
to the basic frequency to determine the final blowout frequency. Adjustment factor 1 reflects well 
design and reservoir characteristics. Adjustment factor 2 reflects the evaluation of risk elements. 
Table 13: Blowout frequency per 10 000 drilled wells and adjustments applied. 
Category Result 
Basic frequency 2.100 
Adjustment factor 1 0.803 
Adjustment factor 2 0.767 
Manual adjustment 0.586 
Frequency 0.758 
 
This yields a final blowout frequency of less than 1 per 10 000 drilled exploration wells, or a 
probability of 7.58 × 10-5. This probability is considerably smaller than 9.84 × 10-5, which resulted 
from the statistical approach in section 5.1. The overall risk reduction is achieved is considerable. But 
this is mainly due to lack of reliable information, which tends to result in conservative estimates. For 
a hypothetical situation in this unexplored area, knowledge is limited. It is difficult to predict 
reservoir conditions, and improvements related to equipment, procedures, etc. By involving experts 
in the BlowFAM assessment process, the risk might be reduced to a lower level. The risk can also be 
reduced by implementing risk reducing measures. BlowFAM allows identifying risk reducing 
measures through the evaluation of risk elements. This is further discussed in section 5.2.7. 
The blowout probability determined through BlowFAM is considered to yield the most well specific 
result, compared to the statistical approach. This case study attempts to determine the blowout risk 
in a mechanistic manner, by evaluating specific conditions at the well location. Therefore, the 
blowout probability resulting from the BlowFAM assessment is considered to be the most 
appropriate. It is also the most interesting in relation to possible identification of risk reducing 
measures. 
5.2.5 Scenarios 
Table 14 presents the flow path, release point and BOP opening distribution for a subsea exploration 
well. These data are collected from the BlowFAM worksheet. It resembles the Scandpower data in 
Table 8. But in Table 8 subsea, wellhead and BOP releases have been merged into one (subsea) 
category. Also, the flow paths tubing and outer annulus have been included in similar categories in 
Table 8. However, since BlowFAM is based on older statistics, the values will deviate from the more 
recent Scandpower data. As these distributions are not thoroughly updated, scenario evaluations will 
be based on section 5.1.5. Flow path and release point distributions are shown graphically in Fig. 16. 
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Table 14: Flow path and release point distribution for a floating platform, collected from the BlowFAM worksheet. 
Flow path Subsea Wellhead BOP/X-mas tree Drill floor 
Full Choked Full Choked Full Choked Full Choked 
Outside casing 24 % 5 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
Outer annulus 0 % 0 % 24 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
Annulus 0 % 0 % 0 % 18 % 0 % 5 % 0 % 14 % 
Open hole 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 5 % 
Tubing 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 5 % 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Illustration of flow path and release point distribution for a floating platform from BlowFAM. 
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5.2.6 Sensitivity study 
This section will investigate the effect of varying input parameters on adjustment factor 1. There is 
high uncertainty related to several reservoir parameters. Adjustment factor 1 is highly sensitive to 
some of these. The sensitivity to some different parameters is investigated and shown in Table 15. 
This is done by observing the implication of changing a single parameter, while other parameters are 
kept constant. But when changing input such as drilling window or pore pressure, the mud weight 
(MW) must also be changed to obtain an appropriate mud density within the drilling window. The 
values used in the base case are also included in the “Default” column. These yield an adjustment 
factor of 0.803. 
Table 15: Sensitivity of adjustment factor 1 to various input parameters in the BlowFAM case analysis. 
Variable Default Value Adjustment factor 1 
Base case 0.803 
Drilling window (EMW 
SG) 
0.80 (mw 1.60) 0.40 (mw 1.40) 1.309 
0.60 (mw 1.50) 0.959 
1.00 (mw 1.70) 0.712 
Pore pressure 1.20 (mw 1.60) 1.10 (mw 1.50) 0.784 
1.30 (mw 1.70) 0.860 
Risk of drilling too deep Possible No 0.751 
Yes 0.933 
Well testing Yes No 0.756 
Reservoir segmentation Unknown No 0.683 
Yes 1.299 
Reservoir productivity Low Unknown/average 0.937 
High 1.207 
Gas cap Yes No 0.803 
GOR 200 400 0.803 
 
As can be seen from the Table 15, adjustment factor 1 is highly sensitive to the drilling window. 
Seeing that there is little data available on pressure profiles in this area, it becomes difficult to 
determine such values accurately. Consequently, there is a high uncertainty related to this value. 
Since BlowFAM does not allow presenting input parameters as probability distribution, it must be 
given as a single value. Therefore, it is specified slightly conservative. The pore pressure also has 
some uncertainty related to it. But as can be determined from Table 15, variations in this parameter 
will not be as important for the blowout risk (as long as the drilling window is kept constant). 
Whether there is a gas cap present or not, has a negligible effect on the blowout risk. For low risk 
levels, the effect is not noticeable. This is also the case for changes in GOR.   
5.2.7 Risk management 
BlowFAM has the possibility to identify risk reducing measures, through the evaluation or risk 
elements. It can enlighten weak areas and work as a decision support tool in risk management. Risk 
reducing measures identified through BlowFAM will affect the risk by reducing the probability of a 
blowout occurring in the first place. It identifies measures that can be initiated to try to prevent a 
blowout. Many of the risk elements are procedures and technology improvements that can be 
implemented as a means of reducing the risk. Risk reducing measures will here be identified to 
provide an example of how BlowFAM can be used as a decision support tool. 
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In appendix E.3, a number of risk reducing measures have been identified. These are mostly related  
to human factors, procedures and the BOP reliability. Risk related to human errors can be reduced by 
an increased frequency and quality of training courses, especially courses related to well control. A 
qualification feedback system can help reveal lack of experience in some areas. Procedures can be 
improved by better mud control and more differentiated contingency plans. Mud control can be 
improved by careful monitoring of mud volumes, e.g. between trips. High rate mixing and an 
increased number of mud pumps available can ensure fast mud supply during a critical situation. 
Checking cement quality before permitting to drill ahead can also reduce the risk. Use of a more 
reliable BOP, and frequent testing can further reduce the blowout risk. 
Each of the identified elements have been given a maximum positive score.  The additional positive 
score from section E.3 is added up, and found to be 39 points higher than for the base case. The new 
adjustment factor 2 can then be calculated from the same formula as in 5.2.4: 
                  
        
  
 
             
   
       
If comparing this to the adjustment factor from the base case of 0.767, it can be seen that the 
blowout frequency is reduced with approximately 31 % by implementing these measures. This would 
result in a blowout probability of 5.22 × 10-5. In this way, BlowFAM can quantify the effects of 
different risk reducing measures on blowout probability. 
5.2.8 Limitations 
Based on the use of BlowFAM for this case study, it was experienced some shortcomings. Both 
statistics and risk elements in BlowFAM have not been thoroughly updated since 2003. Historical 
data from the most recent SINTEF database must be included to reflect present day blowout 
probabilities. This lack of updates is also reflected in the historical blowout cause distribution in Table 
12. This cause distribution changes each year, as new incidents are included in the blowout database. 
The flow path, release point and BOP opening distributions given in Table 14 (and Fig. 16) are also 
collected from statistics from 2003. Since these data are not updated, these distributions will not be 
used as basis in this case study. The scenario distributions found in section 5.1.5 are considered to be 
more accurate. 
The implications of different well configuration and reservoir characteristics should also be re-
evaluated. By evaluating recent blowout incidents, trends can be identified which reflects the 
implications of e.g. a different drilling windows. 
There is a high number of risk elements included in BlowFAM. These elements have not been 
updated since the model was developed in 1995. Thus, these elements need a thorough review to 
determine whether they are still relevant with today’s technology and equipment. Many of the 
elements might concern types of equipment and procedures which are not in use today. Safety 
requirements have grown stricter in this period. Therefore, all the risk elements should be re-
evaluated to reflect issues regarding present day equipment and safety levels. 
There are also several bugs in the BlowFAM calculations. Adjustment factor 1 supplied by the 
BlowFAM tool does not match the one calculated from the cause distribution in Table 12. The last 
cause “unknown” is not included in BlowFAM’s adjustment factor. Thus, the model yields an 
adjustment factor which is too low.  
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Adjustment factor 2 supplied by BlowFAM does not match the adjustment factor calculated from the 
given formula. The explanation seems to be that some of the risk elements with a negative score has 
not been excluded in the calculations. The total negative score was found from section E.2 to be 9. 
BlowFAM’s adjustment factor of 0.749 would correspond to a total negative score of 6, assuming the 
other numbers are constant. This can explain the lower adjustment factor given by BlowFAM. The 
elements related to drilling before BOP are supposed to be automatically excluded when choosing 
deep drilling. However, several of these elements are included in the calculations of adjustment 
factor 2 for deep drilling. Thus, there seems to be an error in the command telling BlowFAM which 
elements to include. As elements related to drilling before setting of the BOP have not been altered 
in this assessment, it has not affected the adjustment factor here. The tool is currently being 
modified to exclude these bugs (pers. comm. Giljarhus). 
It can be added as this student’s subjective opinion that the layout of the risk element evaluation has 
room for improvement. Relevant risk elements are automatically screened and highlighted, 
depending on whether they relate to production, drilling (before or after BOP), etc. Instead of 
highlighting relevant elements, irrelevant elements could be removed. The screening process should 
be more thorough and also differentiate between deepwater, HPHT and normal wells. It should also 
be possible to categorize elements according to type of equipment or procedure they related to. 
Elements related to cement, casing, BOP and so on could be combined to ease the evaluation 
process, or at least unified in the same section. 
BlowFAM does not allow presenting input parameters as probability distributions. The model only 
allows single value input. Thus, parameters that are uncertain must be assumed relatively 
conservative to ensure that the risk is not underestimated. If input is presented as probability 
distributions, this would also yield results presented as probability distributions. If the model were to 
include uncertainty, this would require an entirely different calculation engine. As of today, blowout 
probability is commonly given by single values. This is also the case in the presentation given in Fig. 1. 
BlowFAM is not a mechanistically based approach, as it is based on statistics and not on calculations 
of well specific conditions. Also, it consists of a high number of assessment factors. These are 
evaluated and given credit according to the opinion of the user, which gives it a subjective and not 
necessarily scientific basis.  
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6. BlowFlow - Blowout scenarios 
Assessing blowout rate and duration is an important part of an environmental risk assessment (ERA). 
However, there is no standardized method for calculations of these values which can easily be 
communicated and compared between different parties. MIRA states that a sufficient number of 
probable flow rates and duration should be established, for use in an environmental risk assessment 
(Brude, 2007). The approaches used to determine these values typically vary from company to 
company. It is unclear which approach gives the best prediction, whether uncertainty is handled 
properly and how applicable one methodology is to a given situation. 
Due to the high variations from analysis to analysis, OLF has produced guidelines on how to 
determine flow rate and duration in a more detailed manner. According to these guidelines, flow rate 
and duration should be presented as probability distributions to reflect uncertainty in input 
parameters. BlowFlow is a computer tool used to calculate flow rate and duration of a blowout that 
builds on these OLF guidelines (Nilsen et al., 2004). It is a mechanistic model developed by IRIS (Arild 
et al., 2008). BlowFlow is still in the development phase, and is being continuously tested against 
field data at Statoil (pers. comm. Ford). 
The different steps of an ERA are shown in Fig. 1, where BlowFlow constitutes the 2nd step of the 
process. The blowout rate and duration are detrimental with respect to environmental 
consequences, and therefore to the result of an ERA. BlowFlow will be used here to assess flow rate 
and duration in a probabilistic manner for a range of different blowout scenarios. The tool allows 
assessing the uncertainty of parameters. This facilitates a way to assess uncertainties, where the 
uncertainty in input parameters is reflected in the probability distributions of flow rate and duration. 
This uncertainty should be allowed to propagate as in Fig. 1, to ensure that the level of detail is not 
compromised. 
A sensitivity study will be performed to assess which parameters are the most crucial to the 
uncertainty of the flow rate. This can reveal which parameters that contribute most to an increased 
risk. This chapter will also investigate the effects of neglecting uncertainty, and choosing a more 
conservative approach. Such an approach resembles a more traditional conservative approach. This 
will also demonstrate how the probabilistic flow rate and duration distributions are a function of 
uncertainty in input parameters. 
BlowFlow can aid the risk management process by providing a common platform for identifying risk 
mitigating measures. This is done by observing the effects of varying input parameters. BlowFlow can 
also help dimension oil spill preparedness, as it predicts possible flow rates and durations. 
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6.1 Well input 
This section presents basic input on type of fluid, reservoir characteristics and well design. These 
properties must be carefully considered to be able to predict the possible blowout rate accurately. As 
in section 5.2.2, reservoir parameters have been determined based on discussion with Tore Høy, and 
through comparison with data from the Goliat field. Well design, drill pipe and casing diameters have 
been discussed with Kjell Kåre Fjelde. 
6.1.1 Platform 
The water depth in the area has been set to 330 m, with a seabed temperature of 2.5 ᵒC, as discussed 
in section 5.2.2. The platform is a semi-submersible drilling rig. A rotary table (RT) elevation of 25 
meters is considered adequate (pers. comm. Fjelde). This is more than sufficient with respect to 
wave height in the former disputed area (pers. comm. Høy). Fig. 17 shows a schematic 
representation of the platform and water depth. 
 
Figure 17: Topside schematic. 
 
6.1.2 Architecture 
The casing program is crucial for the well diameter, and thus for the potential flow rate from the 
well. The suspensions depths and outer and inner diameters of the casings are listed in Table 16. 
Each casing is suspended from the seabed. The casing program is also shown schematically in Fig. 18. 
As discussed in section 5.2.2, the inclination of an exploration well is usually small. Thus, for 
simplicity the well trajectory is assumed to be vertical. Table 16 also includes length and diameters of 
the open hole section, riser and BOP. These details have set based on discussion with Kjell Kåre 
Fjelde (pers. comm. Fjelde). The bit location has been assumed equal to the BlowFlow default 
settings, which is at the bottom of the well. 
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Table 16: Casing program, open hole, riser and BOP design used as input in BlowFlow (pers. comm. Fjelde). 
Section Suspension depth (m) Shoe depth 
(m) 
OD (in) ID (in) 
Casing 
program 
355 500 30.0 29.0 
355 890 20.0 19.0 
355 1500 13.4 12.3 
355 1880 9.63 8.62 
 Length (m) OD (in) ID (in) 
Open hole 120 8.50  
Riser 355 21.0 19.0 
BOP 2.00 20.0  
 
 
 
Figure 18: Wellbore schematic showing casing program and open hole section. 
BlowFlow has many different material selection possibilities for casings and other well equipment. 
For this specific well, stainless/stretched steel is chosen as the best alternative. This is the most 
commonly used steel type, and is considered sufficient to prevent erosion and different types of 
corrosion damage. This is also the default steel type in BlowFlow, with a given roughness height of 15 
µm. This was selected through discussion with Kjell Kåre Fjelde (pers. comm. Fjelde). 
6.1.3 Drill string 
Dimensions of drill string components are presented in Table 17, and schematically in Fig. 19. All 
components are assumed to be made of stainless steel. The drill bit diameter is set to 8.5 inches 
which corresponds to the open hole diameter (pers. comm. Fjelde). Drill-collar and drill string sizes 
are set according to the BlowFlow default values. 
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Table 17: Drill string description used as input in BlowFlow. 
Type Number Length OD (in) ID (in) 
Bit 1 3.00 in 8.50  
Drill-collar 10 9.14 m 6.75 3.00 
Drill string 1 1910 m 5.00 4.28 
 
 
Figure 19: Drill string overview. 
 
6.1.4 Fluid 
As described in section 5.2.1, the case study reservoir is assumed to contain oil with an adjacent gas 
cap. BlowFlow estimates specific flow rates for both oil and gas. The relative amount of each will 
depend on the gas-oil ratio (GOR). Flow rate of oil will be in focus in this case study. Gas typically 
evaporates relatively quickly, and is therefore considered to have limited environmental effects. A 
typical ERA methodology includes only oil flow when assessing environmental consequences, as this 
represents the highest environmental hazard.  
Impurities in the reservoir, such as CO2, H2S and N2, are for simplicity assumed to be negligible (pers. 
comm. Høy). Presence of small amounts of such gases will not have any noticeable implications on 
the flow rate of oil.  
6.1.5 Reservoir properties 
A possible oil reservoir is according to Tore Høy most likely to be found at a depth of 2 000 m, in 
Triassic layers. The reservoir temperature was calculated to be 52.5 ᵒC in section 5.2.2. The net 
thickness of the flowing reservoir is set to 15 m (pers. comm. Høy), which also corresponds to the 
thickness of the Goliat reservoirs (pers. comm. Holen). The total thickness of the zone is set to 160 m 
(pers. comm. Høy). The net/gross ratio is the relation between the hydrocarbon thickness of the 
zone and the total thickness of the zone, including shale/sand, etc. This yields a net/gross ratio of 
9.4 %. The top depth is set to 1 985 m. The GOR has been set to 200, as in section 5.2.2. It is possible 
to present the thickness and GOR as probability distributions in BlowFlow. However, there is not 
considered to be a sufficient basis to present these parameters as such distributions. They are 
therefore represented as single values.  
The gravity of the Kobbe oil of the Goliat field is 796 kg/m3 (Bjørnbom et al., 2008). As there is some 
uncertainty related to this parameter, it has been set to 800 kg/m3 for the well in question. This is 
chosen based on recommendations from Tore Høy (pers. comm. Høy). The Kobbe gas gravity is 0.800 
SG (pers. comm. Holen). It is chosen to use this as input in this case study. Oil gravity is the density of 
the oil at standard conditions (pers. comm. Høy). Gas gravity is the gas density at standard 
conditions, relative to air density. These input parameters are summarized in Table 18. 
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Table 18: Reservoir zone properties, represented by single values as BlowFlow input (pers. comm. Høy). 
Variable Value 
Reservoir temperature 52.5 ᵒC 
Reservoir thickness (net pay) 15.0 m 
Net/gross ratio 9.4 % 
Top reservoir depth (TVD RT) 1985 m 
Oil gravity 800 kg/m3 
Gas gravity 0.800 SG 
GOR 200 
 
Some of the input values with a high uncertainty related to them are presented by probability 
distributions. There is assumed to be a high degree of uncertainty related to the reservoir pressure. 
The pressure gradient was given in section 5.2.2 to be 1.2. The reservoir pressure can be calculated 
from the pressure gradient by using the below formula. 
                                
  9.81                     
Where: 
  = Pressure, Pa 
  = Formation density, kg/m
3 
   = Pressure gradient, SG 
   = Water density, kg/m
3 
g = Gravitational constant, 9.81 m/s2 
h = Well depth, m 
This results in a reservoir pressure of 235 bars. However, the pressure varies greatly from reservoir to 
reservoir. Since there is high uncertainty related to this value, but without statistical basis for 
representing the reservoir pressure as a probability function, it was decided to present it as a 
triangular distribution. A pressure gradient of 1.2 is assumed to be slightly conservative, as the Goliat 
pressure gradient is 1.1 (pers. comm. Holen). A pressure gradient of 1.1 would correspond to a 
pressure of 216 bars. The assumed minimum pressure is set to 210 bar, most likely pressure to 220 
bar, and the maximum pressure to 240 bar (pers. comm. Høy). This triangular distribution is 
presented in Fig. 20, where the pressure is plotted against probability. 
 
Figure 20: Reservoir pressure represented by a triangular probability distribution. 
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6.1.6 Productivity index 
For this specific well the inflow model “Oil – Basic” is chosen. This is the preferred model to 
determine the productivity index for vertical and deviated wells with rectangular drainage areas. The 
necessary input values for this model are listed in Table 19. The reservoir area is of limited 
importance to the flow rate, as long as the well is located close to the middle. Therefore, it is 
assumed equal to the BlowFlow default values, as listed in the table. The vertical well location is the 
reservoir penetration depth. As this must be set as a single value, the well location is assumed to be 
in the middle of the flowing reservoir zone, at 7.5 m (pers. comm. Fjelde). The oil formation volume 
factor (Bo) and oil viscosity (µo) are calculated from the PVT models (appendix C). 
Permeability and skin factor are both crucial parameters with respect to reservoir productivity. The 
skin factor (well damage) typically varies from -6 for a productive fractured reservoir, to 100 or more 
for a poorly executed gravel pack. A skin factor of 0 corresponds to no damage. In BlowFlow it must 
be set by a single value. For a vertical well the skin factor is usually quite small. Due to the high 
uncertainty it is set to 0, to avoid underestimating this parameter (pers. comm. Fjelde). This is also 
the value recommended to use in the BlowFlow user manual (Ford, 2012).  
According to Tore Høy, a reservoir in this area will have quite poor reservoir conditions. The 
horizontal permeability for such a reservoir is likely to vary between 2 – 150 mD, with 100 mD as the 
assumed most probable value. (pers. comm. Høy). Thus, it is represented by a triangular distribution, 
as listed in Table 19. By experimenting with these values one can see how the flow rate is affected 
(see section 6.5 for sensitivity study). The vertical-horizontal permeability (kV/kH) is set to 0.1, which 
is the value recommended in BlowFlow. 
Table 19: Input to the “Oil – Simple” inflow model in BlowFlow (pers. comm. Høy, pers. comm. Fjelde). 
Variable Value 
Reservoir length along well (xe) 1000 m 
Reservoir  with across well (ye) 500 m 
Well location along reservoir (xw) 1000 m 
Well location across reservoir (yw) 500 m 
Well location (zw) 7.50 m 
Oil formation volume factor (Bo) 1.58 
Oil viscosity (µo) 0.386 cP 
Skin along well (damage) 0 
Horizontal permeability (mD) 2 - 100 - 150 mD 
kV/kH 0.100 
 
BlowFlow calculates the productivity index of the reservoir, based on these input data. This yields the 
volumetric flow rate per drawdown pressure. The drawdown pressure is the difference between the 
pore pressure and flowing bottomhole pressure. The mean productivity index is plotted for three 
different reservoir penetration depths in Fig. 21; 5 m, 50 % and 100 % It can be seen that the 
productivity is strongly dependent on the penetration depth.  
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Figure 21: Mean productivity index for 5 m, 50 % and 100 % reservoir penetration. 
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6.2 Scenario input 
The type of blowout scenario will be important for the severity of a blowout. Scenarios that can vary 
from blowout to blowout include: 
- Release point 
- Flow path 
- Penetration depth 
- BOP opening 
These scenarios must be defined as probability distributions in BlowFlow. The probabilities have 
been determined based on an evaluation of statistics. In addition, OLF’s guidelines on calculation of 
flow rate and duration have been considered (Nilsen et al., 2004). For a more mechanistic approach, 
these values can be based on a detailed kick analysis (Arild et al., 2008). However, this is very time 
consuming and requires expert judgment. Thus, it will not be performed in this case study. Each 
different scenario will have a specific flow rate. The probability of each scenario will therefore be 
important to the overall mean flow rate and discharge volume. 
6.2.1 Release point 
As discussed in section 2.1.3, a blowout from a subsea well mainly has two possible release points; 
subsea and topside. Underground blowouts will the disregarded here, seeing that they are not 
included in BlowFlow. The release point distribution found in section 5.1.5 will be used as input in 
BlowFlow. This distribution is based on updated statistics (Haugsvold, 2011, Holand, 2010). It is 
shown as a sector diagram in Fig. 23. 
6.2.2 Flow path 
The blowout scenarios are also characterized by different flow paths, which were discussed in section 
2.1.4. There are three possible flow paths included in BlowFlow:  
- Through the drill string 
- Through annulus, between the casing and drill string 
- Through the open hole, without a drill string in the well 
Both the SINTEF database and Scandpower report show that a significant amount of blowout data is 
related to blowouts outside the casing. At present, this flow path is not part of the BlowFlow tool. 
Therefore, incidents related to outside casing flow are considered to flow through annulus. The flow 
path distribution between the 3 possible flow paths was found in section 5.1.5. This distribution is 
used as input in BlowFlow. Both release point and flow path distribution is shown graphically in the 
sector diagram in Fig. 22. 
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Figure 22: Sector diagram of release point and flow path distribution. 
6.2.3 Penetration depth 
The reservoir penetration depth is related to the proportion of the reservoir that is exposed to the 
well. As can be seen from Fig. 21, this is crucial for the flow rate. It is difficult to predict at what 
penetration depth a blowout is most likely to occur. It will vary depending on the type of well. For an 
exploration well, it is more likely to encounter an unexpected pressure zone, compared to a 
developmental well. This is because much less information is available about the reservoir and 
pressure profile. This would typically occur right after the reservoir has been penetrated, at about 5 
m penetration depth. A blowout can occur at 100 % penetration depth if swabbing (see section 2.1.2) 
is experienced during tripping (withdrawal of the drill string). With respect to other blowout causes, 
these can occur at all different penetration depths.  
The OLF guidelines proposes a penetration depth distribution as presented in Table 20 (Nilsen et al., 
2004).  A 5 m penetration is assumed to be the least probable, with 20 % probability. This might be a 
little conservative for an exploration well, where unexpected pressure zones are encountered more 
often. Penetration depths of 50 % and 100 % are given equal probabilities of 40 %. It is concluded to 
use the OLF recommendations as BlowFlow input (Nilsen et al., 2004). 
Table 20: Reservoir penetration depth distribution as input in BlowFlow. 
Reservoir penetration depth Probability 
5 m 17 % 20 % 
15 m 50 % 40 % 
30 m 100 % 40 % 
 
6.2.4 BOP opening 
The BOP opening will also affect the flow rate of a potential blowout. The BOP stack is a reliable 
system, and a fully open BOP is therefore less likely. Two possible BOP openings are commonly 
included in ERAs: fully open and partially closed (5 % opening). OLF’s guidelines proposes a 
distribution with a 30 % chance of full flow and 70 % chance of choked flow (Nilsen et al., 2004). 
According to the statistics of Table 8, 51 % of subsea blowouts occur with restricted flow, and 75 % of 
topside blowouts (Haugsvold, 2011). However, the BOP seal might be disintegrated over time. Then, 
the flow restriction could decrease quickly, and the restricted flow escalate into full flow. This is 
especially the case for high flow rates. Statoil and IRIS commonly apply a fully open BOP as a 
conservative implication is BlowFlow (pers. comm. Ford). It is chosen to use full flow as basis in the 
case study.  
Subsea 
annulus 
80 % 
Topside 
drill 
string 
5 % 
Topside 
annulus 
10 % 
Topside 
open 
hole 
5 % 
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6.3 Duration input 
There are several different well kill mechanisms included in BlowFlow. These are capping, coning 
bridging and relief well drilling. Each of these killing mechanisms are described in appendix A. The 
effect of the different mechanisms on the blowout duration will depend on 3 factors: 
- Degree of flow reduction 
- Probability of success 
- Duration 
Not all of these mechanisms will make the well completely seize to flow. Coning can e.g. reduce the 
flow of oil due to water or gas coning. For such cases, the flow reduction is given as a percentage 
decline in oil flow. Bridging also has the ability to restrict the flow, but is here assumed to be 100 % 
effective. Each mechanism has a different duration, and will therefore take place at different times in 
the blowout lapse. Some might be initiated almost immediately, while others need a longer period of 
time to be deployed. Probabilities, effects and durations of the different mechanisms have been 
based on both statistics and expert judgment. 
6.3.1 Coning 
The probability of coning has been set to 50 %, with a flow reduction of 50 %. In reality, the 
probability and effect of both water and gas coning will depend on the reservoir penetration depth. 
However, they cannot be specified specifically for different scenarios in BlowFlow. If coning is to 
occur, it typically happens quite quickly. The time for coning to take place is therefore set to 1 day 
(pers. comm. Fjelde). The probability, duration and effect of coning is shown in Table 21. 
Table 21: Implications of coning. 
Variable Value 
Coning probability 50 % 
Coning duration 1 day 
Coning effect 50 % 
 
If coning where considered to be 100 % effective, it would have implications on the duration of the 
blowout. If coning is set to have a smaller effect than 100 %, it cannot be considered as a killing 
mechanism. It will then only influence the flow rate after the given time, and thus the total discharge 
volume. If coning occurs, the flow rate will be reduced by 50 % from day 1. 
6.3.2 Bridging 
Bridging will normally take place relatively early in the blowout lapse. According to the Scandpower 
report on blowout statistics from 2009, as much as 77 % of the registered blowouts have been 
stopped due to bridging (Haugsvold, 2010). According to more recent historical data, the time for 
bridging to take place can be presented by a Weibull distribution, with a shape (α) of 0.6 and a scale 
(β) of 3.8 days (Haugsvold, 2011). BlowFlow does not construct a curve for the bridging duration. But 
with a shape of 0.6, it resembles an exponential distribution. BlowFlow yields a mean duration of 5.7 
days. It is chosen to use this probability and duration as input in BlowFlow. Probability and 
distribution values for the bridging duration are listed in Table 22. 
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Table 22: Probability and duration of bridging (Haugsvold, 2010, Haugsvold, 2011). 
Probability Duration (Weibull distribution) 
Shape (α) Scale (β) 
77 % 0.6 3.8 days 
 
6.3.3 Crew interventions (capping) 
The mechanism capping will here be referred to as crew interventions to avoid confusing these 
operations with the new capping technology described in appendix A.4.1. Currently the only active 
measure included in BlowFlow is capping. Thus, capping is commonly applied by Statoil and IRIS to 
include all types of crew interventions (other than well caps and relief wells). Therefore, this 
mechanism in BlowFlow will from now on be referred to as crew interventions. This will be further 
discussed in section 6.7. The default probabilities and durations are set according to historical data 
from the Scandpower report. The complexity of a crew intervention will depend on preparedness 
and the physical conditions at the release point. Crew interventions are split into subsea and topside, 
since the duration and success probability of a crew intervention has been evaluated to vary with 
different release points (Haugsvold, 2011).  
According the blowout statistics from 2009, there is a high probability that a blowout is killed by a 
crew intervention. The historical data indicate that crew interventions have a success probability of 
70 % for topside incidents, and 43 % for subsea incidents (Haugsvold, 2010). The time to perform 
these operations also deviate between topside and subsea releases. According to more recent 
historical data, the durations can be constructed as Weibull distributions. With a shape (α) of 0.6 for 
topside and 0.5 for subsea interventions, both durations resemble an exponential distribution. The 
scale is given to be 1.8 days and 6.3 days, respectively. BlowFlow does not construct curves for these 
durations, but yields mean durations of 2.7 and 12.6 days, respectively. It is considered more difficult 
to regain access of a subsea well, since these interventions are more complex. Therefore subsea 
interventions are more time consuming. It has been concluded to use these values as input in 
BlowFlow. Success probabilities and distributions values are listed in Table 23. These probabilities 
might be a bit conservative because of the low flow rates of the well of this case study. It is generally 
easier to kill a well with a smaller flow rate through crew interventions. On the other hand, 
equipment mobilization might be more time consuming due to the remote locations. For simplicity, 
these factors have not been given any credit here due to lack of reliable information. 
Table 23: Probability and duration of topside and subsea crew interventions, entered as input in the capping mechanism 
in BlowFlow. 
Crew interventions Probability Duration (Weibull distribution) 
Shape (α) Scale (β) 
Topside 70 % 0.6 1.8 days 
Subsea 43 % 0.5 6.3 days 
 
Well caps are currently not available for deployment on the NCS. But in light of the Macondo 
accident, development of several types of subsea capping devices has been initiated. The SWRP is 
currently working on developing capping stacks that will be applicable on the NCS. It is therefore not 
unlikely that a well cap will become available in the near future, possibly before any exploration wells 
will be drilled in the former disputed area. A well cap is not included as a killing mechanism in the 
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base case, since the technology is not yet qualified and implemented. It will however be considered 
in section 6.6, as a risk reducing measure. 
6.3.4 Relief well 
The probability of a relief well to be successful is set to 100 %. This is based on the fact that two relief 
wells will always be prepared, which significantly increases the probability of successfully intersecting 
the uncontrolled flowing well. If the first attempt fails, then the other well is ready for deployment. 
The time it takes to drill a relief well depend on several different factors: The decision time, rig 
mobilization time, drilling time, intersection time and killing time. An operator must always have a 
relief well contingency plan before start of drilling, in case of a blowout. Therefore the decision time 
is set to 0. The rig mobilization is assumed to take two weeks, due to the remote location (pers. 
comm. Fjelde). 
The time it takes to drill a relief well is difficult to determine accurately. This will depend on several 
different factors, such as the accessibility to the uncontrolled blowing well. To account for the 
uncertainty related to the drilling process, the drilling time is represented by a triangular probability 
distribution, as listed in Table 24. Due to the low to moderate reservoir depth, it might be difficult to 
accurately steer the relief well into the bottom of the wellbore. Well intersection might require 
several attempts. Due to some uncertainty in the time necessary to intersect the well, this is also 
presented as a triangular distribution. It is assumed to vary between 1 to 5 days, with 3 days as the 
most likely duration. The time to kill the blowing well from the relief well after intersection is 
represented by a exponential distribution, with mean durations of 1 day (pers. comm. Fjelde). These 
durations are summarized in Table 24. The killing time is also presented graphically in Fig. 23, where 
the number of days is plotted against probability. 
Table 24: Probability and duration of drilling a successful relief well. 
Activity Duration (days) 
Decision time 0 
New rig mobilization time 14 
Drilling time 25 – 36 – 54 
Time to steer/control relief well into main well 1 – 3 – 5 
Killing time (mean value) 1  
 
 
Figure 23: Exponential distribution of killing duration from a relief well, in days versus probability. 
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6.4 Results 
The output section presents a summary of the results from each simulated blowout case. This is 
expressed through probability distributions of flow rate, duration and volume (Arild et al., 2008). 
Flow rate and duration has here received most focus, as these are commonly applied to the ERA. The 
probability distributions are presented as density curves, where each value has an associated 
probability. Each density curve has associated distribution values. The different distribution values 
are defined in appendix B.4. 
6.4.1 IPR / VLP 
An IPR curve gives bottomhole pressure as a function of flow rate into the well. It is a function of the 
reservoir productivity. The VLP curve represents the bottomhole pressure as a function of flow rate 
out of the well. In other words, VLP curves present the bottom hole pressure necessary to produce 
fluids out of the well at a specific rate. The intersection point between the IPR curves and the VLP 
curve, determines the mean flow rate for each penetration depth. Flow rates are determined by pre-
generating IPR and VLP curves, and interpolating between them. Interpolation gives more accurate 
results, but can only be used for single reservoir zone cases.  
Fig. 25 presents the mean IPR curves for three different reservoir penetration depths; 5 m, 50 % and 
100 %. Since IPR curves are a function of flow into the well, they are independent of release point, 
flow path and BOP opening. IPR curves will only vary with penetration depth. A deeper reservoir 
penetration corresponds to a higher reservoir exposure. This will yield a higher productivity, and 
consequently a higher flow rate. A penetration depth of 5 m would significantly limit influx, 
compared to 50 % or 100 % reservoir penetration. This correlation is seen from Fig. 24 below. 
 
Figure 24: IPR and VLP curves for a subsea annulus blowout. 
Fig. 24 also presents an example of a mean VLP curve, for a subsea annulus blowout. As explained in 
section 3.2.4, the VLP curve varies with different release points, flow paths and BOP openings. As a 
result, the flow rate will also vary with these scenarios. The vertical travel distance the fluid travels is 
higher for a topside blowout, than for a subsea blowout. One might assume that this would yield a 
higher flow rate for a subsea release. However, this is not the case here. The pressure profile is 
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similar from the reservoir to the seabed for both cases. But the pressure difference along the riser 
(from seabed to the platform) can deviate from the hydrostatic head of the seawater. If the fluid 
density is lower than for seawater this can yield a lower pressure drop in the riser, compared to 
outside. A lower pressure drop would yield a lower VLP curve; with an associated higher flow rate 
(see Fig. 24). The pressure profile in the riser will also depend on friction. 
The flow rate will also vary with flow path. This is mainly a result of frictional pressure loss. A smaller 
flow area will generally yield a higher frictional pressure loss. The fluid is most inhibited near the well 
wall or pipe. Thus, friction is high for smaller flow diameters. Higher flow restrictions would yield a 
higher VLP curve; with an associated lower flow rate (see Fig. 24). Therefore, the open hole flow path 
has the highest flow rate, while the drill pipe has the lowest. A partially closed BOP would also inhibit 
flow and cause a large pressure drop across the wellhead. Higher flow restriction yields a higher VLP 
curve, with an associated lower flow rate. A fully open BOP is assumed for all cases in this study. This 
results in slightly more conservative flow rates. The effect of a partially closed BOP is assessed in 
section 6.5. 
The IPR and VLP curves in Fig. 24 indicate that in order reduce the flow rate; the flowing bottomhole 
pressure must be increased. A higher bottomhole pressure would result in a reduced drawdown 
pressure. This principle is used when employing a dynamic kill from a relief well. In a production well, 
the intention is rather to maximize flow. 
6.4.2 Flow rate 
The flow rate is a function of a wide range of parameters. Reservoir conditions, well design and 
penetration depth are important factors when determining the flow rate. Which parameters are the 
most crucial will be assessed in the sensitivity study of section 6.5. The flow rate is represented by a 
density curve, where the probability is plotted against flow rate in m3/d. The graph consists of 98 
cells, forming columns of different heights representing the probability for each specific flow rate. 
The flow rate varies with release point, flow path, reservoir penetration depth, type of fluid and with 
time. One curve is presented for each scenario. Due to the large amounts of data, each curve will not 
be presented. BlowFlow also presents a probabilistic flow rate distribution, which is the weighted 
mean distribution between the different scenarios. Fig. 25 shows this probabilistic flow rate 
distribution for oil at day 0.  
 
Figure 25: Probabilistic flow rate distribution at day 0, in m3/d. 
The distribution values corresponding to this curve are given in Table 25, along with distribution 
values for different release points and flow paths. Subsea blowouts through the drill string or open 
hole are excluded as these are not seen as possible scenarios (see section 5.1.5). The flow rate ranges 
from a minimum of 114 m3/d to a maximum of 3 377 m3/d. The flow rate can be any value within this 
range. Each flow rate is given a specific probability. The flow rate can be estimated for a single 
scenario, or as the weighted for a probabilistic scenario. This allows representing uncertainty on a 
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detailed level. The probabilistic flow rate for a topside blowout can be calculated to be 1 333 m3/d, 
based on the flow path distribution from Table 9, and mean flow rates from Table 24. The mean 
subsea flow rate can be read directly from the table to be 1 196 m3/d. The probabilistic mean flow 
rate (subsea and topside) is given by BlowFlow to be 1 200 m3/d.  
Table 25: Flow rate distribution values for oil at day 0 for different release points and flow paths. 
Distribution 
values 
Flow rate oil (m3/d) 
Topside Subsea Probabilistic 
Drill string Annulus Open hole Annulus 
Minimum 114 151 148 129 129 
P10 654 709 742 583 591 
P50 1 187 1 267 1 307 1 135 1 144 
P90 1 892 2 124 2 255 1 904 1 901 
Maximum 2 586 3 188 3 377 2 822 2 822 
Mean 1 236 1 344 1 406 1 196 1 200 
St. dev. 458 542 584 494 486 
 
In BlowFlow, the flow rate distribution will decrease quickly with time. One flow rate curve is given 
for each day. The flow rate approaches 0 as it comes closer to the maximum duration, which is 72 
days (see below). This is a reflection of the probability and duration of each killing mechanism. In 
reality, the flow rate is constant if none of the killing mechanisms have occurred. Therefore, the flow 
rate at day 0 will be used as basis further in this case study. However, this will exclude the effect of 
coning. If coning occurs, it will reduce the flow rate by 50 % after 1 day. Using the flow rate at day 1 
however would also include effects of bridging and crew interventions. This would be unrealistic, as 
these mechanisms are considered to kill the blowout, rather than reducing the flow rate. In reality, 
bridging might be able to reduce the flow, but this is not quantified in BlowFlow. These mechanisms 
will only increases the probability that the blowout has been killed, and thus that the flow rate is 0 
m3/d. The flow rate over time is discussed further in appendix F. 
The flow rates resulting from this study are quite low compared to an average field on the NCS, and 
to fields further west in the Barents Sea (Aspholm et al., 2007). The low flow rates are due to the 
poor reservoir conditions in the area. According to Tore Høy, an oil reservoir in the southeastern 
Barents Sea is likely to have a poor productivity (pers. comm. Høy). Flow rates in this area have also 
been predicted by the NPD. These have currently not been published, but according to Tore Høy, 
they are as follows (pers. comm. Høy): 
- P95: 239 m3/d 
- P50: 717 m3/d 
- P05: 1592 m3/d 
The flow rates predicted by the NPD are lower than the ones supplied by BlowFlow. This is most 
likely due to a difference in the input parameters applied in the analysis. In this case study, the oil 
gravity of 800 kg/m3 was set based on the density of the Kobbe reservoir. This was chosen based on 
recommendations from Tore Høy. The NPD have applied a density of 857 kg/m3 in their calculations 
(pers. comm. Høy), which is equal to the density of the Realgrunnen reservoir of the Goliat field. 
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6.4.3 Duration 
The duration is a function of the different killing mechanisms. It will depend on the time of 
occurrence, and the probability of a mechanism to successfully kill the well. For this case, 3 different 
killing mechanisms are considered: 
- The blowout stops due to bridging. 
- The blowout stops due to successful drilling of a relief well. 
- The blowout is stopped by crew interventions (other than capping and relief well drilling). 
The duration curve is presented as a probability distribution in Fig. 26, which reflects the uncertainty 
of the different killing mechanisms. The attending distribution values are given in Table 26. 
 
Figure 26: Probabilistic blowout duration distribution, in days. 
Table 26: Distribution values for the duration density function. 
Distribution values Duration (days) 
Minimum 0 
P10 0 
P50 2 
P90 51 
Maximum 72 
Mean 10 
St. dev. 19 
 
The curve in Fig. 26 has several peaks because of the different killing mechanisms that interfere at 
different times. The 1st peak is a function of the implications bridging and crew interventions 
combined, as these mechanisms overlap in duration. Both durations are presented as exponential 
distributions. The 1st peak of the duration curve has a similar shape, with a steep inclination during 
the first few days. There is a 77 % chance that the blowout will be stopped due to bridging within the 
early phase of the blowout. The success probability and duration of a crew intervention will vary 
depending on release point (see section 6.3.3). Crew interventions are generally considered to be 
effective within a period of 14 days, but can also have a longer duration. Topside crew interventions 
have a 70 % success probability, while subsea crew interventions have a 43 % success probability. 
This leaves a small residual probability that the well is killed by a relief well. The 2nd (much lower) 
peak is caused by a dynamic kill from a relief well. The duration of this operation is a function of the 
mobilization time, drilling time, intersection time and killing time. These are represented by several 
probability distributions. The time to kill a blowout from a relief well is considered to vary between 
40 and 72 days. The maximum duration is therefore 72 days. 
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The duration is here independent of probabilistic scenarios such as release point, flow path, 
penetration depth and BOP opening. Consequently, it is represented by a single curve. However, it 
includes different durations for topside and subsea capping. The probabilistic duration is then 
calculated from the release point distribution. For some cases it might be beneficial to construct 
different blowout durations for different release points. This will be discussed further in section 6.7.  
The mean duration resulting from this case study is 10 days. This blowout duration correspond quite 
well to other ERAs in the area. The mean duration for the Goliat exploration well was estimated to be 
9 days (Aspholm et al., 2007). Due to the remoteness of the well of this case study, this deviation 
seems reasonable.  
6.4.4 Volume 
The volume is a function of the probabilistic distributions of both blowout flow rate and duration. 
Consequently, the volume is also given as a probability distribution. The volume will vary with type of 
fluid, release point, flow path and penetration depth. Each scenario has a probability distribution for 
total discharge volume. This results in a high amount of data, which will not be presented here. Fig. 
27 shows an example of the probabilistic total discharge volume of oil. The associated distribution 
values are given in Table 27. This table also includes oil discharge volume for other relevant release 
points and flow paths.  
 
Figure 27: Probabilistic total discharged volume distribution of oil, in m3. 
Table 27: Volume distribution values for both oil and gas for different scenarios. 
Distribution 
values 
Volume oil (m3) 
Topside Subsea Probabilistic 
Drill string Annulus Open hole Annulus 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 165 
P10 795 795 839 694 707 
P50 2 105 2 369 2 476 2 049 2 036 
P90 33 651 25 310 36 725 31 507 31 573 
Maximum 155 601 195 748 195 419 175 257 175 257  
Mean 10 285 11 149 11 634 9 693 10 195 
St. dev. 19 653 21 668 22 592 18 874 19 416 
 
Since the volume is a function of the flow rate and the duration distributions, it reflects uncertainty 
related to reservoir and well input, as well as uncertainty related to different killing mechanisms. The 
volume also reflects the flow rate over time. Thus, the effects of coning is here taken into account.  
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6.4.5 Summary 
BlowFlow presents flow rate, duration and volume as probability distributions. These are curves 
composed of 98 or 100 columns, where the value of each column has an associated probability. Table 
28 presents the mean values for flow rate, volume and duration for both oil and gas, for different 
release points and flow paths. A probabilistically weighted mean value is also shown to the right. The 
flow rate and volume will vary with type of fluid and scenario, while the duration remains constant. 
The flow rates and durations are typically applied as input to the ERA, through oil drift simulations. 
However, in this thesis oil drift simulations will not be performed. 
Table 28: Summary of mean values of flow rate, duration and volume for different release points and flow paths, for the 
mean reservoir penetration. 
Mean values at 
different scenarios 
Topside Subsea Probabilistic 
Drill string Annulus Open hole Annulus 
Flow rate oil (m3/d) 1 236 1 344 1 406 1 196 1 200 
Flow rate gas (m3/d) 247 288 268 820 281 241 239 191 240 056 
Duration (days) 10 10 10 10 10 
Volume oil (m3) 10 285 11 149 11 634 9 693 9 792 
Volume gas (Mm3) 2.1 2.2 2.3 1.9 2.0 
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6.5 Sensitivity study 
A sensitivity study should be performed to reveal which parameters contribute most to an increased 
risk. This involves investigate how uncertainty in input parameters is reflected in the final results. It 
also involves assessing how changes in one parameter is reflected in the final results. What would 
happen to the results if all input parameters were presented by single values? If uncertainty is not 
included in the analysis, it is more common to chose conservative approximations. A sensitivity study 
is here performed to enlighten the effect of varying input parameters such as reservoir conditions 
and well diameter. The sensitivity study emphasizes the effect on flow rate. It would also be possible 
to investigate the effect of altering duration input. However, the sensitivity to duration input will be 
assessed when identifying risk reducing measures in the following section. 
The flow rate is a function of reservoir conditions, well design and scenario. Fig. 28 shows which 
reservoir parameters’ uncertainty is most crucial to the flow rate distribution. Permeability and 
pressure are both parameters with high associated uncertainties. This will be strongly reflected in the 
probabilistic flow rate curve. Fig. 28 shows that the flow rate distribution is sensitive to uncertainty in 
both permeability and pressure. The flow rate is more sensitive to permeability, as the pressure has a 
more narrow triangular distribution. BOP opening, bit location, thickness and GOR have here been 
set as single values. Consequently, they do not contribute to uncertainty in the probabilistic flow rate 
curve. The productivity index is a function of permeability, and otherwise single value input. 
 
Figure 28: Flow rate sensitivity to uncertain input parameters in BlowFlow. 
Table 29 shows the effect of altering different input parameters on oil flow rate. The base case values 
are included in the “Default” column. The table shows how the mean flow rate varies when entering 
input as single values rather than probability distributions. BlowFlow does not allow all parameters to 
be given by probability distributions. Some of these parameters have a lot of uncertainty related to 
them. The table shows how increasing or decreasing these values will affect the mean flow rate. It 
can be seen that both skin factor and permeability are crucial parameters to the flow rate. 
Consequently, it might be beneficial to allow the skin factor to be presented as a probability 
distribution. Otherwise, the flow rate becomes a result of a conservative assumption. The skin factor 
has been set to 0 in the base case, which is relatively conservative. The GOR, reservoir thickness and 
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oil and gas gravities are also important parameters. A partially closed BOP is seen to have a negligible 
effect on flow rate. 
Table 29: Sensitivity of the mean flow rate to reservoir parameters and well diameter. 
Variable (other 
parameters constant) 
Default Value Mean flow rate oil (m3/d) 
Base case 1 200 
Permeability (mD) 2-100-150 50 667 
125 1 635 
300 3 590 
Pressure (bar) 210-220-240 216 1 110 
235 1 287 
260 1500 
Skin 0.0 5.0 696 
10.0 517 
Net thickness (m) 15.0 30.0 1 900 
GOR 200 100 1 043 
300 1 214 
Oil gravity (kg/m3) 800 820 969 
850 703 
Gas gravity (SG) 0.800 0.700 1 132 
0.900 1 250 
Well diameter (inches) 8 ½ 12 ¼ 1 284 
Penetration depth 20 % 
40 % 
40 % 
5 m 797 
50 % 1 033 
100 % 1 525 
BOP opening 100 % 5 %  1 192 
 
 
If uncertainty were neglected, a more conservative approach would have to be taken. A alternative 
case will here be presented to enlighten the effects of choosing conservative single values, rather 
than using probability distributions. As discussed above, the uncertainty in flow rate is a function of 
uncertainty in pressure and permeability. The uncertainty in the blowout duration is a function of the 
uncertainty in the time frames of the different killing mechanisms. In the example below, a simplified 
conservative case is presented. The reservoir parameters and durations applied are listed in Table 30. 
Table 30: Reservoir parameters and durations presented as conservative single values. 
Flow rate Reservoir parameter 
Pressure 235 bar 
Permeability 125 mD 
Duration Time frames 
Time for bridging to occur 8 days 
Crew interventions Topside 4 days 
Subsea 10 days 
Relief well Drilling time 40 days 
Intersection time 4 days 
Killing time 2 days 
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BlowFlow was run based on the single value input listed in Table 30. The results are presented in 
Table 31. The weighted mean topside flow rates have been calculated from the three possible flow 
paths, as a function of the flow path distribution of Table 9. 
Table 31: Distributions for flow rate and duration where all inputs are presented as single values. 
Flow rate (m3/d) Distribution 
Topside Subsea 
1 380 1 231 20.5 % 
1 779 1 631 40.1 % 
2 608 2 393 39.4 % 
Duration (days) Distribution 
(topside crew interventions)                                      4   13.9 % 
(bridging)                                                                        8 66.4 % 
(subsea crew interventions)                                     10   7.8 % 
(drilling of relief well)                                                 62 11.9 % 
 
If all these input values were represented by single values, the flow rate and duration curves would 
be considerably simplified. Excluding the uncertainty in input parameters will also exclude the 
uncertainty in the results. The flow rate presented in Table 31 is given by 3 columns; one for each 
penetration depth. The lowest flow rate corresponds to a 5 m reservoir penetration, etc. Thus, the 
flow rate distribution has been simplified to yield one flow rate for each scenario. The percentage 
distribution in Table 31 correspond to the penetration depth distribution of Table 20. There are some 
minor deviations in the percentages, as BlowFlow includes a limited number of simulations. The 
duration in Table 31 is presented by 4 columns; one for each killing mechanism. 
These distributions have been subject to a major simplification, when excluding the uncertainty. In 
the base case they were represented by smooth curves composed of 98 to 100 columns. Since input 
values are chosen conservatively, the results will be correspondingly higher. The environmental risk 
resulting from the more conservative flow rates and durations is investigated in section 7.3. 
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6.6 Risk management 
A high flow rate or a long duration will result in a greater oil spill volume, and hence a potential for 
greater consequences. As discussed in section 2.2, the risk is a function of both probability and 
consequences of a blowout. BlowFlow can be used to identify measures that can mitigate the 
consequences of a blowout. This is done through observing the effects of altering input parameters. 
Reservoir conditions cannot be changed at will, and is therefore unsuitable for identification of risk 
reducing measures. Parameters related to well design can also affect the flow rate. I.e. the well 
diameter will affect flow restrictions and the pressure profile of the well. As can be seen from Table 
29, changes in well diameter will not have any major effect on flow rate. Thus, this will not be applied 
as a risk mitigating measure in this case. 
The duration is a function of the different killing mechanisms. Since the duration is a probabilistic 
curve, changing one of the mechanisms will alter the curve. By evaluating the probability and time 
frame of each mechanism, risk mitigating measures can be identified. Coning and bridging are 
naturally occurring events that cannot be influenced by human activity. But capping and relief well 
drilling are active measures that can be affected by risk mitigating measures. Decreasing the time 
necessary to perform a killing operation can reduce the blowout duration. Increasing the probability 
of a killing mechanism to be successful can have a similar effect. 
The maximum blowout duration is set by the maximum time it takes to drill a relief well. Thus, 
reducing relief well drilling time will reduce the maximum duration. A contingency plan is required 
before drilling is initiated. This is especially important due to the remote location. There are mainly 
two identified risk mitigating measures with respect to relief well drilling: 
- Improved emergency preparedness by making sure relief well drilling rigs are available at a 
reasonable distance.  
- Detailed planning and an increased number of training courses to prepare drilling experts for 
an emergency situation. 
Keeping a relief well drilling rig available nearby will reduce the rig mobilization time significantly. It 
would be preferable to have two rigs available, as two relief wells should be drilled simultaneously. 
Initiating such a measure is assumed to yield a rig mobilization time of 6 days, compared to 14 for the 
base case. Detailed planning and an increased number of training courses is assumed to reduce the 
time to intersect the well, as it can increase the chance of successful intersection at the first attempt. 
The reduced intersection time is assumed to vary (uniformly) between 1 to 2 days. The drilling time is 
mostly a function of the rate of penetration. But through detailed planning it might be possible to 
choose a more appropriate well location and drilling path. Thus, it has been concluded that the 
drilling time can be reduced slightly. The new drilling time is presented as a triangular distribution (23 
– 33 – 52 days). These new time frames are listed in Table 32 (pers. comm. Fjelde). The killing time is 
here kept constant. 
In light of the Macondo accident, development of capping devices was initiated by several different 
companies. SWRP is currently working on developing subsea capping devices deployable around the 
world. When the development is completed, these devices are to be located at strategic locations. 
They will be available on the NCS for operators that have signed a contract with Oil Spill Response 
Limited (OSRL). For well cap deployment, it would be necessary to have access to a vessel or rig able 
to deploy the device. This vessel must include a crane with a high enough lifting capacity. Rough seas 
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and harsh weather conditions can be an obstacle, as lifting cranes often have a maximum wave 
working height. Keeping both vessel and well cap available at a reasonable distance will improve 
emergency preparedness, and reduce the time necessary to deploy the device. Emergency 
equipment delivered by SWRP can also increase the chance of manually overruling the BOP. This can 
increase the chance of a short blowout duration (typically 2 days). For the time being, this has not 
been embedded in the BlowFlow analysis due to lack of quantitative data. 
If a capping device is made available this could reduce the probability of a long-term blowout 
considerably. It can therefore be considered a major risk mitigating measure. For the purpose of 
investigating the effects of this risk reducing measure, it is assumed that this device becomes 
available prior to drilling of the case study well. However, the time to deploy this well cap is difficult 
to estimate, as these devices are not yet commissioned. It will depend on: 
- The decision time of the operator 
- Delivery time of equipment 
- Deployment time 
- Killing time 
There are no appropriate killing mechanisms available for simulating this in BlowFlow, as the capping 
mechanism is used to simulate more traditional crew interventions (see section 6.3.3). Since this 
section only addresses implications on blowout duration, it is chosen to simulate a well cap through 
the coning mechanism. Coning will only affect flow rate over time in this study. Thus, coning will not 
have any implications on the duration. If the effect of coning is set to 100 %, it can resemble the 
same kind of mechanism as capping. However, this will not allow presenting different input for 
subsea and topside blowouts. This new capping technology involves only subsea equipment. 
Therefore, the effect of capping will be slightly overestimated. 
Whether a blowout can be killed by a well cap will depend on condition at the release point. This will 
depend on the condition of the wellhead, whether the well is on fire, etc. According to Tormod 
Slåtsveen it is likely that a well cap can be deployed and kill the well within a time span of 10 to 18 
days after blowout initiation (pers. comm. Slåtsveen). It is chosen to present the deploying time as a 
Gaussian distribution as shown in Table 32 and Fig. 29. However, this is assuming that the well is 
“capable”. According to Tormod Slåtsveen, as many as 90 % of all subsea wells worldwide are 
considered to be “capable” (pers. comm. Slåtsveen). Since the well is assumed to have a 80 % 
probability of a subsea blowout, the success probability of the well cap is set to 72 %, to achieve the 
correct effect on the probabilistic duration curve. 
Table 32: Altered duration input after implementation of risk reducing measures. 
Killing 
mechanism 
Probability of 
success 
Duration (days) 
Relief well 100 % Mobilization time 6 
Drilling time Minimum Most likely Maximum 
23 33 52 
Intersection time Minimum Maximum 
1 2 
Well cap 72 % Time to deploy Mean Standard deviation 
13 1,3 
72 
 
Figure 29: Gaussian distribution of well cap deployment time, in days versus probability. 
BlowFlow was run with this new duration input, and the resulting probability curve is shown in Fig. 
30, with associated distribution values in Table 33. The effects of risk mitigating measures related to 
relief well drilling and well cap deployment on the blowout duration are shown both separately and 
simultaneously in Table 33. 
 
Figure 30: Probabilistic blowout duration distribution after implementation of risk reducing measures, in days. 
Table 33: Distribution values for the duration after implementation of risk reducing measures. 
Distribution 
values 
Duration (days) 
Base case Capping Relief well Both 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
P10 0 0 0 0 
P50 2 2 2 2 
P90 51 13 40 14 
Maximum 72 69 62 61 
Mean 10 6 9 6 
St. dev. 19 11 15 9 
 
Development of capping device applicable on the NCS will have a great implication on the blowout 
duration. It can be seen from Fig. 30 that the well cap shifts the curve to the left. Since capping has a 
high success probability, the residual probability that the blowout is killed by a relief well becomes 
much smaller. By comparing the columns “Capping” and “Relief well kill” of the Table 33, it can be 
seen that a well cap has a much greater implication on the duration, compared to the reduced 
drilling time of a relief well. The well cap reduces the duration distribution significantly. The mean 
duration is reduced from 10 to 6 days. But it will not influence the maximum duration, as this is still 
set by the maximum time to drill a relief well. The difference in the maximum duration with and 
without a well cap in the table is only a result of the limited number of simulations in BlowFlow.  
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6.7 Limitations 
The BlowFlow tool is still under development and is subject to continuous improvement. Simulation 
errors are continuously being excluded. Through this case study, it was experienced some 
shortcomings. The latest version seems to have overcome most of these problems. However, there 
still seems to be some limitations where there is room for improvement. 
There are several common flow paths that are not included in BlowFlow. Blowout data from the 
SINTEF database and Scandpower report indicate that there is a considerable amount of blowout 
data related to flow both outside the casing, especially for subsea blowouts.  It would therefore be of 
benefit if the model included these flow paths in future upgrades. The flow path outside casing is 
planned to be included in the model through the next project phase (pers. comm. Ford). Lack of the 
outside casing flow path is assumed to have a conservative implication, since there is likely to be 
more flow resistance outside the casing than inside the relatively open annulus.  For the present 
study, all subsea blowouts are assumed to flow through the annulus.  
The BOP opening distribution is set independently of flow path. It will therefore be equal for flow 
through the drill string, annulus or open hole. According to historical data in Table 8, the BOP 
opening distribution will vary with different flow paths (Haugsvold, 2011). Therefore, this would be 
an advantage to include in future upgrades. For an outside casing blowout, the BOP might be unable 
to restrict the flow. However, it can be seen from Table 29 that a partially closed BOP will only have a 
negligible effect on flow rate. 
Reservoir depletion is currently not part of the BlowFlow tool. Fig. 35 in appendix A indicates that 9 % 
of well incidents in the GoM OCS was stopped due to depletion. However, these data are based on 
incidents from 1960 – 1996. The distribution might look different if considering the last 16 years. In 
addition this article does not differentiate between blowout and well releases. Therefore, these data 
will not be weighted in this study. But it indicates that blowouts are sometimes stopped by natural 
depletion. In BlowFlow the reservoir pressure or hydrocarbon reserves are assumed constant. If the 
reservoir is drained, it can result in a decrease in flow rate. If the pressure is significantly reduced as a 
result of reservoir draining, the well might also seize to flow. The reservoir pressure can be 
maintained even though reserves diminish, due to a rise of the oil water contact. For the reservoir to 
be depleted during a blowout, the reservoir must either be small or have poor communication 
between zones. 
Currently, capping is the only active measure included in BlowFlow (other than relief wells). 
BlowFlow does not differentiate between capping and other crew interventions. The capping 
mechanism in BlowFlow is often used to simulate more traditional crew interventions. The default 
settings are therefore based on statistics on crew interventions from the Scandpower report 
(Haugsvold, 2011). This may be less appropriate since the well cap technology under development is 
referred to as capping. This can lead to confusion. These new capping devices will also have a 
different duration than other crew interventions. Therefore, it might be beneficial to include a 
separate mechanism to simulate crew interventions. As there are currently not enough appropriate 
mechanisms to simulate both, capping had to be simulated through the coning mechanism. This will 
yield a slightly underestimated duration since the coning mechanism cannot be specified for subsea 
operations only. 
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The duration in BlowFlow is given by a single probabilistic curve. It might beneficial to calculate 
separate durations for topside and subsea releases. This is commonly done in ERAs today. The 
complexity of a crew intervention will depend on whether the operation is performed subsea or 
topside. Subsea interventions are more complex, and might be more time-consuming than a topside 
intervention. The complexity will also depend on the water depth. But as mentioned, a topside 
blowout can sometimes escalate into a subsea blowout. As a result it might be difficult to estimate 
the difference in duration for these different release points.  
BlowFlow allows presenting input parameters as probability distributions of different forms. 
However, there are several input parameters that cannot be entered as distributions. Examples are 
skin factor (well damage) and oil and gas gravities. All these parameters are important for the flow 
rate of a potential blowout. Table 29 shows the changes in flow rate when altering these parameters. 
It would require a more complicated and time-consuming calculation process, but it should be 
possible to present these input values as distributions. This would allow expressing uncertainty on a 
more detailed level, rather than using conservative approximations. 
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7. OPERAto - Environmental risk 
In this thesis, OPERAto is used to analyze the environmental risk related to drilling of an exploration 
well in the former disputed area. Based on result from BlowFAM and BlowFlow, it is used investigate 
the consequences of a blowout to selected valued ecosystem components (VECs). This yields an 
overall environmental risk, which is compared to given acceptance criteria. It is also possible to study 
the effect of risk reducing measures. Since data are not available to apply OPERAto on a well in the 
former disputed area, the model applied for the Norne field is chosen as an example. Several 
conditions have been fixed in this model, and cannot be altered to reflect field specific conditions for 
the former disputed area. Therefore the resulting environmental risk will not be field specific. This is 
further discussed in section 7.5. 
To be able to reflect field specific conditions, the OPERAto worksheet would have to be re-
developed. This would require performing new oil drift simulations. This is a time-consuming process 
which would require employing professionals. Environmental data would also have to be changed to 
reflect VECs present in the southeastern Barents Sea. It was therefore not practically possible to 
construct a new worksheet for this case study.  
Even though the resulting environmental risk will be incorrect for a well in the former disputed area, 
the tool can still be used to perform a methodological study. The worksheet applied for the Norne 
field can indicate the functionality and purpose of this methodology. The objective is to determine 
the compatibility between the different computer modeling tools used in this thesis. This involves 
assessing how the results from BlowFAM and BlowFlow fit into OPERAto. Assessing blowout 
probability, flow rate and duration is the main focus in this thesis. This chapter will examine the tools 
ability to reflect uncertainty in input parameters, such as flow rate and duration. The main focus is to 
investigate the ability of OPERAto to allow the uncertainty to propagate, and be reflected in the final 
results.  
The effects of neglecting uncertainty and taking a more conservative approach on the environmental 
risk will be observed in section 7.3. The ability of OPERAto to work as a risk management tool is 
investigated in section 7.4. This is done by observing the implications of different risk reducing 
measures on the environmental risk. OPERAto can reflect how changes in input parameters influence 
the overall environmental risk. The reflection of uncertainty through the conservative approach and 
through the implementation of risk reducing measures will be assessed. 
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7.1 Input 
As explained earlier, certain data in OPERAto are fixed and cannot be changed. Values that can be 
changed are related to activity level, blowout probability and probability distributions for release 
point, flow rate and duration. OPERAto will use results from BlowFAM as input on blowout 
probability, while BlowFlow results are used to determine distributions for flow rate and duration. 
7.1.1 Blowout probability 
The blowout probability used in OPERAto is collected from the BlowFAM results. This is considered to 
yield the most well specific results, of the two approaches assessed chapter 5. BlowFAM yields an 
adjusted blowout probability of 7.58 × 10-5. 
7.1.2 Flow rate 
7 flow rates are given in OPERAto. These cannot be altered, as they were used as basis when the oil 
drift simulations were performed. However, the probability for each of these can be changed. The 
results from BlowFlow are used as basis when determining the flow rate distribution between these 
7 rates. The flow rate will vary with different scenarios. OPERAto can present different probability 
distributions for topside and subsea releases. The release point distribution used here is the one 
derived in section 5.1.5, with a 20 % chance of a topside release and 80 % chance of a subsea release. 
This is seen as the most appropriate since the BlowFAM release point distribution has not been 
adjusted according to recent statistics. OPERAto does not however, differentiate between different 
flow paths. 
BlowFlow presents the flow rate as a probability curve, as seen in Fig. 25. It consists of 98 columns, 
where each represents a flow rate with an associated probability. To be able to use this as input in 
OPERAto, it has to be converted to a discrete distribution. The 7 given flow rates for Norne are listed 
in column 1 of Table 34 below. Each of these rates must be given a specific probability. However, the 
maximum flow rate for Norne is set to 12 000 m3/d, while the maximum flow rate of the case study is 
3 377 m3/d. The flow rate is therefore distributed between the 5 lowest rates (200 – 5 000 m3/d).  
To find a probability for each of these 5 rates, the density curve from BlowFlow is re-distributed. This 
is done by dividing each of the 98 flow rates in BlowFlow, between the 2 closest rates of these 5. The 
98 flow rates with associated probabilities are read from the curve, and entered into an excel sheet. 
This had to be done for each of the 4 possible scenarios; subsea annulus, topside drill string, topside 
annulus and topside open hole. The flow rates that are lower than the smallest flow rate of OPERAto 
is considered to contribute 100 % to the lowest rate. For flow rates in between 2 values, the 
following formula was used: 
                        
Where: 
Q1 = The closest lower flow rate in OPERAto, m
3/d 
Q2 = The closest higher flow rate in OPERAto, m
3/d 
x = Probability contribution to the lower flow rate 
QBlowFlow = Flow rate of a given column in BlowFlow, m
3/d 
The equation is solved with respect to x, to determine the distribution between the lower and higher 
flow rate. This includes a high number of calculations, as it had to be performed for all 98 flow rates, 
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for 4 different scenarios. Thus, only one example will be included here. For a subsea blowout, one of 
the 98 columns has a flow rate of 726 m3/d, with an associated probability of 2.6 %. The closest lower 
flow rate in OPERAto is 600 m3/d, and the higher flow rate 1 200 m3/d. This is entered in the above 
formula, which is solved with respect to x: 
                                       
A distribution with a 79 % probability for flow rate 600 m3/d and 21 % for flow rate and 1 200 m3/d, 
correspond to the flow rate of 726 m3/d. These two probabilities are multiplied with the flow rate’s 
associated probability in BlowFlow. 
                                   
                                      
This means that this specific column yields a percentage contribution of 2.1 % to the lower flow rate 
of 600 m3/d, and 0.6 % to the higher flow rate of 1 200 m3/d.  
The probability for each rate can then be found by adding up the percentage contributions from each 
of the 98 flow rates. This must be done for both topside and subsea rates. As OPERAto does not 
differentiate between flow paths, the weighted mean flow between possible topside flow paths is 
applied. The flow path distribution in Table 9 is used as basis to calculate the weighted mean 
percentage contribution to each of the 5 applicable flow rates. As annulus is considered to be the 
only possible flow path for a subsea blowout, the distribution is found directly from the sum of each 
contribution. The total percentage contributions for both topside and subsea flow rates are listed in 
Table 34, and shown graphically in Fig. 31.  
Table 34: Discrete probability distribution of flow rate for subsea and topside blowouts used in the OPERAto base case 
analysis. 
Flow rate (m3/d) Distribution 
Topside Subsea 
200 1.6 % 4.0 % 
600 22.6 % 28.2 % 
1 200 51.2 % 50.2 % 
2 300 24.1 % 17.5 % 
5 000 0.5 % 0.1 % 
8 000 0.0 % 0.0 % 
12 000 0.0 % 0.0 % 
 
These distributions result in an overall mean flow rate of 1 216 m3/d. This is close to the mean flow 
rate of 1 200 m3/d given by BlowFlow. However, this new flow rate distribution is a major 
simplification compared to the flow rate curve in Fig. 25. Thus, the level of detail is compromised, 
and this limits the ability to reflect uncertainty. 
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Figure 31: Bar chart of blowout rate distribution for both subsea and topside used in OPERAto. 
7.1.3 Duration 
The 6 durations available in OPERAto are listed in Table 35. BlowFlow results are used as basis when 
determining the distribution between the given duration. The BlowFlow duration curve in Fig. 26, 
had to be converted to a discrete distribution, to fit into OPERAto. The durations and associated 
probabilities are read from the curve in Fig. 26, and entered in an excel sheet. The percentage 
contribution to each of the 6 given durations is calculated in the same manner as explained above. 
The results are presented in Table 35, and graphically in Fig. 32. This gives a weighted mean duration 
of 10 days, which is the same as the mean duration from BlowFlow. However, this re-distribution also 
implies a major simplification that limits the ability to allow the uncertainty to propagate. 
Table 35: Discrete probability distribution of blowout duration used in the OPERAto base case analysis. 
Duration (days) Distribution 
0.5 44.0 % 
2.0 18.5 % 
5.0 14.7 % 
14.0 6.7 % 
28.0 9.6 % 
84.0 6.5 % 
 
 
Figure 32: Histogram of blowout duration distributions used in OPERAto. 
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7.2 Results 
This section presents the environmental risk resulting from the base case input on blowout 
probability, flow rate and duration. It is important to emphasize that the results presented through 
this chapter does not represent the actual risk of the case study. The objective is to investigate the 
compatibility between the computer models, and how the uncertainty is reflected through OPERAto.  
Fig. 33 shows the risk contribution from drilling of an exploration well, in different seasons for open 
sea VECs. It includes both topside and subsea release for each season. The risk is presented as 
damage frequency per season, for each of 4 severity levels; minor, moderate, considerable and 
severe. These results can help to evaluate in which season the drilling activity poses the highest risk. 
If one season has a much higher risk, it can be concluded that drilling should not be performed in this 
season. Fig. 33 shows that drilling in the autumn poses a slightly higher risk than in other seasons. 
But this is not necessarily relevant for our case study, seeing that other resources are present at 
different times of the year in the former disputed area, compared to the Norne field. For coastal and 
beach VECs, this chart looks quite different. But due to the long distance to shore from the well of 
the case study, environmental risk in open sea areas will receive most focus. It is chosen to 
investigate the environmental risk associated with drilling of an exploration well in the autumn in the 
further study. 
 
Figure 33: Risk contribution from drilling of an exploration well in different seasons estimated by OPERAto. 
Fig. 34 presents the environmental risk to VECs at the open sea as a percentage of the acceptance 
criteria. It shows the risk for each of the 4 severity levels, and for each type of operation. Since 
drilling is the only operation that is performed in this study, the only risk is related to drilling. The 
percentages presented in this diagram are commonly used as decision support, to determine 
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whether an activity poses an acceptable risk or not. The environmental risk presented in Fig. 34 is 
considered low, as it constitutes less than 3 % of the acceptance criteria.  
 
Figure 34: Environmental risk as percentage of acceptance criteria, for 4 severity levels estimated by OPERAto. 
Table 36 lists the environmental risk to VECs related to drilling for the 3 different habitats: Open sea, 
coastal and beach. As for Fig. 34, the associated environmental risk low. The highest risk is related to 
a moderately serious incident for open sea VECs. The environmental risk here constitutes 2.3 % of 
the defined acceptance criteria. This moderately serious incident involves an incident with a 
restitution time of 1 to 3 years. Table 36 also presents the environmental risk index. This index is a 
function of the risk contribution from each of the 4 severity levels. The calculation of this index is 
shown in section 3.3.3. As the environmental risk index is an absolute value, it is a good means of 
comparing the risk between different cases or fields. The table shows that a blowout poses a greater 
risk for VECs in the open sea, compared to in coastal and beach habitats. The reason is the low 
probability of oil beaching. 
Table 36: Environmental risk as a percentage of acceptance criteria, for 3 different habitats. 
Severity level Environmental risk as % of acceptance criteria 
For open sea VECs For coastal VECs For beach VECs 
Minor 0.5 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 
Moderate 2.3 % 0.3 % 0.1 % 
Considerable 0.5 % 0.2 % 0.0 % 
Severe 0.4 % 0.1 % 0.0 % 
Environmental risk index 0.59 0.12 0.01 
 
The uncertainty that has been allowed to propagate is reflected in the distribution between the 4 
severity levels. A higher or lower level of uncertainty can result in a change in the severity level 
distribution. I.e. a higher flow rate or a longer duration would yield a greater risk contribution in the 
severe categories. Since the level of detail is considerably compromised in this example, the severity 
level distribution might not be completely accurate. Some alternative ways of presenting input is 
investigated in the next section. 
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7.3 Sensitivity study 
This section will investigate the implications of a conservative case on the environmental risk to open 
sea VECs. In this conservative case the uncertainty has been neglected in BlowFlow, and more 
conservative data has been chosen as input. If the methodology does not incorporate uncertainty in 
the analysis, or if there is limited data available, it is common to use conservative approximations. In 
section 6.5, relatively conservative single values have been chosen for reservoir conditions and 
duration input in BlowFlow. This has resulted in highly simplified distributions for flow rate and 
duration. This section will investigate the environmental risk associated with such an approach. The 
simplified distributions given in Table 31 must be re-distributed to be applicable in OPERAto. This is 
done in the same manner as above. The new distribution is listed in the Table 37.  
Table 37: New distribution for more conservative values without uncertainty, as input to alternative OPERAto analysis. 
Flow rate (m3/d) Distribution 
Topside Subsea 
1 200 43.8 % 35.7 % 
2 300 54.8 % 59.7 % 
5 000 1.4 % 4.6 % 
Duration (days) Distribution 
2.0 5.0 % 
5.0 57.0 % 
14.0 26.0 % 
28.0 4.7 % 
84.0 7.3 % 
 
The re-distribution of the simplified BlowFlow data does not involve any major simplification. Thus, 
the simplified conservative case of BlowFlow corresponds better to the level of detail incorporated in 
OPERAto. The data from Table 37 is applied as input in OPERAto through an alternative case. The 
resulting environmental risk is shown in the column “Conservative case” of Table 38. The risk is here 
compared to the risk of the base case. 
Table 38: Environmental risk to open sea VEC for a simplified and conservative case, estimated by OPERAto. 
Severity level Environmental risk as % of acceptance criteria 
Base case Conservative case 
Minor 0.5 % 0.8 % 
Moderate 2.3 % 3.4 % 
Considerable 0.5 % 0.7 % 
Severe 0.4 % 0.4 % 
Environmental risk index 0.59 0.65 
 
Table 38 yields an environmental risk which is considerably higher than for the base case. The 
environmental risk index has increase from 0.59 to 0.65, which corresponds to an increase of 10 %. 
The conservative case generally increases the risk in all severity levels, especially in the lower 
categories. When uncertainty is neglected, the severity level is shifted. This is a result of the much 
lower level of detail. 
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7.4 Risk management 
It is important to incorporate risk management into an ERA. OPERAto determines whether the risk is 
acceptable or not, by comparing the environmental risk against acceptance criteria. If the risk is too 
high, risk reducing measures should be considered. OPERAto can investigate the effects of different 
risk reducing measures by observing the relative effect on the environmental risk. Risk reduction and 
risk management has been incorporated in this case study regardless of the resulting environmental 
risk. This is to investigate the ability of the applied methodology to provide a basis for choosing and 
implementing risk reducing measures. The level of detail and reflection of uncertainty through the 
risk management process is also investigated. 
Possible risk reducing measures have been identified both through BlowFAM and BlowFlow. These 
measures were identified and implemented in section 5.2.7 and 6.6, respectively. The blowout risk is 
defined as a function of both probability and consequences of a blowout. Risk reducing measures 
identified in BlowFAM are preventive measures, which will reduce the probability of a blowout 
occurring. Risk reducing measures identified in BlowFlow will reduce the duration of a blowout, and 
can therefore mitigate the consequences. This section will investigate the effect of both preventive 
and risk mitigating measures on the environmental risk. 
If the risk reducing measures identified through BlowFAM are implemented, this will result in a 
blowout probability of 5.22 × 10-5. This is a 31 % reduction compared to the base case probability. 
The reduced probability can be entered directly in OPERAto, without any simplification. The 
environmental effect of this reduced probability alone can be seen in the column “BlowFAM” of 
Table 40. 
If the risk mitigating measures identified by BlowFlow are implemented, this will result in a duration 
distribution as shown in Fig. 30. The weighted mean duration is here 6 days, compared to the base 
case duration of 10 days. The reduced duration curve must be simplified and re-distributed to be 
applicable as OPERAto input. This is done in the same manner as above. The simplified duration 
distribution entered in OPERAto is listed in Table 39. This simplification will, as in the previous 
sections, result in a compromised level of detail. 
Table 39: Durations distribution after implementation of risk reducing measures from BlowFlow. 
Duration (days) Distribution 
0.5 43.0 % 
2.0 18.4 % 
5.0 16.3 % 
14.0 17.4 % 
28.0 3.8 % 
84.0 1.1 % 
 
The environmental effect of implementing the risk mitigating measures identified in BlowFlow is 
shown in the column “BlowFlow” of Table 40. The column “Both” present the environmental risk 
resulting from implementing risk reducing measures identified in both BlowFAM and BlowFlow 
simultaneously. 
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Table 40: Environmental risk to open sea VEC after implementing all risk reducing measures. 
Severity level Environmental risk as% of acceptance criteria 
Base case BlowFAM BlowFlow Both 
Minor 0.5 % 0.4 % 0.6 % 0.4 % 
Moderate 2.3 % 1.6 % 2.3 % 1.6 % 
Considerable 0.5 % 0.4 % 0.3 % 0.2 % 
Severe 0.4 % 0.3 % 0.2 % 0.1 % 
Environmental risk index 0.59 0.41 0.35 0.24 
 
Both preventive and consequence mitigating measures are seen to have a considerable effect on the 
environmental risk. The 31 % reduction in blowout probability has lead to corresponding 31 % 
reduction in the environmental risk index. The relative reduction in each severity level is relatively 
similar. One could say that the absolute risk is reduced. The relative reduction in the environmental 
risk as assumed to present an accurate result, as there is no simplification in the implementation 
preventive measures. 
The reduced blowout duration will also reduce the environmental risk index, and thus the overall 
risk. But the reduced duration will changed the distribution between the different severity levels. 
This is a result of the reduced probability of a long-term blowout. The risk of severe and considerable 
damage has been considerably reduced, relative to the lower severity levels. The risk in the lower 
severity levels are kept relatively constant. The accuracy of these measures is questionable, due to 
the considerable simplification in the duration distribution. However, it is assumed to yield a good 
indication of the relative risk reduction.  
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7.5 Limitations 
The OPERAto worksheet applied in this thesis was originally constructed for the Norne field. This has 
resulted in several limitations. The oil type used in OPERAto is the Norne oil. The case study oil type 
resembles the Goliat oil from Kobbe, which has a slightly different density and composition (pers. 
comm. Aas). The oil type will be important to oil persistence and dispersion characteristics, and 
therefore also to the oil drift simulations. As a result it will yield inaccurate results in relation to the 
area of influence, and the extent of damage to VECs. 
The Norne field is located approximately 150 km off the coast, in the northern part of the Norwegian 
Sea. The case study well, on the other hand, is located approximately 300 km off the coast of 
Finnmark in the southeastern Barents Sea. Since Norne has an entirely different location, the wind 
and current systems will be completely different. The prevailing wind and current conditions used in 
the oil drift simulations are from the northern Norwegian Sea. As a result, the oil drift simulations 
used in OPERAto will not be representative for the case study. The influence area, and also the risk 
level, will therefore be incorrect for the area in question.  
OPERAto is based on input on environmental resources present in the northern part of the 
Norwegian Sea. Seabirds are considered the most important VECs here, and are therefore used as 
the study object. However, the type and number of seabirds present in the southeastern Barents Sea 
may be different. OPERAto presents the risk as a percentage of these acceptance criteria. Seeing that 
neither the area of influence nor the number of seabirds killed is relevant for the case study well, the 
resulting environmental risk will be incorrect. The area of influence from Norne stretches beyond the 
Lofoten area. This area is highly productive and might contain a lot of valuable natural resources. 
Therefore, the environmental risk might be considerably overestimated, and not numerically 
relevant for the southeastern Barents Sea. This is emphasized in order to avoid any possible 
misunderstandings regarding environmental risk in the former disputed area, based on calculations 
made in this study. 
The given flow rates and durations cannot be altered, since these have been used when performing 
the oil drift simulation. As a result, these values may not be the most representative for this case 
study. The wells at the Norne field are considered to be far more productive than the well of the case 
study. I.e. the maximum flow rate at Norne is set to 12 000 m3/d, while the maximum flow rate given 
by BlowFlow 3 377 m3/d. Flow rate 6 and 7 from Table 3 are much higher than the BlowFlow values. 
The flow rate distribution must therefore be divided between the 5 lowest rates in OPERAto. This 
limits the models ability to reflect uncertainty. Flow rate 1 is a bit higher than the minimum flow rate 
from BlowFlow. This will yield results that are a bit conservative, as everything below 200 m3/d is 
included in this rate. 
The flow rate and duration curves in Fig. 25 and 26 from BlowFlow must be considerable simplified to 
be applied as input in OPERAto. By comparing these curves with the diagrams given in Fig. 31 and 32, 
it can be seen that the level of detail has been severely compromised. This limits the ability to reflect 
uncertainty on a detailed level, as was proposed in Fig. 1. OPERAto does not differentiate between 
different flow paths. Thus, the weighted mean flow rate from different flow paths must be calculated 
for BlowFlow results to be applicable in OPERAto. This will also compromises the level of detail. 
However, it is less common to include different flow rates for different flow paths in ERAs today 
(Aspholm et al., 2007).  
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8. Discussion 
The Barents Sea is an area of increasing interest from oil and gas operators. The oil production on the 
NCS is declining, thus the industry must move further north to explore new prospects. The areas off 
Lofoten and the Barents Sea are rich in environmental resources like fish, seabirds, sea mammals and 
special coastal areas. Whether these areas should be opened for exploration and year-round 
petroleum activity have been subject to political debate for many years. In 2004 it was agreed to 
open the Barents Sea, with the exception of some areas (Hasle et al., 2009). 
There are several factors related to physical conditions that makes the Barents Sea more challenging 
for offshore petroleum activity, compared to further south (Allen, 2011, Sutyagin et al., 2007):  
- Proximity of the sea ice 
- Rough seas and harsh weather 
- Relatively frequent formations of polar lows 
- Risk of sea spray and atmospheric icing 
- Reduced visibility 
- Long dark winters 
- Remoteness and limited infrastructure 
These factors might complicate design, oil spill preparedness, rescue operations and attempts to kill 
a blowout. As the industry moves north-eastwards the offshore developments become even more 
challenging due remoteness and lack of infra structure. As a result of these factors, the consequences 
of a accident may be more serious in the Arctic region compared to warmer areas.  Enhanced system 
integrity and operational certainty will be of increasing importance (Allen, 2011).  
The Barents Sea contains important spawning areas for several specimens of fish, such as capelin. 
Cod and herring spawning areas are typically located further south. During spawning season large 
portions of a specific specie is gathered in a smaller area. Eggs and larvae are much more susceptible 
to damage from external stress factors than adult fish. Unlike adult fish, they are normally not able to 
escape polluted areas. Therefore, most spawning areas are closed for drilling activities, either year-
round or certain times of the year. However, in case of a large-scale oil spill in areas nearby, it is still 
possible that these areas can be exposed (Hjermann et al., 2007). Seabirds are among the most 
vulnerable species, because they cannot easily avoid an oil spill. If a larger area is polluted it could kill 
a large portion of a seabird population. Seabirds are considered to be the most valued ecosystem 
component for the Norne field in OPERAto. Thus, seabirds will be considered for determination of 
the environmental risk in this study. What type of species this includes will not be discussed in 
further detail. 
After agreement of the maritime delimitations between Norway and Russia, it is likely that the 
formed disputed area will be opened for petroleum exploration in the near future. Whether any 
recoverable oil resources will be found in the southeastern Barents Sea is uncertain. Geologic history 
indicates that hydrocarbon resources might have leaked out due to high erosion and uplift through 
several ice ages. Seismic surveys indicate that the remaining resources are most likely gas. However, 
it might be possible that an oil reservoir could be trapped beneath a salt structure (pers. comm. Høy). 
The risk of a blowout in this area has been determined, assuming that an oil reservoir was discovered 
at a depth of 2 000 m. This involves determining blowout probability, flow rate and duration. Due to 
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variations in geological conditions, well configuration, location and organizational factors, the risk 
will vary from well to well. Therefore, this case study has attempted to determine these parameters 
in a well specific manner. Two different approaches have been used to determine the blowout 
probability. The results and limitations of these approaches will be further discussed in section 8.1. 
BlowFlow was used to determine flow rate and duration of a potential blowout in a probabilistic 
manner. This will be further discussed in section 8.2. 
OPERAto yields the environmental risk as a function of blowout probability, flow rate and duration. 
However, the resulting risk is not correct with respect to the well of the case study. The OPERAto 
worksheet is based on oil drift simulations, oil type and environmental data for the Norne field. 
OPERAto is only used to perform a methodological study. The compatibility between the different 
models, and the ability of OPERAto to reflect uncertainty is discussed in section 8.3. The sensitivity of 
the environmental risk to different risk mitigating measures will also be investigated, to assess the 
tools’ applicability in risk management. 
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8.1 Blowout probability 
There is currently a wide range of different approaches used to determine blowout probability for a 
specific well or operation. Many of these approaches are based on statistics, such as historical 
blowout data from the SINTEF database and Scandpower report (Haugsvold, 2011, Holand, 2010). 
Statistical probabilities are often adjusted to reflect recent technological and operational 
improvements, as shown in Fig. 14. To reflect recent improvements and well specific conditions it is 
necessary to consider formation properties, well configuration, equipment, procedures and 
management. There are also several models developed to determine the blowout probability in a 
more mechanistic, well specific manner. In this thesis two different approaches to determine 
blowout probability will be evaluated. A brief comparison is included at the end of this chapter.  
8.1.1 Statistical approach 
The first method is a statistical approach that adjusts the basic blowout probability by consideration 
of recent trends in kick statistics. For a hypothetical case, as in this case study, it is difficult to assess 
factors like BOP reliability, procedures and technology quantitatively. This would also be a time-
consuming process, and due to the limitations of this thesis these factors have not be given any 
credit here. Scandpower states that the basic blowout probability is 1.23 × 10-4 for an exploratory 
oil well (Haugsvold, 2011). However, this basic probability presents an industry average, and does 
not reflect recent trends in statistics. 
The kick frequency has been considerably reduced during the past decades. According to Fig. 15, the 
average kick frequency has been reduced by 40 % in more recent time. The kick frequency varies 
from year to year, and using the mean value as basis could lead to an underestimation of the 
blowout risk. It is also taken into consideration that the kick frequency in 2010 was relatively high. 
There is a relatively high uncertainty related to the annual kick frequency. Thus, a relatively 
conservative reduction of 20 % is used as an approximation. The kick frequency is assumed to be 
directly correlated to the blowout frequency, as a kick is often the initiating event of a blowout, Thus, 
this 20 % reduction is directly applied to the basic blowout probability. This results in a blowout 
probability of 9.84 × 10-4. 
The modified blowout probability does not involve a considerable risk reduction, compared to other 
fields on the NCS (Brandt et al., 2010). But compared to the ERA for the Goliat exploration well, 
where the historical blowout probability has been applied directly, this approach involves a  reduced 
risk. If an evaluation of BOP reliability, equipment, human errors and organizational factors were 
conducted, the risk could potentially have been reduced even further. If the assessment was 
performed related to a specific operator or organization, some of these improvements could have 
been given credit. 
Release point and flow path distribution have also been determined based on the SINTEF database 
and Scandpower report. For a subsea exploration well, a subsea release point is seen as the most 
probable. Common flow paths for a subsea release are through annulus and outside casing (Holand, 
2010, Haugsvold, 2011). As flow on the outside of the casing is not included in BlowFlow, it will be 
disregarded in the flow path distribution. Annulus is therefore seen as the only possible flow path for 
a subsea release. For a topside release the possible flow paths are through the drill string, annulus or 
open hole. The Scandpower data in Table 8 indicate that annulus flow is the more probable flow path 
for a topside release (Haugsvold, 2011). 
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This statistical blowout probability assessment cannot be considered as mechanistic, as it is purely 
based on statistics and recent trends. It does not incorporate well specific conditions in the 
assessment. This is not a good basis for evaluating whether the risk is acceptable or not (Arild et al., 
2008). It does not provide any basis for making risk management decisions, as it is not applicable for 
identifying risk reducing measures. Neither well specific conditions nor uncertainty in different 
parameters have been included in this assessment. 
8.1.2 BlowFAM 
The second approach used in this thesis is Scandpower’s computer model BlowFAM. This has been 
developed to adjust statistic blowout probabilities through a consideration of well specific conditions 
such as well configuration, operating procedures, planning/organization and formation properties. It 
determines a basic blowout probability for a given activity, based on statistics from the SINTEF 
database (Holand, 2010). For deep drilling of an oil containing exploration, BlowFAM yields a basic 
blowout probability of 2.1 × 10-4. This does not correspond to the basic blowout probability given by 
the Scandpower report, which is 1.23 × 10-4. This deviation is caused by the lack of updated statistics 
in the computer model. It is based on statistics from 2003. The tool is now subject to modification. 
But for the time being, the basic blowout probability must be corrected by a manual adjustment. 
The basic blowout probability is adjusted through several steps. In the first part of BlowFAM, relevant 
blowout causes are adjusted through an evaluation of well configuration and formation properties. 
An adjustment factor of 0.803 has resulted from the given input. This adjustment is applied to the 
basic blowout probability, and has resulted in a risk reduction of almost 20 %. This means that well 
and reservoir characteristics yield a blowout probability lower than that of an average well. Seeing 
that a reservoir in the present case study is considered to have a low productivity, this seems 
reasonable. The risk reduction might be higher if less conservative input had been applied. As Table 
15 shows, a wider drilling window would reduce the risk considerably. But as there is limited 
knowledge of pressure profiles in the area, the uncertainty related to such parameters is high.  
In the second part of BlowFAM, 300 risk elements related to frame conditions, management, 
equipment and procedures are evaluated to determine a second adjustment factor. There is limited 
knowledge with respect to many of the risk elements. It is for example difficult to say anything about 
the risk related to organizational factors for a hypothetical situation. Ideally, a BlowFAM analysis 
should be performed through close cooperation with the operator and drilling professionals. The risk 
elements considered to contribute to a reduced or increased risk in this case study are mostly related 
to physical conditions at the location and recent technological and operational improvements. 
Through the evaluation of risk elements an adjustment factor of 0.767 has resulted. This involves a 
23 % reduction of the blowout probability. If more knowledge is available, and operators and drilling 
professionals are included in the assessment, it might be possible to reduce the risk further. 
The final blowout probability, after applying each adjustment factor, becomes 7.58 × 10-5. This 
involves an overall reduction of 38 %, compared to the basic blowout probability. This is considered 
to be a moderate risk reduction (Brandt et al., 2010). 
BlowFAM also presents release points, flow paths and BOP opening distribution. This is shown in 
Table 14 and Fig. 16. These data resemble the historical data given in Table 8. However, there are 
deviations between the given distributions. This is because the statistics in BlowFAM have not been 
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updated since 2003. Table 8 reflects historical data up to 2008. BlowFAM is currently being updated 
with respect to recent statistics. 
BlowFAM allows identifying risk reducing measures directly, by evaluating different risk elements in 
the second part of BlowFAM. A number of these elements has the possibility to reduce the 
probability of a blowout occurring. Such measures are therefore referred to as preventive. Through 
the evaluation of risk contributing elements, weak areas can be detected (Dervo and Blom-Jensen, 
2004). Several possible preventive measures are identified and listed in appendix E.3. If these are 
implemented, it will lead to a 31 % reduction in the blowout probability. The blowout probability 
after this risk reduction becomes 5.22 × 10-5. Consequently, it can be concluded that BlowFAM can 
serve as a tool to aid decision making, through a risk management process. 
Whether all these risk reducing measures are economical, or even necessary in reality must be 
assessed according to the ALARP principle. If the risk is more than half of the environmental risk 
acceptance criteria, risk reduction should be considered. The cost of each measure should not be 
disproportionate to the benefit gained. Considering the risk elements in a cost-benefit manner will 
help identify which elements yield the highest risk reduction per cost. Risk reducing measures should 
be implemented until it is no longer economically feasible. Thus, it might not be necessary to 
implement all the risk elements identified. It might not be necessary to implement any at all, as it will 
depend on the resulting risk level and the cost of the different risk elements. 
BlowFAM is supposed to be updated each year with respect to historical blowout data, according to 
changes in the annual SINTEF report. However, this has not been done since 2003. Thus, the basic 
probabilities embedded in the model do not correspond to the most recent blowout data. A manual 
adjustment has been implemented to adjust the basic blowout probability to reflect today’s risk 
level. The lack of recent modifications is not only reflected in the basic blowout probability. The 
historical cause distribution shown in table 12 will continuously change as incidents are added or 
removed from the database. This is also the case for release point, flow path and BOP opening 
distributions. The distributions presented by BlowFlow are all based on data from 2003. 
The list of risk elements should also be reviewed regularly. These elements have not been thoroughly 
updated after development of the model. As a result, many of the elements may not be relevant at 
all. There have been significant improvements in technology since 1995, and other types of 
equipment may be used. This list should therefore be re-evaluated, to add new risk elements and 
remove those that are no longer applicable. 
BlowFAM does not allow reflecting uncertainty in input parameters. Parameters such as drilling 
window and pore pressure are associated with a high uncertainty. The drilling window is especially 
crucial to the blowout risk. Since the model does not allow any uncertainty in input parameters, the 
blowout probability becomes a result of an assumption; in this case that the drilling window is 0.8 
SG. Allowing input parameters in BlowFAM to be presented as probability distributions would be 
difficult, as this would require an entirely different calculating engine. If uncertainty in input 
parameters were allowed, the final probability would also have to be presented as probability 
distributions. As of today, the blowout probability is commonly presented as a single value. This is 
also seen in Fig. 1. A sensitivity study was conducted in section 5.2.6 to enlighten the effects of 
varying input parameters. This can enlighten which parameters contribute most to an increased risk. 
This might initiate a discussion about the reasoning behind crucial parameters. By gaining more 
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detailed knowledge form e.g. seismic surveys, the uncertainty could be reduced. This could eliminate 
the need for conservative assumptions. 
8.1.3 Comparison 
There is a deviation between the results of the two different blowout probability assessment 
approaches. The statistical approach yields a blowout probability of 9.84 × 10-5, while BlowFAM 
yields a probability of 7.58 × 10-5. Even though both models are based on statistics, they consider 
very different aspects. BlowFAM has several advantages compared to the more traditional statistical 
approach. If the computer model was updated with respect to both recent statistics and the risk 
elements included, it could work as a flexible tool able to predict blowout risk in a well specific 
manner. BlowFAM also eases the risk management process. Through the risk element evaluation it 
can help detect weak areas. However, this model requires an understanding of risk elements, as well 
as competence in drilling and completion, to obtain detailed input data and accurate results. It is 
therefore preferable to  involve experts, operators and/or contractors in the blowout probability 
assessment (Dervo and Blom-Jensen, 2004).  
The more traditional statistical approach does not require this level of competence, as it is based on 
publications. Basic blowout probabilities collected from statistics present an industry average. 
Consequently, it does not consider the specific properties of the well in question. The uniqueness of 
each drilling operation becomes difficult to incorporate into the analysis. Moreover, it does not 
consider typical risk contributors such as pressure margins, procedures and equipment. Possible risk 
reducing measures will relate to these factors. If they are not reflected in the analysis it is difficult to 
identify and evaluate possible risk reducing measures. Thus, it is not a good basis for making sound 
risk management decision. But the results are relatively easy to communicate (Arild et al., 2008).  
Seeing that BlowFAM is considered to yield more well specific results than the more statistical 
approach, this blowout probability was used further in the study. The blowout probability of the case 
study is therefore set to 7.58 × 10-5. But due to the lack of updated release point, flow path and BOP 
opening distributions in BlowFAM, it was concluded to use the scenario distributions from the 1st 
approach. The distributions from the 1st approach are summarized in Table 9 of section 5.1.5. 
None of these models can be defined as mechanistically based approaches, as they are both based 
on statistics rather than calculations based on driving mechanisms. BlowFAM also involves a high 
number of assessment factors. Each element is evaluated by the user. How much each element is 
weighted becomes a result of the opinion of the analyst. A positive or negative score given for each 
element becomes an assumption, rather than a number collected from seismic data or the drilling 
program. This results in a subjective and not necessarily a scientific basis. Neither of them allow to 
reflect any uncertainty. Both input and results are given as single values. Due to these factors the two 
blowout probability assessment models deviate from the mechanistic approach of BlowFlow.  
KickRisk is another tool used to evaluate blowout risk and possible scenarios in a more mechanistic 
manner. This tool is a predecessor of BlowFlow, and these tools are often used in combination. A 
KickRisk simulation is time-consuming, and relies on expert judgment when assessing input 
parameters. This tool have therefore not been employed in this thesis. 
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8.2 BlowFlow - Blowout scenarios 
As of today, there is no common standardized methodology among oil companies for calculation of 
blowout rate and duration. MIRA states that a sufficient number of probable flow rates and duration 
should be established, for use in an environmental risk assessment (Brude, 2007). Today’s practice 
varies greatly from company to company. The reasoning behind a selected methodology might be 
difficult to access, and the calculations hard to track. As a result, it might be hard to compare flow 
rates and durations from field to field (Arild et al., 2008). OLF has produces guidelines on how to 
determine flow rate and duration, for use in an ERA, in a probabilistic manner (Nilsen et al., 2004). 
Traditionally, flow rates and duration have often been determined based on statistical or 
conservative values. A purely statistical approach calculates the blowout rate and duration based on 
historical data. This limits the ability to incorporate the uniqueness of each well in the assessment. If 
a more conservative approach is taken, this would yield worst-case scenarios. A major disadvantage 
of this approach is that the results may be unrealistic. Risk reducing measures will then be over-
dimensioned. Neither of these approaches handles uncertainty properly. Consequently, they do not 
provide the framework necessary for making sound risk management decisions (Arild et al., 2008).  
BlowFlow is a computer tool developed by IRIS to determine blowout rate and duration in a 
probabilistic and well specific manner. It is a mechanistic approach that simulates a high number of 
scenarios, by enabling risk based quantification. The simulations are based on a wide range of input 
parameters related to reservoir conditions, well design, killing mechanisms and scenario 
distributions. The uncertainty in input parameters is allowed to propagate and be reflected in the 
end result. It allows the user to assess uncertainty on a detailed level, by understanding how the 
uncertainty of each parameter propagates to the overall uncertainty picture. It is necessary to 
communicate these probabilistic elements through the different steps of the analysis. 
BlowFlow can aid the risk management process by providing a common platform for communication 
between geologists, HSE-engineers and drilling engineers. This involves identifying risk reducing 
measures, by observing the effects of varying input parameters. BlowFlow can also help to dimension 
oil spill preparedness, as it predicts possible flow rates and durations. 
8.2.1 Flow rate 
In this study focus has been on oil flow rate. BlowFlow presents flow rate for both oil and gas, for 
each single scenario. However, gas is considered to be less harmful with respect to VECs, as it 
typically evaporates relatively quickly. When performing oil drift simulations, these are typically 
based on oil flow rate. Thus, oil flow rate has been in focus in this study. 
The flow rate varies for different types of scenarios such as release point, flow path and penetration 
depth. This is a result of the flow restrictions and pressure profiles of the well. A flow rate curve is 
presented for each combination of release point and flow path. Fig. 25 presents the probabilistic flow 
rate distribution, which is the weighted mean between the different scenarios. Each flow rate curve 
is presented as a probability distribution. The flow rate ranges from a minimum of 114 m3/d to a 
maximum of 3 377 m3/d. The flow rate can be any value within this range. The flow rates can be 
estimated for a single scenario, or as the weighted mean value from different scenarios. This allows 
representing uncertainty on a detailed level. If more detailed data on reservoir conditions were 
collected, this might indicate that the flow rate lies in the upper range of the distribution.  
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The flow rate is a function of wide range of reservoir parameters, well design and scenario 
distributions. Which input parameters that contribute most to an increased flow rate was 
investigated through a sensitivity study in section 6.5. This can help establish a discussion between 
analyst and decision makers, in terms of how to reduce the impact of a blowout. The reasoning 
behind the assessed figures is evaluated. This gives a good background for discussing the benefits  of 
for example a revised will design or for collecting more subsurface information (Arild et al., 2008). 
Table 29 indicates that permeability, pressure, skin factor (well damage) and gravity are important 
parameters. Permeability and pressure are both parameters with high associated uncertainties. Their 
uncertainty is strongly reflected in the probabilistic flow rate curve in Fig. 25. This can easily be seen 
from Table 30, where the uncertainty in these parameters has been neglected. 
BlowFlow allows presenting input parameters as probability distributions of different forms. 
However, there are certain input parameters that cannot be entered as distributions. Examples are 
skin factor (well damage) and oil and gas gravities. Table 29 demonstrates that these parameters are 
important for the flow rate of a potential blowout. Consequently, it might be beneficial to present 
these input values as distributions. Otherwise, conservative approximations might have to be chosen. 
Due to a high uncertainty, the skin factor is assumed relatively conservative. This will also have a 
conservative implication on the flow rate. Presenting this parameter as a distribution, would allow 
expressing uncertainty on a more detailed level, rather than using conservative approximations. 
In BlowFlow the flow rate distribution decreases rapidly with time. One curve is given for each day, 
for each scenario. This is a reflection of the different killing mechanisms. In reality, the flow rate is 
constant if none of the killing mechanisms have occurred. Therefore, the flow rate at day 0 has been 
used as basis in this case study. Using the flow rate at day 0 will however excluded the effects of 
coning. But if using the flow rate at day 1, this would include a reduced flow as a result of bridging 
and crew interventions. This would be unrealistic, as the flow rate is not really reduced by these 
mechanisms. They will only increase the probability that the blowout has been killed, and that the 
flow rate is 0 m3/d. 
According to historical data, a significant amount of subsea incidents are related to blowouts outside 
the casing (Holand, 2010, Haugsvold, 2011). At present, this flow path is not included in BlowFlow. 
But in light of the Macondo accident, there has been an increased focus on outside casing blowouts. 
Thus, this flow path is planned to be included in the model in near future. However, it might be 
difficult to predict flow patterns and friction on the outside of the casing. It is considered reasonable 
to assume that the outside casing flow is small, compared to flow through the relatively open 
annulus. Excluding flow outside the casing, in favor of annulus flow, will therefore result in a higher 
overall flow rate. However, it is desirable to achieve as realistic results as possible. A higher degree of 
conservatism results in a lower overall accuracy. 
The overall mean flow rate resulting from the BlowFlow assessment is 1 200 m3/d. This is quite low 
compared to other fields on the NCS, and further west in the Barents Sea. This is in spite of the above 
mentioned limitations regarding the skin factor and outside casing flow. The flow rates estimated in 
the ERA for the Goliat exploration well provides an example. The Kobbe reservoir has a weighted 
mean flow rate of 3 288 m3/d (Aspholm et al., 2007). This is considerably higher than for well of this 
case study. The low flow rates are caused by the poor reservoir conditions in the area. According to 
Tore Høy, an oil reservoir at the given depth is likely to have a poor productivity (pers. comm. Høy). It 
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might be possible to find fields with higher productivity in this new area. It might also prove to be 
merely a gas province. 
Flow rates in the southeastern Barents Sea have been predicted by the NPD. These have currently 
not been published, but according to Tore Høy they are as follows (pers. comm. Høy): 
- P95: 239 m3/d 
- P50: 717 m3/d 
- P05: 1592 m3/d  
The flow rates predicted by the NPD are lower compared to those given by BlowFlow. This is 
presumably due to a difference in certain input parameters applied in the analysis. In this case study, 
the oil gravity was based on the gravity of the Kobbe reservoir of the Goliat field (800 kg/m3). This 
was chosen based on recommendations from Tore Høy. The NPD have applied an oil gravity of 857 
kg/m3 in their calculations (pers. comm. Høy). As can be seen from Table 29, a density of 850 kg/m3 
in BlowFlow would yield a mean flow rate of 703 m3/d. This correspond better the flow rates 
predicted by the NPD. 
8.2.2 Duration 
The duration is a function of the different killing mechanisms, and the release point distribution. It 
will depend on the time of occurrence, and the probability of a mechanism to successfully kill the 
well. There are several different killing mechanisms considered in the base case. Some are naturally 
occurring, while others are active measures initiated by the crew. The duration curve is presented as 
a probability distribution that reflects the uncertainty of the different killing mechanisms (see Fig. 
26). This allows a detailed reflection of uncertainty, and a high level of detail.  
The duration in BlowFlow is presented as a single probabilistic curve. This means that it is given 
independently of release point, flow path, penetration depth and BOP opening. However, BlowFlow 
differentiates between the duration of crew interventions for topside and subsea releases. The 
duration is currently found by weighting the mean duration of different release points. It might be 
desirable to present a probabilistic duration curve for each release point. A subsea intervention is 
typically more complex, and might be more time-consuming than a topside intervention. Subsea 
blowouts typically have a longer duration than topside blowouts. In ERAs today, it is common to 
present one duration for each release point. This is also embedded in OPERAto. If BlowFlow 
presented one curve for each release point, a higher level of detail could be maintained through the 
analysis. 
Currently, capping is the only active measure included in BlowFlow. Seeing that well caps are not 
available at the NCS today, they are not included as a killing mechanism in the base case of this 
study. The capping mechanism in BlowFlow is commonly used to apply more traditional types of 
crew interventions. The default settings of this mechanism are based on statistics on crew 
interventions from the Scandpower report (Haugsvold, 2011). This may lead to confusion since the 
well cap technology is under development. These new capping devices will also have a different 
duration than the traditional crew interventions. Therefore, it might be beneficial to include a 
separate mechanism to simulate crew interventions in the future. 
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The duration found from BlowFlow in this case study seems reasonable, compared to other fields on 
the NCS. The mean duration estimated for the exploration well at the Goliat field was 9 days 
(Aspholm et al., 2007). This corresponds well to the duration of 10 days found in this case study. The 
location of the well of this case study is further from shore. Due to remoteness, a slightly longer 
duration seems reasonable. 
8.2.3 Uncertainty 
Through BlowFlow, the flow rates and duration can be determined on a detailed level, with a high 
reflection of uncertainty. Uncertainty in input parameters has here been allowed to propagate and 
be reflected in the probabilistic curves of the final results. By allowing input to be presented as 
probability distributions, one can avoid over-estimating the risk. If only single values were used as 
input, this would typically include more conservative estimations. Conservative assumptions are 
commonly used to account for uncertainty. An example is shown in section 6.5, where uncertain 
parameters have been set to conservative single values. This has resulted in much simplified and 
more conservative results. The major drawback of such an approach is that the scenarios generated 
may be unrealistic, thus over-dimensioning risk reducing measures. This conservative approach does 
not provide the framework necessary for making sound risk management decisions (Arild et al., 
2008). 
By including a high degree of uncertainty in the analysis, as in BlowFlow, detailed and realistic results 
can be achieved. This uncertainty should be allowed to propagate in the ERA, to obtain the same 
level of detail in the following steps and in the resulting environmental risk. Fig. 1 presents such an 
assessment, where the environmental risk and recovery time is presented as probability 
distributions. To utilize the full potential of BlowFlow to perform detailed assessments, the level of 
detail must be maintained throughout the ERA. 
8.2.4 Risk management 
BlowFlow can be applied as a decision support tool, to assess which input parameters contribute 
most to an increased risk. Decision-makers can be informed about potential outcomes, driving forces 
and mechanisms affecting the blowout risk. The analysis is detailed with respect to which factors that 
contributes to a high flow rate and duration. As it helps improve communication between geologists, 
HSE-engineers and drilling engineers, it provides a common platform for risk informed decision 
making (Arild et al., 2008). 
Risk mitigating measures have been identified in section 6.6. The implications of a risk mitigating 
measures can be investigated by observing the effects of altering input parameters. As reservoir 
parameters cannot be changed at will, these cannot be used to identify such measures. Risk 
mitigating measures implemented in this case study are related to killing mechanisms and blowout 
duration. The identified measures involve minimizing the time necessary drill a relief well, and 
investigating implications of the new capping technology. 
There are currently no capping devices available on the NCS. But in light of the Macondo accident, 
development of several different capping devices has been initiated by the SWRP. During 2013 these 
are to be placed at strategic location. The aim of this development is to reduce the environmental 
consequences of a subsea blowout, by reducing the possibility of a long-term blowout. This will 
enhance the industry’s ability to respond quickly and efficiently to a subsea well control incident. 
Compared to a relief well, a capping device has a considerably shorter time of deployment (Lewis, 
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2012). As a well cap may have great implications on the blowout duration, it can be considered as a 
major risk mitigating measure. Opening of the former disputed area for petroleum exploration and 
production will be up for governmental discussion in the spring 2013 at the earliest. It is therefore 
not unlikely that a well cap will be available before start of drilling.  
The effect of implementing risk mitigating measures related to relief well drilling and well cap 
development was investigated in section 6.6. Table 33 shows that the blowout duration was 
considerably reduced. This can also be observed by comparing the duration curves of Fig. 26 and 30. 
The mean duration has been reduced from 10 to 6 days, after implementation of these risk 
mitigating measures. The maximum duration is reduced from 72 days to 62 days, as a result of the 
reduced relief well killing time. 
Development of a capping device applicable on the NCS would no doubt have a considerably 
reducing effect on the probability distribution of the blowout duration. It can be seen from Fig. 30 
that the well cap shifts the curve to the left, by creating a new “peak”. Since capping has a high 
success probability (72 %), the residual probability that the blowout is killed by a relief well becomes 
much smaller. By comparing the columns “Capping” and “Relief well” of Table 33, it can be seen that 
well cap development has had a much greater implication on the duration distribution, compared to 
the reduced killing time of a relief well. The latter has limited effect because of the small residual 
probability that the well is killed by a relief well. A well cap will not influence the maximum duration, 
as this is still governed by the maximum time to drill a relief well. 
Through an evaluation of risk mitigating measures, it has been concluded that BlowFlow can be 
applied as a risk management tool to identify of such measures. It is considered a good platform for 
risk informed decision making. Due to the high level of detail it yields realistic scenarios, which is a 
good basis for making risk management decisions. 
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8.3 OPERAto - Environmental risk 
OPERAto is an excel worksheet model developed by DNV to determine the environmental risk 
related to a blowout. The risk is calculated based on the number of harmed VECs, and their recovery 
time. As there is currently no OPERAto model applicable for the former disputed area, the worksheet 
run for the Norne field has been applied in this case study. Even though the environmental risk 
resulting from the assessment does not present a realistic risk picture for the well of the case study, 
OPERAto can still be used to assess the functionality and purpose of this methodology. The objective 
of this case study is to investigate the compatibility of the different models, and the propagation of 
uncertainty through the different steps of an ERA. Both flow rate and duration are associated with a 
considerable amount of uncertainty. The ability of OPERAto to reflect uncertainty in input 
parameters is here the main focus. 
OPERAto serves as a tool to aid the risk management process. It has the ability to reflect changes in 
blowout probability, flow rate and duration. The relative effect of risk reducing measures on the 
environmental risk has been observed. However, the relative risk might not provide an accurate and 
correct picture as it is based on data from another area. 
8.3.1 Environmental risk 
The environmental risk in OPERAto is given as a percentage of acceptance criteria for 4 different 
severity levels. These numbers can be used to determine whether the risk level is acceptable or not. 
It will also help determine whether risk reduction is necessary. The severity of an incident will 
depend on the flow rate and duration of a potential blowout. According to Table 36, the 
environmental risk resulting from this case study is quite low compared to the acceptance criteria. It 
is also low compared to other wells on the NCS (Aspholm et al., 2007). This is mainly a result of 
relatively low flow rates. It is important to emphasize that these results are not necessarily correct 
with respect to the well of the present case study in the eastern Barents Sea. As the Norne field is 
located quite close to the productive area around Lofoten, the environmental risk might be even 
lower for the case study. To determine this with certainty, oil drift simulations and collection of 
regional data on environmental resources would be necessary.  
OPERAto can be used to asses in which season an operation poses the highest and lowest risk. If 
drilling in one season poses a higher risk, it can be concluded not to perform the drilling operation in 
that specific season. Fig. 33 shows the risk contribution from drilling of a well in each of the 4 
seasons. For this case study, drilling in the autumn yields the highest overall risk contribution. As the 
environmental resources, wind and currents vary from field to field, the risk contributions might be 
different if well specific data were included.  
The location of an exploration well will be of great importance to the environmental consequences. It 
will be decisive for the distance to shore or ice edge, the abundance of environmental resources, and 
the prevailing direction of oil drift. The location will also be of importance for oil spill response 
capability, and to some degree the rate of natural weathering. If the blowout point is close to the 
coast or the ice edge the consequences can be much more severe than in the open ocean. Both 
coastal and ice edge environments are generally considered more sensitive to oil spills. Due to oil 
penetration in landmasses, accumulation under ice sheets etc., the natural oil degradation is 
significantly prolonged and pollution may persist much longer, compared to in a pelagic 
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environment. The oil can persist in the ice or landmasses for many years, and this may have a 
negative effect on biological growth and marine organisms (Blumer and Sass, 1972, Doerffer, 1992).  
OPERAto can also indicate in which habitat the risk is highest. Table 36 shows that the highest risk 
contribution in the present study was related to open sea VECs, rather than coastal or beach VECs. 
This is mostly because beaching is considered less likely for an accidental oil spill at Norne. The Norne 
field is located approximately 150 km off shore, while the present case study well is located 
approximately 300 km off the coast. This is considered to be quite far off shore. However, the 
prevailing direction of oil drift in the areas is crucial to whether an oil spill will reach shore or not. 
Whether an oil spill from the well of this case study is likely to reach the ice edge should also be 
assessed. Oil drift simulations have been performed by DNV through OS3D, at a nearby location. The 
results are presented in a Master’s thesis written by Sigve Evensønn Rasmussen. The results indicate 
that it is less likely that the oil reaches shore or the ice edge, even at moderate to high flow rates 
(Rasmussen, 2011). 
8.3.2 Risk management 
The environmental risk is here a function of both the probability and consequences of a blowout. If 
an area is particularly vulnerable, this could yield more severe consequences compared to a less 
vulnerable area. To achieve the same level of risk for a vulnerable area, risk reducing measures might 
have to be implemented. But whether the environment in the Arctic region is more vulnerable than 
further south on the NCS is not included in the scope of this study. In principle, the risk can be 
reduced by reducing the probability and/or mitigating the consequences of a potential accident. 
It is important to incorporate risk management into an ERA. OPERAto can be used to determine 
whether the risk related to a specific activity is acceptable or not, by comparing the environmental 
risk against acceptance criteria. If the risk is too high, risk reducing measures should be considered.  
Possible risk reducing measures have been investigated here, regardless of the resulting risk level. 
This was done to evaluate the ability of the applied methodology to provide a basis for choosing and 
implementing risk reducing measures. Possible risk reducing measures was identified both through 
BlowFAM and BlowFlow. OPERAto investigated the effects of these risk reducing measures, by 
observing the relative effect on the environmental risk.  
Both preventive and consequence mitigating measures are seen to have a considerable impact on 
the risk level in Table 40. BlowFAM identified risk reducing measures able to prevent a blowout from 
occurring in the first place. Such measures are therefore be referred to as preventive. A reduced 
blowout probability led to a corresponding reduction in the environmental risk index. The relative 
risk reduction in each severity level was relatively similar. One could say that the absolute risk level 
was reduced. The relative reduction in the environmental risk is assumed to be representative, as 
there is no data lost when implementing these preventive measures. The level of detail is presumably 
maintained throughout the evaluation. 
The risk reducing measures identified in BlowFlow are categorized as consequence mitigating 
measures. These are related to reducing the duration of a blowout. The shorter blowout duration has 
led to a reduced environmental risk index, and thus a reduced overall risk. It has also led to a change 
in the distribution between the different severity levels. This is caused by the much lower probability 
of a long-term blowout. The risk of severe and considerable damage has been considerably reduced, 
relative to the lower severity levels. The reduced probabilistic duration had to be simplified and re-
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distributed to be applicable as input in OPERAto. Consequently, the environmental effects of these 
measures may not be completely accurate. The accuracy may also be compromised by the fact that 
the worksheet is not based on well specific conditions. However, OPERAto is assumed to yield a good 
indication of the relative effects of these consequence mitigating measures on the environmental 
risk. 
By combining these tools in a risk management process, it provides a common platform to make 
sound risk management decisions. Decision-makers can be informed about potential outcomes, 
driving forces and mechanisms affecting the blowout risk. The analysis is detailed with respect to 
which factors that contribute to a high risk level. By pointing out major risk contributors, the most 
appropriate measures can be chosen. Together these tool can aid the risk management process by 
evaluating whether risks should be avoided, transferred, mitigated or accepted (Arild et al., 2008). It 
provides a good means of assessing the effects of different risk reducing measures. It can also be 
used as basis to plan emergency preparedness and oil spill response (Roald, 2000). 
The preventive measures identified through BlowFAM were reflected directly an accurately in the 
environmental risk of OPERAto. This is due to the good compatibility between these models. 
However, the level of detail is compromised when changes in blowout duration propagates through 
the analysis, to the environmental risk. OPERAto does not allow maintaining the high level of detail in 
the duration distribution. Thus, the detailed reflection of uncertainty related to the identified 
consequence mitigating measures was not reflected in the final results. If the OPERAto worksheet 
allowed reflecting uncertainty on a more detailed level, risk management could be performed with 
improved precision. 
8.3.3 Level of detail / uncertainty 
In this study, blowout probability, flow rate and duration were the main variables. Blowout 
probability is commonly given as a single value in ERAs today. This is also the form in which it is 
entered in OPERAto. As both blowout probability assessment methods applied in this thesis present 
a single value for blowout probability, there is a good compatibility between these methods and 
OPERAto. Due to the good compatibility between input and output, no data is lost in this step. 
However, there is uncertainty related to certain BlowFAM input. As it does not allow presenting any 
input as distributions, this uncertainty is eliminated from the assessment. If a model was developed 
to present blowout probability in a probabilistic manner, this would also require changes in the 
following steps of an ERA, and consequently in OPERAto. 
As both flow rate and duration involves a high uncertainty, this uncertainty should ideally be allowed 
to propagate throughout the assessment, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Each of the steps following the 
calculations of flow rate and duration should ideally be presented as probability distributions. This 
includes presenting possible outcomes in environmental recovery time as probability distributions 
(Arild et al., 2008). 
In the OPERAto worksheet applied in this case study, there are 7 possible flow rates and 6 possible 
durations. BlowFlow on the other hand, presents these parameters as density curves of 98 - 100 
columns (Fig. 25 and 26). Consequently, these distributions had to be considerably simplified to be 
applicable as input in OPERAto. In addition, the flow rates given in OPERAto were not the most 
suitable for the case study, considering that the worksheet was tailored for the Norne field. Only the 
5 lowest flow rates were applicable. As a result of these factors, the level of detail that BlowFlow 
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allowed to work with was severely compromised. This limited the possibility to reflect the 
uncertainty related to these parameters in the resulting environmental risk. Consequently, the 
environmental risk and recovery times will not present the same accuracy as the one presented by 
BlowFlow. It is not possible to assess how the compromised level of detail affected the overall risk.  
If running a new OPERAto worksheet for this specific well, it would be possible to tailor the flow rates 
and durations. As only 5 of 7 flow rates in the current worksheet were applicable, this would improve 
the tool’s ability to reflect uncertainty. Unfortunately, it is not possible to investigate the effects of 
applying more appropriate flow rates on the environmental risk, as the flow rates are fixed in 
OPERAto. As an example, mean values for flow rate (1 200 m3/d) and duration (10 days) from 
BlowFlow can be entered in OPERAto, rather than distributions. This yields an environmental risk 
index of 0.46, compared to 0.59 for the base case. This demonstrates that a major simplification can 
result in an incorrect risk. It can therefore be concluded that a higher level of detail maintained 
throughout the analysis can affect the risk considerably.  
A conservative case was presented in section 7.3, were the uncertainty related to reservoir 
conditions and killing mechanisms was neglected. Conservative single values were applied as input to 
BlowFlow, rather than probability distribution. Table 38 shows that it led to an increase in the 
environmental risk index (from 0.59 to 0.64). Through this simplified conservative case the BlowFlow 
results could be reflected with better accuracy in OPERAto. This is to be expected, as the uncertainty 
has been eliminated. The ability of BlowFlow to present detailed results with a high reflection of 
uncertainty has not been utilized. The major drawback of such an approach is that the scenarios 
generated may be unrealistic, thus over-dimensioning risk reducing measures. It does not provide 
the framework necessary for making sound risk management decisions (Arild et al., 2008). For the 
risk to be as accurate as possible, it is important to maintain a high level of detail. This will lead to a 
better reflection of uncertainty, and provide a better basis for decisions related to risk management. 
By modeling with different blowout probabilities, flow rates and durations in section 7.4, the 
following could be concluded: The blowout probability affects the overall risk level. Flow rate and 
duration will affect the overall risk, but also influence the distribution between the different levels of 
severity. It is the flow rate and duration that determines the area of influence, and consequently the 
severity of a blowout. A high flow rate with a long duration would yield a high risk contribution in the 
severe category. A shorter duration will reduce the probability of a long-term blowout, and thus 
reduce the risk of having an incident with severe consequences. This demonstrates that the 
uncertainty in OPERAto is reflected in the severity level distribution, and that this can vary with 
different input values from BlowFlow. It means that the tools can communicate variable blowout 
probabilities, flow rates and durations and maintain a certain level of detail through the analysis. This 
can be utilized to achieve a better reflection of uncertainty. 
From the above, it seems clear that if OPERAto was developed based on a higher number of flow 
rates and durations, this would allow the model to reflect uncertainty in greater detail. This is 
assumingly easy to include in the calculations of the OPERAto worksheet. However, this would 
require performing a high number of oil drift simulations. Whether this is necessary would have to be 
considered for each specific case. If the risk is in an ALARP area, it might be helpful to use such an 
approach. If the risk is close to or above the risk acceptance criteria, a more detailed analysis can be 
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crucial with respect to the final decisions. It is clear that there is still a lot of work to be done before a 
unified methodology exists, that can allow maintaining a high level of detail throughout an ERA. 
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9. Conclusion 
The objective of this thesis was to determine the blowout risk in a probabilistic manner, where the 
uncertainty related to different parameters was emphasized. This was done by applying several 
different computer modeling tools. It was attempted to determine blowout probability, flow rate and 
duration in a well specific manner, to reflect the uniqueness of the well in question. The 
environmental risk was determined through a methodological study, to investigate the ability of the 
applied tools to communicate probabilistic elements throughout an environmental risk assessment. 
It is important to maintain a high level of detail to provide a good basis for making sound risk 
management decisions. 
Two approaches were applied for determining blowout probability. Neither of these methods can be 
defined as mechanistic as they both are based on statistics, rather than on calculations based on 
driving mechanisms. BlowFAM also consists of a high number of assessment factors. These are 
evaluated and given credit according to the opinion of the user, which gives it a subjective and not 
necessarily genuine scientific basis. However, BlowFAM has several advantages compared to more 
traditional statistical approach. This model is considered to yield the most well specific result of the 
two approaches, and was therefore chosen as the most appropriate for this case study. BlowFAM 
yielded a blowout probability of 7.58 × 10-5. The key to moving toward a more mechanistic approach 
is modeling conditions that govern whether a blowout is likely to occur or not, e.g. through a detailed 
kick analysis.  
The blowout probability is commonly given as a single value in ERAs today, as provided by both of the 
above probability assessment methods. This is also the form in which the blowout probability is 
entered in OPERAto. Consequently, it can be concluded that there is a good compatibility between 
both blowout probability assessment approaches and OPERAto. Due to the good compatibility 
between input and output, no data is lost in this step. However, there is uncertainty related to 
certain BlowFAM input. As it does not allow presenting any input as distributions, this uncertainty is 
eliminated from the assessment. 
Through BlowFlow, the blowout rates and duration can be determined on a detailed level, with a 
high reflection of uncertainty. Uncertainty in input parameters has been allowed to propagate and be 
reflected in the probabilistic curves of the final results. Since the results are calculated based on well 
driving mechanisms it can be considered a mechanistic approach. The uncertainty should ideally be 
allowed to propagate throughout an ERA, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Each of the steps following the 
calculations of flow rate and duration should be presented as probability distributions, to obtain the 
same level of detail in the resulting environmental risk. This includes presenting possible outcomes in 
environmental recovery time as probability distributions. 
The flow rates given by BlowFlow for this case study are quite low compared to typical wells on the 
NCS. The overall mean flow rate from BlowFlow is 1 200 m3/d. This is a result of the poor reservoir 
conditions in the southeastern Barents Sea. The duration resulting from BlowFlow seems reasonable 
compared to estimated durations from ERAs in nearby areas. The mean duration from the case study 
is 10 days. 
OPERAto allows entering the flow rate and duration as simplified probability distributions divided 
between 6 and 7 values, respectively. This distribution is significantly simplified, compared to the 
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probabilistic curves given by BlowFlow. The level of detail is therefore compromised. This limits the 
ability to reflect the level of uncertainty that BlowFlow allows to work with. 
Through the methods applied it can be concluded that it was possible to determine blowout 
probability, flow rate and duration in a well specific manner. However, it was not possible to 
determine the environmental risk in a relevant manner, within the frames of this thesis. Still it was 
possible to study how these tools communicated, and how the uncertainty was allowed to propagate 
through the environmental risk assessment. 
Another objective of this thesis was to investigate if, and how these tools could be operated in 
combination to improve the overall environmental risk assessment through risk informed decision 
making. The ability of these tools to aid the risk management process was investigated. OPERAto can 
be used to determine whether the risk is acceptable or not, and whether risk reduction is necessary. 
This model can also observe the environmental effects of implementing different risk reducing 
measures. Both preventive and consequence mitigating measures have proven able to reduce the 
environmental risk considerably. 
By combining these tools in a risk management process, it provides a common platform to make 
sound risk management decisions. Decision-makers can be informed about potential outcomes, 
driving forces and mechanisms affecting the blowout risk. The analysis is detailed with respect to 
which factors that contribute to a high risk level. Together these tools can aid the risk management 
process by evaluating whether risks should be avoided, transferred, mitigated or accepted. However, 
certain limitation emerge when the consequence mitigating measures identified by BlowFlow 
propagates through the assessment. Due to the limited compatibility between BlowFlow and 
OPERAto, the level of detail is compromised. A high level of detail is important to provide a good 
basis for making sound risk management decisions. If OPERAto allowed reflecting uncertainty on a 
more detailed level, risk management could be performed with improved precision. Accordingly, one 
could avoid over- or under-estimating risk reducing measures. 
The main objective of this thesis was to investigate how a combined use of these tools handles 
uncertainty throughout the analysis. By modeling with different blowout probabilities, flow rates and 
durations, the following could be concluded: A reduced blowout probability led to a corresponding 
reduction in the overall environmental risk. Flow rate and duration affected the overall 
environmental risk, but also the distribution between the different levels of severity. It is the flow 
rate and duration that determines the area of influence, and consequently the severity of a blowout. 
This demonstrates that the uncertainty in OPERAto is reflected in the severity level distribution. This 
means that the tools can communicate variable blowout probabilities, flow rates and durations and 
maintain a certain level of detail through the analysis. This can be utilized to achieve a better 
reflection of uncertainty. For the risks in the different severity level to be as accurate as possible, it is 
important to maintain a high level of detail. 
It seems clear that if OPERAto was developed based on a higher number of flow rates and durations, 
this would allow the model to reflect uncertainty in greater detail. This is assumingly easy to include 
in the calculations of the OPERAto worksheet. However, this would require performing a high 
number of oil drift simulations. Whether this is necessary would have to be considered for each 
specific case. If the risk is close to or above the risk acceptance criteria, a more detailed analysis can 
be crucial with respect to the final decisions. 
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As to the questions asked, the conclusion can be summarized as follows: The methodology 
investigated allows handling the uncertainty of some elements by probability distributions. These are 
allowed to propagate to some degree through the analysis, and be reflected in the severity levels of 
the environmental risk assessment tool. It was also demonstrated that this can be important and 
make a difference as to which decisions should be taken to reduce the risk. However, it is also clear 
that the potential for improvement is large. There is still much modeling work to be done before a 
unified methodology exists. A unified ERA methodology should allow the inclusion of both preventive 
and consequence mitigating measures, where endpoints are in targeted environmental resources, 
and where uncertainties can be included in a probabilistic manner. 
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Appendix A – Killing mechanisms 
The blowout duration depends on how long it takes to kill the uncontrolled blowing well. Some 
common killing mechanisms are discussed in this appendix. It includes both passive and active 
measures. Fig. 35 presents an overview of the most common killing methods applied in the GoM 
from 1960 to 1996. However, the distribution might look different if considering the last 16 years. 
Also, this article does not differentiate between blowouts and well releases (Skalle et al., 1999). 
 
Figure 35: Kill methods applied to the GoM OCS from 1960 to 1996 (Skalle et al., 1999). 
A.1 Natural depletion 
There is a theoretical possibility that the reservoir can deplete naturally. This means that the 
pressure is reduced as a result of the reservoir emptying out. This might be the case for very small 
reservoirs or reservoirs with poor communication between zones. When the reservoir pressure 
approaches the pressure of the bottomhole pressure, the well will cease to flow. However, for most 
wells it would take a long time before the blowout rate is even reduced due to depletion. Normally, 
the reservoir pressure is maintained even though reserves diminish, due to a rise of the oil water 
contact. 
A.2 Coning 
Coning is a type of natural cessation that refers to the event were the water level beneath the oil 
may rise, or the gas level above the oil may sink, in proximity of the well. As the oil flows out of the 
well at high flow rates, the reservoir area close to the well will be drained, and therefore experience 
a reduced pressure. Due to the lower pressure close to the well, the gas-oil contact and the oil-water 
contact will be drawn towards the well opening. The smaller the distance to the well, the larger the 
drawdown pressure will be. As the oil-water contact rises (or gas-oil contact sinks) in proximity of the 
well, it forms a conical shape as is shown in Fig. 36. The extent to which coning takes place will 
depend on the drawdown pressure, the vertical and horizontal permeability (Kv/Kr), as well as the 
vertical distance (z) from the perforations to the gas-oil or oil-water contact (Wheatley, 1985).  
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Figure 36: Schematic of oil/water coning system, where radial and vertical distance from the well is shown on the x- and 
y-axis, respectively (Wheatley, 1985). 
To avoid coning in a producing well, it is crucial not to perforate the well too close to the gas-oil 
contact or oil-water contact. If the gas or water breaks through, it will lead to a high gas or water 
production, and an equivalent reduction in oil production. This will reduce revenue and lead to fill up 
of production and processing equipment. For mature fields, the water production can make out as 
much as 95 % or more of the total produced volume. In case of a blowout, a gas or water 
breakthrough will reduce the amount of oil flowing out of the well significantly. Coning can therefore 
be considered a killing mechanism. However, it will not stop oil completely from flowing; the degree 
of prevention will vary greatly. 
A.3 Bridging 
Bridging is a naturally occurring mechanism, which blocks the well and prevents the fluid from 
flowing. It can either stop or reduce flow. It is considered a passive mechanism because it is affected 
by formation characteristics, and generally not by attempts to kill the well. The term “bridging” 
includes several natural mechanisms that change the conditions inside the wellbore, and lead to stop 
of influx (Adams and Kuhlman, 1991): 
- Accumulation of formation debris that block fluid flow.  
- Collapse of open hole wellbore 
- Formations of gas hydrates 
Formation debris can consist of sand that is produced along with the reservoir fluids, or fragments 
torn of the well wall. Solids accumulation can be substantial in poorly consolidated sandstone 
reservoirs with great permeability. A high flow rate can then cause rapid accumulation. However, if 
the flow rate is too high, the solids might follow the fluids out of the well and bridging will not occur. 
If the well pressure drops below the collapse pressure of the formation, this can lead to collapse of 
the open hole well bore which will reduce or stop the flow. This can be a result of high influx rates, 
rapid pressure drops, high collapse gradient, or a combination of these. If the borehole is cased and 
perforated, this will prevent well collapse. Nor do deepwater wells with high hydrostatic heads tend 
to collapse. Plugging of the well can occur with severe hydrate formation. This originates if the fluid 
contains methane and water at low temperatures and high pressures (Adams and Kuhlman, 1991).  
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If bridging occurs, this typically happens within the first 24 hours (Adams et al., 1991). The drawdown 
pressure near the wellbore will be most significant in this initial period. Also, formation disturbance 
and washout will normally occur a few hours after the blowout initiation. If the formation holds 
stable through this first period, it is unlikely that bridging will occur (Adams and Kuhlman, 1991). 
According to the Scandpower blowout database, as much as 77 % of blowouts are killed by bridging 
(Haugsvold, 2010). This is a very desirable event if a blowout should occur. It requires no work, and 
there are only financial losses due to the oil spill itself. 
A.4 Active measures 
An active measure is an intervention activated by the crew to stop an uncontrolled blowout. 
Normally, the operator attempts to regain access to the well by manually closing/overriding the BOP 
and/or by restoring the primary barrier (through e.g. bullheading or snubbing). I.e. an ROV can be 
deployed to regain access, and seal the wellhead at the seabed. Crew interventions related to the 
primary and secondary barrier will not be discussed further here. They can be studied in detail in the 
SINTEF database, which includes information of how each registered blowout incident has been 
killed (Holand, 2010). Capping will be discussed in further detail below, along with different methods 
to circulate mud into the well (Vallejo-Arrieta, 2002). 
A.4.1 Capping 
Capping serves to stop the uncontrolled flow by closing it in at the release point. It is a mechanical 
shut-in of the well. A capping stack commonly consist of a pipe fitted with one or more valves or 
BOPs, as well as kill and choke lines. This mechanism requires access to the well. Thus, any debris or 
damage structures might have to be removed prior to well cap deployment. It may be necessary to 
cut valves, risers or the entire wellhead before attaching the cap. Alternatively, the existing wellhead 
equipment might be repaired or replaced. If the wellhead has been cut, the pipe of the capping stack 
must be anchored into the well remains. If the well is on fire, this can complicate a capping 
operation, as the fire must be distinguished for most cases. If the well is cratered, capping is not 
possible (Vallejo-Arrieta, 2002). 
When deploying a well cap, the valves are first left open to let the well flow while the assembly is 
properly anchored. The wellhead pressure is sometimes reduced by diverting well fluids, before 
closing it. This operation is shown in Fig. 37. After shut-in, the well must be killed by circulating heavy 
mud through the capping device by e.g. bullheading or snubbing. When pressure control has been 
retrieved, it is often sealed by cementing, either directly through the well cap or through a relief well 
(Grace and Cudd, 2003, Schubert et al., 2004). 
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Figure 37: Typical capping operation (Vallejo-Arrieta, 2002). 
When the Deepwater Horizon blowout started, on April 20th 2010, there were no existing capping 
equipment able to shut in the well. Such equipment had not yet been developed for deepwater, 
HPHT wells with such high blowout rates.  At these conditions, drilling of a relief well  would take 
months. BP immediately started its attempts to contain the leaks and shut in the well. Development 
of capping devices was initiated, to be able to stop the blowout. By July 15th, a three ram capping 
device “Top Hat” was finally in place, and the well ceased to flow. On August 4th a pressure test 
showed that the well had reached static conditions. The casing was plugged by cement, and the well 
could finally be declared shut-in. The operations was complicated by the fact that the riser had to be 
cut before the cap could be deployed, because it was still attached to the BOP and had been bent 
when the platform sank. The well cap was then placed on top of the original wellhead. At September 
17th a relief well was completed to seal the well permanently (Yeo et al., 2010-2011, McAndrews, 
2011).  
This event initiated reviews of potential response options, and development of several new capping 
devices. Oil and Gas UK established the Oil Spill Prevention and Response Advisory Group (OSPRAG) 
for review at UK sector. This resulted in OSPRAG developing its own capping device which have 
become available on the UK continental shelf, for met-ocean conditions. It can be deployed quite 
rapidly using a wide range of vessels or rigs, due to its relatively low weight. This device is currently 
only available on British sector (Kinkead, 2011). The Subsea Well Response Project was established 
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by 9 oil companies to enhance the industry’s capability to respond to a subsea well incident around 
the world. 4 capping stacks capable of handling a variety of scenarios are to be prepared. During 
2013 capping stacks and dispersant equipment will be placed at strategic locations in South America, 
Europe, Africa and Australasia. From there, the devices can be transported by sea or air to blowout 
locations around the world (Lewis, 2012). 
A.4.2 Bullheading 
Bullheading involves pumping of kill fluid to displace any influx fluids back down the well and into the 
reservoir or other subsurface formations. The kill fluid must be circulated at a momentum greater 
than the flow of formation fluid coming up the wellbore. The mud can be injected through the kill 
and choke lines by e.g. a capping device. However, bullheading challenges the integrity of the 
wellhead and casings. As kill fluids are pumped into the well at high pressure, the design pressure of 
the casing or wellhead might be exceeded. If the casing is severely damaged it might result in an 
underground blowout. Also, if the fracture gradient is exceeded, the reservoir below the casing may 
fracture and mud will be lost to the formation. Bullheading can therefore lead to further 
deterioration of the blowout conditions. Thus, inappropriate bullheading can lead to a longer 
blowout duration since well control might be delayed, or other kill methods eliminated (Vallejo-
Arrieta, 2002). 
A.4.3 Snubbing 
Snubbing is a vertical intervention that involves running the bottom hole assembly (BHA) on a pipe 
string into the uncontrolled flowing well. The pipe is made up and broken down while running in and 
pulling out. A snubbing operation allows killing a blowout by injection of killing mud through the drill 
string. Alternatively, this operation can be performed through wireline or coiled tubing (Vallejo-
Arrieta, 2002).  
A.5 Relief well 
If none of the above methods can kill the blowout successfully, a relief well will have to be drilled. 
This is a worst-case scenario, seeing that relief well drilling is a time-consuming operation. Relief 
wells are typically used to gain control of a blowing well where a direct surface intervention is 
impossible. This involves drilling of a new well to intersect the original one, to regain pressure 
control. Planning of two relief wells is typically initiated early on. If the first relief well is unsuccessful 
in intersecting the blowing well, the second one can be used. The well should be intersected at the 
bottom, as close to the flowing zone as possible as shown in Fig. 38. When the relief well hits the 
blowing well, communication is established. The BOP can then be closed and killing mud pumped 
down through both the kill and choke line. There are several methods for killing a blowout through a 
relief well; Dynamic kill, static kill and flooding. Dynamic kill is the most commonly used, and will be 
in focus here (Maehs et al., 2008). 
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Figure 38: Relief well intervention (Vallejo-Arrieta, 2002). 
A dynamic kill involves circulating kill fluids from the relief well, and into the bottom of the blowing 
well. Seawater is often used as the initial kill fluid, since it is easily accessible. The water in itself does 
not have a sufficient hydrostatic head to stop influx. But as the fluid is pumped down into the 
annulus at high rates it creates a high frictional pressure. This frictional pressure combined with the 
hydrostatic head of the fluid column make out the equivalent circulating pressure. As the pump 
pressure is increased the equivalent circulating pressure eventually overcomes the flowing well 
pressure and influx of formation fluids is stopped (Adams and Kuhlman, 1994). 
As the well ceases to flow, frictional pressure is neglected and the hydrostatic pressure of the kill 
fluid alone must exceed the formation pore pressure. The pump rate must then be sustained until 
the seawater can be replaced by a heavier kill mud. The mud is circulated down through the annulus 
of the relief well, and up through the annulus of the original well. The hydrostatic head of the mud 
must be sufficient to prevent inflow, consequently higher than the static formation pressure (Adams 
and Kuhlman, 1994). If the formation is fractured, the pump rate can be decreased to reduce mud 
loss. A thick, viscous mud can help reduce the chance of fracturing. If a heavy mud was injected 
initially, instead of water, it would be difficult to avoid fracturing the formation (Noynaert and 
Schubert, 2005).  
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Appendix B – Probability distributions and distribution values 
Below some different probability distributions are explained briefly. A graphical representation is 
shown Fig. 12. These are the distribution available in BlowFlow for uncertain input values. Only some 
of them will be included in this assignment. 
B.1 Common distributions 
- A single value or deterministic value is used if there is little or no uncertainty related to the 
variable. 
- A uniform distribution is specified by a minimum value and a maximum value. All values in 
between have a constant probability of 1 / (max – min). This means that all values in the 
interval have the same probability, while those below or above have a probability of zero. 
- A triangular distribution is specified by its minimum value, most probable value (peak value) 
and maximum value. The probability increases linearly from zero at the minimum value, to a 
maximum probability at the peak value, and then decreases linearly to zero at the maximum 
value. It does not necessarily need to be symmetric. 
- A piecewise linear distribution is specified by a minimum value, lower percentile value, most 
probable value, upper percentile value and a maximum value. Here, the increase or decrease 
in probability is constant between each of these values, and it allows a “tail” effect. Like for a 
triangular distribution, it does not have to be symmetric. 
- A discrete distribution is defined by a set of values with associated probabilities.  Each value 
is given with a specific probability, and the sum of all these probabilities must be equal to 1. 
It is often presented as a histogram (Walpole et al., 2012). 
B.2 Advanced distributions 
- A generic distribution is built up of a set of data. Based on a number of input values, a 
histogram is formed. The distribution curve is a “smoothing” curve with the same shape as 
the histogram. This type of distribution is suitable if there is historical data available, and it is 
difficult to find an appropriate distribution. 
- A normal distribution, or Gaussian distribution, is defined by a mean (expectation) value and 
a standard deviation. It is has a symmetrical bell shaped curve. It has the highest probabilities 
near the mean value, and decreases on either side. Here the total probabilities within one 
standard deviation is 0.68, and 0.95 the within two standard deviations. 
- An exponential distribution is given by a mean value, where the probability decreases 
exponentially with increasing values. This model is used to model the behavior of units with a 
constant failure rate that does not degrade with time. It is a special case of the Weibull 
distribution, where the variable k is set to 1. 
- A Weibull distribution is set by a shape parameter (α), and scale parameter (β), both 
positive. It is often used to measure the failure rate of a unit, due to its flexibility. It can 
mimic a normal distribution or an exponential distribution. If α is less than 1, the curve is 
decreasing over time. I.e. if k is set to 0.5, the failure rate decreases exponentially. If α is 
higher than 1, this suggests an increases over time. The latter can mimic a normal 
distribution (Walpole et al., 2012). 
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B.3 Special case distributions 
- A trapezium distribution is represented by a minimum, left peak, right peak and maximum 
value. The probability increases linearly from the minimum value to the left peak, is uniform 
from the left to the right peak, and decreases linearly from the right peak to the maximum 
value. It will then form a trapeze.  
- A tailed triangular distribution is like a triangular distribution given by a minimum, peak and 
maximum value. However, one side is represented by a tail that has an exponential slope. 
This tail can be either on the left or the right side of the peak. The opposite side has a linear 
slope. 
B.4 Distribution values 
Results are often presented as distribution values. Some common ones that are used in this thesis 
are defined below. 
- Minimum value 
- P10, 10 % percentile 
- P50, 50 % percentile 
- P90, 90 % percentile 
- Maximum value 
- Mean value 
- Standard deviation 
The 10 % percentile expresses the value, where there is a 10 % chance that the results will be lower 
or equal to this value. Accordingly, there is a 90 % chance that the results will be higher than the 
given value. Likewise, there is a 50 % and 90 % chance that the results will be lower than the P50 and 
P90 values, respectively. The standard deviation is measure of variation or "dispersion" from mean 
value. A low standard deviation indicates that the data points tend to be very close to the mean, 
whereas a high standard deviation indicates that the data points are spread out over a larger range 
of values (Walpole et al., 2012). 
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Appendix C – PVT properties and correlation 
This section defines different PVT properties that are necessary to calculate in BlowFlow. It also 
describes different correlation available in the tool used to determine these values. 
C.1 Definitions of PVT properties 
The bubble point pressure (Pb) is the pressure at which the first bubble of gas is formed when 
decreasing the pressure of a fluid. The solution gas-oil ratio (Rs) is the amount of gas dissolved in the 
oil at a given pressure in scf/stb. Rs increases linearly with pressure as it approaches Bp, after which it 
is constant. The oil is said to be under-saturated with gas above Bp, because there is no more free gas 
available to dissolve in the solution. Rs is also a function of the oil and gas composition. The solution 
gas-oil ratio is often the most significant component of the PVT correlations. It has a strong impact on 
oil viscosity and the formation volume factors (Danesh, 1998). Fig. 39 shows how the solution gas-oil 
ratio changes with pressure below and above the bubble point pressure. 
 
Figure 39: Solution gas oil ration as a function of pressure (Danesh, 1998). 
The oil formation volume factor (Bo) is the volume of oil and dissolved gas at reservoir conditions 
divided by the volume of oil standard conditions. Since the oil flow rate is normally measured at 
standard conditions, it must be converted to reservoir conditions by multiplying with Bo. This value is 
usually higher than 1, because the oil contains dissolved gas at reservoir conditions. As for Rs, it 
increases linearly with pressure as it approaches the bubble point pressure. This is because more gas 
goes into solution. Above Bp however, there is no more gas to enter the solution, and the oil is 
compressed (England et al., 1987, Danesh, 1998). Fig. 40 shows how the oil formation volume factor 
changes with pressure below and above the bubble point pressure. 
 
Figure 40: Oil formation volume factor as a function of pressure (Danesh, 1998). 
The viscosity can be defined as “thickness” or “internal friction” of a fluid. Water has a viscosity of 1 
cP at 20 ᵒC, and a higher viscosity corresponds to higher flow resistance (Danesh, 1998).  
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C.2 PVT correlations 
Several models are available in BlowFlow to correlated PVT properties. Different methods may be 
applied for determining the different parameters mentioned above. These models are presented 
shortly below, along with the a conclusion of which model is the most appropriate for the case study. 
Information about errors and applicability is given in the BlowFlow tool.  
C.2.1 Vasquez-Beggs 
The Vasquez-Beggs correlation from 1978 is based on approximately 6000 measured data points at 
various temperatures and pressures. This data is gathered from more than 600 crude oil systems. 
There will be various degrees of error when using PVT correlation An average error of ±8 % has been 
reported for the Vasquez-Beggs correlation. This model is applicable for determining Pb, Rs, Bo and µo. 
C.2.2 Standing 
The Standing model is based on 105 experimentally determined data points, which is gathered from 
22 different oil-gas mixtures in the United States. It is valid for oil gravities of 0.770 - 0.970 SG and 
reservoir temperatures of 38 - 109 °C (Shokir et al., 2004). As for the Vasquez-Beggs it is applicable to 
find Pb, Rs, Bo and µo. 
C.2.3 De Ghetto 
The De Ghetto model can be used to determine Pb, Rs, Bo and µo. Data on the first three parameters 
are collected worldwide, while data on the latter is collected from the Mediterranean Basin, Africa 
and the Persian Gulf. It is optimized to handle both heavy oils (0.92 - 1.00 SG) and extra-heavy oils 
(gravities greater than 1.00 SG). However, it may also be used for lighter oils. For saturated and 
under-saturated oil viscosity prediction, the average absolute errors were reported to be 12 % and 6 
%, respectively. 
C.2.4 Egbogah 
The Egbogah correlation is especially developed to determine oil viscosity for heavy oils. It is 
applicable for oil gravities 0.75 - 1.04 SG and reservoir temperatures of 15 - 80 °C. 
C.2.5 Lee 
The Lee model is applicable to determine gas viscosity for reservoir temperatures within 38 - 171 °C 
and pressures of 7 - 552 bars. Average reported error is 2 – 4 %. For high gas viscosities the model is 
known to under-predict the viscosity. 
C.2.6 Modified Lee 
The modified Lee model is also used to determine gas viscosity. It is reported to have an average 
absolute error of 2.3 percent, and is based on a wider range of data, compared to the traditional Lee 
model. 
C.2.7 Case study 
For determination of bubble point pressure (Pb), solutions gas-oil ratio (Rs), oil formation volume 
factor (Bo), and oil viscosity (µo) in the case study, the Vasquez-Beggs correlation will be employed. 
This is chosen because this model is based on large amounts of data collected worldwide. The 
Standing model is based on much smaller database, which is collected in California. Thus, the 
Vasquez-Beggs is more applicable on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. De Ghetto and Egbogah on 
the other hand, are more complex models applicable for heavy oils.  
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The gas viscosity (µg) is determined by the modified Lee model, since this has a lower average error 
rate than the traditional Lee model. 
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Appendix D – Multiphase flow models 
This section describes the different multiphase flow models available in BlowFlow, and their 
applicability. Limitations of each model are described in the BlowFlow tool. This section also includes 
a conclusion of which model is the most applicable for the case study.  
D.1 Hagedorn-Brown 
The Hagedorn-Brown correlation is one of the multiphase flow models used in the BlowFlow tool. 
When developing this correlation, a 450 meter deep well was used to obtain experimental pressure 
profiles at different flow rates. Pressures were measured for flow in tubes ranging from 1 ¼ to 2 7/8 
in outer diameter. Since it was developed for vertical flow in oil wells, it has limited accuracy for 
horizontal or deviated wells. The effects of liquid viscosity were studied by using water and oil as the 
liquid phase. The oil used had viscosities of 10, 35 and 110 cP at stock tank conditions. Also, a wide 
range of gas/liquid ratios were included in the study. The model gives the best results for liquids with 
a moderate to high gas fractions, and high mixture velocities. The correlation provides good results 
over a wide range of well conditions an flow regimes and is among the most widely used multiphase 
flow models. However, the model has several limitations (Hagedorn and Brown, 1965): 
- Over predicts pressure losses for high API gravities. 
- Under predicts pressure losses for low API gravities. 
- Over predicts pressure drop for large pipe/tubing sizes. 
- Poor accuracy for deviated or horizontal wells. 
D.2 Beggs & Brill 
The Beggs & Brill model is developed for tubing strings in inclined wells and pipelines for hilly terrain. 
It can be used to model flow in vertical, horizontal and inclined wellbores. The elevation pressure 
gradient in a pipeline with a small upward inclination from horizontal can be much higher than the 
frictional pressure gradient. When gas flows at a greater linear velocity than the liquid, slippage takes 
place and liquid holdup occurs. Therefore, in order to predict the pressure drop, the liquid holdup 
must be accurately predicted. The Beggs & Brill model has resulted from experiments using air and 
water as test fluids over a wide range of parameters, as given below (Beggs and Brill, 1973): 
 
- Gas flow rate 0.00 - 8.50 Mscm/d 
- Liquid flow rate 0 - 164 Scm/d 
- Average system pressure 2.00 - 6.50 bar 
- Pipe diameter 1.00 - 1.50 in. 
- Liquid holdup 0.000-0.870 
- Pressure gradient 0.000 - 0.180 bar/m 
- Inclinations angle -90.0° to +90.0° also horizontal flow patterns 
As for the Hagedorn-Brown correlation, it is known to over predict pressure losses at large diameters 
and for high GOR values (especially for GOR > 890). Also, it yields better results for oil at intermediate 
API gravities (Beggs and Brill, 1973). 
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D.3 Orkiszewski 
The Orkiszewski correlation is applicable for assessing pressure drops for two-phase flow in vertical 
wells. It can be used for high-velocity flow ranges and gas condensate wells in addition to oil wells, 
and has proven accuracy. Some known limitations are given below (Orkiszewski, 1967): 
- Over predicts pressure losses for tubing sizes > 2.00 inches 
- At low oil gravities (13.0 – 30.0 °API) the pressure profile is over predicted 
- Errors become large (> 20 %) for GOR > 890 
D.4 Gray 
The Gray correlation is one of the most commonly used methods for gas-condensate well pressure 
profile prediction. It provides accurate results of pressure drops for gas wells experiencing liquid 
loadings. The correlation notes that caution should be used for the following conditions (Gray, 1955): 
- Flow velocities < 15.0 m/s 
- Tubing sizes < 3.50 in 
- Roughness height < 8.44 µm 
There is no single method that gives the most accurate predictions for all types of wells. Models 
developed for predicting pressure drops in oil fields, might give poor results for gas wells. The 
Orkiszewski and Hagedorn-Brown correlations are considered to perform satisfactorily for 
engineering purposes for vertical oil wells with or without water-cut. They are applicable for the 
same types of wells, and are considered equally accurate for most cases.  The Beggs & Brill model is 
considered to be the best method available for inclined/deviated wells, with or without water-cut. 
However, the model can also be used for vertical and horizontal wells. The Gray correlation is also a 
much used model, and is considered to give the best results for vertical gas or condensate wells. 
Several of these models have been modified recently to be able to predict a larger range of flow 
conditions and well designs (Pucknell et al., 1993). 
D.5 Case study 
The multiphase flow model used for this case study is the Hagedorn-Brown correlation. Several of the 
available models can be used for vertical oil and gas wells, but The Hagedorn-Brown is developed for 
a wider range of flow diameters. Thus, it gives better accuracy for larger pipes. The Beggs &Brill and 
Orkiszewski both over predict pressure losses in large tubes. This is unfortunate since it gives smaller 
flow rates. The Gray model is better for gas wells.  
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Appendix E – BlowFAM report 
This section presents the report generated from the BlowFAM tool. It includes general information 
about the well, activity level, results in the form of frequencies and adjustments, and a list of all the 
risk elements considered to contribute the blowout risk for the specific well. Risk elements that are 
not considered to yield a higher or lower risk for this specific well is also included, since these will 
also affect the final blowout frequency. 
E.1 General information 
Water depth (m): 330 m 
BlowFAM session date: 07.05.2012 
Drilling before the BOP is set (number of wells): 0 
Drilling after the BOP is set (number of wells): 1 
Completion (number of operations): 0 
Production (number of operations): 0 
Workover (number of operations): 0 
Wireline (number of operations): 0 
Exploration well 
Type of well: Oil 
Type of installation: Floater 
E.2 Risk elements and evaluations 
The Table 41 present all the risk elements related to drilling after setting of the BOP. Elements 
related to other activities have for simplicity been excluded. The total number of risk elements 
included is 171. 8 of these elements are set to not applicable (NA) for the well in question. Thus, the 
total number of applicable elements is 163. The sum of all positive scores is B = 47, and the sum of all 
negative scores is W = 9. 
Table 41: Risk element evaluation for the base case. 
ID Risk element Max Score Comment 
F Frame Conditions 
F01-01 Areas with low hole (well) density 3 0  
F01-02 Drilling in northern areas 3 -3 The area is in northern areas 
with Arctic climate. 
F01-03 Collisions with icebergs 1 -1 Possibility for iceberg collision 
in this area. 
F01-04 Fields with H2S 2 0  
F01-05 Slimhole drilling 3 0  
F02-01 Difficult to use riser margins in 
deep water 
3 1 The water depth is 330 meters, 
and not considered deep 
water. 
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F02-02 Booster line on marine riser 2 0  
F02-03 Possible hydrate formation 
during flow, circulation out 
3 0  
F02-04 More complex operation systems 
for subsea BOP 
3 1 More advanced technology in 
recent years, and high safety 
demands in the area. 
F02-05 Circulate small amount of gas 
through choke line 
3 0  
F02-06 Establish guidelines for 
deepwater operations 
3 NA Not deepwater. 
F03-01 Drilling into neighbouring well 2 NA No other wells in the area. 
F03-02 Generally good knowledge about 
reservoirs and shallow gas 
5 -1 Limited knowledge since there 
a currently no wells in the 
area. 
F03-03 Increased number of possible 
leak paths between different well 
slots 
2 NA No other wells in the area. 
F04-01 Use of heavy mud to prevent 
hole collapse 
2 NA No horizontal section. 
F04-02 Easy to get stuck pipe after 
rotation stop or if the well is 
closed in 
2 0  
F04-03 Increased time of reservoir 
exposure 
3 NA No horizontal section. 
F04-04 Difficult to circulate out gas from 
horizontal sections 
3 NA No horizontal section. 
F04-05 Possible swabbing during e.g. 
hole cleaning 
2 0  
M Drilling Management 
M01-01 Seismic of 3-D 4 2 Better seismic surveys have 
improved the quality of 
seismic data. 
M01-02 Too much trust on seismics 2 0  
M01-03 Change of location due to 
expected shallow gas 
0 0  
M01-04 Improved casing program 3 3 More reliable data has lead to 
improved casing programs and 
flexibility in the casing setting 
depths. 
M01-05 Experience data available 5 -2 Little data available in this 
area. 
M01-06 Risk analysis prior to drilling 4 1 Thorough analysis is 
demanded. 
M01-07 Prespud meetings 3 2 Better communication and 
awareness. 
M01-08 Systemizing of all drilling 
documentation 
2 0  
M01-09 H2S preparedness when drilling 
wells in new area 
3 0  
M01-10 Kick-off meetings prior to critical 3 2 Better communication and 
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drilling phases awareness. 
M01-11 Improved geological information 4 -2 Little information about 
geology available. 
M01-12 Special shallow gas seismic 
survey 
0 NA Shallow gas not considered. 
M01-13 Analysis of difficult wells 
postdrilling 
4 0  
M01-14 Establishing of Safety 
Management System (SMS) 
3 3 Safety management will be of 
high priority. 
M01-15 Safe Job Analysis 2 0  
M01-16 Risk analysis of new equipment 2 0  
M01-17 System for experience transfer 
into procedures 
3 0  
M01-18 Improved quality of weather 
forecast 
2 2 Weather forecasts significantly 
improved in recent years. 
M01-19 Use of rig which can withstand 
rough weather 
3 3 In northern areas weather 
resistant rigs are required. 
M01-20 Earlier start of well planning 1 1 Thorough planning required. 
M01-21 Use of special contractor if 
possibilities for H2S in well 
2 0  
M01-22 Developed flow chart for the 
planning 
2 0  
M02-01 Simulation tools 3 0  
M02-02 Introduction of new 
equipment/systems 
3 0  
M02-03 Increased training frequency of 
courses in general 
3 0  
M02-04 Qualification feedback system 3 0  
M02-05 Well control (BOP) courses for 
drilling supervisors 
5 0  
M02-06 Internal courses that emphasize 
well control and other critical 
aspects 
3 0  
M02-07 Regularly kick handling tests (kick 
drill/pit drill) 
4 0  
M02-08 More experience and better 
understanding of well conditions 
and parameters 
3 0  
M02-09 Use of rig on normal well prior to 
use on difficult well 
1 0  
M02-10 Expert system gives possible 
explanations to symptoms which 
have occurred 
1 0  
M02-11 Full scale training facilities 4 0  
M03-01 Too much time spent on 
meetings, reporting etc. 
1 0  
M03-02 More stress for some personnel 
due to reduced manning 
1 0  
M03-03 The shift arrangement may result 
in lost experience among some 
2 0  
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personnel 
M03-04 New meeting/information 
structure (team work) 
1 0  
M03-05 Establishing of competent well 
control team 
2 0  
M03-06 Independent mud volume control 
by mud log company 
4 0  
M03-07 Too much trust on mud loggers 
attention 
1 0  
M03-08 Transfer of responsibility to 
contractor leads to higher 
understanding of operations 
3 0  
M03-09 All information onshore/offshore 
channelled through one person 
offshore 
2 0  
M03-10 Engineer who has prepared 
drilling programs is present and 
follows-up offshore 
4 0  
M04-01 Improved physical and 
psychosocial work environment 
2 0  
M04-02 Improved man-machine interface 
ergonomics 
2 0  
M04-03 Improved communication 2 0  
M04-04 Encouraging more team work 
between operator and 
contractors 
1 0  
M04-05 Policy change in companies 
towards safety 
3 3 High safety requirements. 
M04-06 Better control routines for 
logging overtime 
1 0  
M04-07 Stress on contractor personnel 1 0  
M05-01 Improved pressure/functional 
testing 
4 0  
M05-02 System for introduction of new 
and unproven equipment 
2 0  
M06-01 Increased maintenance level 3 0  
M06-02 Reduced manning in some areas 1 0  
M06-03 Tailoring maintenance programs 
to suit each case 
1 0  
M06-04 Contractors evaluated on 
maintenance philosophy 
1 0  
E Drilling 
E01-01 MWD/AWD/LWD 4 0  
E01-02 Sensors for pit level control 3 0  
E01-03 Control/display equipment 2 0  
E01-04 Long response time after stop of 
mud pumps 
1 0  
E01-05 Real time surveillance 3 0  
E01-06 Pore pressure tools 3 0  
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E01-07 Gammaray MWD 3 0  
E01-08 Ultra sonic pit level indicator 1 0  
E01-09 Number of flow meters in mud 
system 
4 0  
E02-01 Slick line 2 0  
E03-01 Top heave compensator 
(hydraulic lock) 
2 0  
E03-02 Active heave compensator 
system 
2 0  
E04-01 Number of connections 3 0  
E04-02 Possible to circulate mud while 
tripping 
4 0  
E04-03 Remotely operated IBOP 3 0  
E04-04 Rotary table as back-up 1 0  
E04-05 Stab the IBOP 3 0  
E04-06 Soft torque system (topdrive and 
rotary table) 
1 0  
E04-07 Dropped objects from topdrive 1 0  
E04-08 Frequent use of IBOP gives more 
wear and lower reliability 
1 0  
E04-09 Reliability of top drive 2 0  
E05-01 Mud quality/properties 4 0  
E05-02 High rate mixing 2 0  
E05-03 Number of mud pumps 1 0  
E05-04 Drilling fluid contingency 3 0  
E05-05 Back-up to the gas sensor in the 
gas trap 
3 0  
E05-06 Closed system to handle gas 
while circulating out 
4 0  
E05-07 Location of individual equipment 1 0  
E05-08 TAM packers beneath top drive 3 0  
E05-09 Closed pits obstruct visual 
detection of pit level 
2 0  
E05-10 Water based mud gives more 
sticking 
1 0  
E05-11 Oil based mud: Gas in solution 3 0  
E06-01 Acoustic back-up control 1 0  
E06-02 Variable bore ram (VBR) 3 3 Commonly used today, 
E06-03 Reliability of subsea BOP 4 0  
E06-04 Accumulator capacity, subsea 
BOP 
1 0  
E06-05 Elastomer in pipe ram 3 3 Pipe rams commonly include 
elastomers today. 
E06-06 Upgrade of annular preventer 4 4 Improved equipment reilability 
E06-07 Nitrogen bottle on annular 
preventer 
3 0  
E06-08 Automatic locking of rams on 
surface BOP 
1 NA Surface BOP not included. 
E06-09 Use of one-stack instead of two- 3 0  
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stack system 
E07-01 Booster line on Marine Riser 2 0  
E07-02 Segmented hubs for riser and 
BOP connection 
1 0  
E08-01 Improved surveillance and 
registration of K/C system. 
(Temperature and pressure) 
2 0  
E08-02 More reliable flexible hoses 
especially with respect to fatigue 
3 0  
E08-03 More K/C inlets on BOP 3 0  
E08-04 Internal pressure equalizing of 
kill/choke valves 
1 0  
E09-01 Improved certification and 
quality in general 
3 0  
E09-02 Removal of side entry hubs on 
drill string 
1 0  
E09-03 Float in drill tool (1) 2 0  
E09-04 Float in drill tool (2) 1 0  
E09-05 Dart/circulation sub 2 0  
E09-06 H2S and CO2 resistant equipment 3 0  
E09-07 Drill bits 3 0  
E09-08 Use of drill pipes with larger 
diameter 
2 0  
E09-09 Sensors for monitoring of drill 
string vibrations 
1 0  
E09-10 Equipment for monitoring of 
condition of downhole tubulars 
3 0  
E10-01 Cement quality and cementing of 
casing 
3 2 Better cement quality and 
procedures. 
E10-02 Automatic cementing unit 2 0  
E11-01 Continuously improved 
equipment 
3 3 Better mud logging equipment 
has lead to improved kick 
detection. 
E13-01 Use of coiled tubing 3 0  
E13-02 Significantly increased quality of 
equipment 
3 0  
E14-01 Wellhead gasket 3 0  
E14-02 Use of fire resistant well heads 1 0  
E15-01 Kinetic energy system 1 0  
E15-02 System to localise travelling block 1 0  
P Operational Procedures 
P01-02 More focus on pore pressure, 
mud weight and formation 
strength in general 
5 2 Recent increased focus in 
these parameters. 
P01-04 Special procedures when drilling 
H2S contaminated wells 
3 0  
P01-07 Use of 2 tested independent 
barriers 
4 4 Two independent barriers are 
required according to North 
Sea standards. 
129 
P01-08 Shut-in at kick detection 4 0  
P01-09 Less possibilities for individual 
decisions 
3 0  
P01-10 Software for recalculation of well 
design 
1 0  
P03-01 Circulate mud and rotate during 
back-reaming 
2 0  
P03-02 Circulate during POOH of the 
open hole section 
4 0  
P03-03 Improved procedures for 
monitoring of mud return 
3 2 Increased focus on kick 
detection. 
P03-04 Circulate bottom up and flow 
check before tripping 
5 0  
P03-05 Higher awareness to procedures 
during tripping in general 
3 0  
P03-06 Perform short trip to check well 
conditions 
4 0  
P03-08 Recording of mud volumes to 
compare between trips 
3 0  
P03-09 Use of software to decide 
pulling/running speed 
3 0  
P04-02 2-Step cementing procedure 2 0  
P04-03 Improved quality check of 
cementing 
2 0  
P04-04 Use float 3 0  
P04-05 Procedure for checking quality of 
cement job before permit to drill 
ahead 
2 0  
P04-06 Continuous monitoring of 
swab/surge pressures during 
running casing 
2 0  
P04-07 Surveying of make-up torque of 
casings 
1 0  
P04-08 Rotate or reciprocate string 
during cementing 
2 0  
P04-09 Circulate down casing 1 0  
P04-10 Monitor annulus during/after 
cementing 
3 0  
P04-11 Fitting of correct sized piperams 4 0  
P04-12 Have circulation sub available on 
deck 
3 0  
P05-01 Improved requirements to quality 
of test equipment 
4 0  
P05-02 Use of special production test 
string 
3 0  
P05-03 Safety valve below seabed in test 
string 
3 0  
P06-01 Monitoring of trip tank 3 0  
P06-02 Closing of blind rams 3 0  
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E.3 Risk reduction 
Table 42 includes an evaluation of possible relevant risk reducing elements from Table 41. Each of 
the implemented elements is given a maximum positive score. This has resulted in an overall 
additional positive score of 39.  
Table 42: List of risk reducing elements implemented in BlowFAM. 
ID Risk element Max Score Comment 
M02-03 Increased training frequency 
of courses in general 
3 3 An increased number and quality of 
training courses can help reduce risk. 
M02-04 Qualification feedback system 3 3 A qualification feedback system may 
reveal lack of experience or training 
in some areas. 
M02-05 Well control (BOP) courses for 
drilling supervisors 
5 5 Annual refreshing courses for drilling 
supervisors can help reduce risk. 
M02-06 Internal courses that 
emphasize well control and 
other critical aspects 
3 3 A higher number of such courses can 
help reduce the risk. 
E05-02 High rate mixing 2 2 High rate mixing will provide fast 
mud supply during critical situations. 
E05-03 Number of mud pumps 1 1 A higher number of mud pumps will 
ensure sufficient mud supply during 
critical situations. 
E05-04 Drilling fluid contingency 3 3 Detailed contingency plans can 
enhance emergency preparedness. 
E06-03 Reliability of subsea BOP 4 4 A more reliable subsea BOP will 
reduce risk. 
P03-05 Higher awareness to 
procedures during tripping in 
general 
3 3 Higher awareness can help reduce 
the risk. 
P03-06 Perform short trip to check 
well conditions 
4 4 Can check if the pulling speed is too 
high and will lead to swabbing. 
P03-08 Recording of mud volumes to 
compare between trips 
3 3 Can make it easier to detect 
abnormalities 
P04-05 Procedure for checking quality 
of cement job before permit to 
drill ahead 
2 2 Squeezing will reveal indications of 
poor cement. 
P04-10 Monitor annulus during/after 
cementing 
3 3 Thorough monitoring can reduce the 
risk. 
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E.4 Frequencies and adjustments 
Table 43 present the results from BlowFAM based on the base case. The frequencies that contained 
errors have here been corrected based on the calculated frequencies. Table 44 presents the 
frequencies resulting after implementation of the risk reducing measures identified in Table 42. 
Table 43: Blowout frequency and adjustments for the base case. 
Phase Activity 
level 
Basic 
blowout 
frequency 
Adjustment 
factor 1 
Adjustment 
factor 2 
Manual 
adjustment 
Blowout 
frequency 
Drilling 
before BOP 
0.00 22.8 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Drilling 
after BOP 
1.00 2.10 0.98 0.77 0.59 0.92 
Completion 0.00 0.73 0.66 0.86 1.00 0.00 
Production 0.00 0.07 0.88 0.77 1.00 0.00 
Workover 0.00 1.40 0.95 0.86 1.00 0.00 
Wireline 0.00 0.06 0.95 0.86 1.00 0.00 
      0.69 
 
Table 44: Blowout frequency and adjustments after risk reduction. 
Phase Activity 
level 
Basic 
blowout 
frequency 
Adjustment 
factor 1 
Adjustment 
factor 2 
Manual 
adjustment 
Blowout 
frequency 
Drilling 
before BOP 
0.00 22.8 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Drilling 
after BOP 
1.00 2.10 0.98 0.53 0.59 0.64 
Completion 0.00 0.73 0.66 0.86 1.00 0.00 
Production 0.00 0.07 0.88 0.77 1.00 0.00 
Workover 0.00 1.40 0.95 0.86 1.00 0.00 
Wireline 0.00 0.06 0.95 0.86 1.00 0.00 
      0.69 
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Appendix F – Flow rate over time 
This section presents the oil flow rate distribution over time given by BlowFlow. The decrease in flow 
rate over time is a function of the different killing mechanisms. Each killing mechanism has a 
different duration, and will therefore take effect at different times. Seeing that the flow rate is a 
density distribution, it reflects each of the killing mechanisms. Table 45 present probabilistic 
(weighted mean) flow rate distribution values for a selection of days; 0, 5, 12, 35, 55 and 72. The 
corresponding curves are shown in Fig. 41. 
Table 45: Oil flow rate distribution values for a probabilistic blowout scenario at day 0, 5, 12, 35, 55 and 75, respectively. 
Distribution 
values 
 Flow rate oil (m3/d) 
Day 0 Day 5 Day 12 Day 35 Day 55 Day 72 
Minimum 129 0 0 0 0 0 
P10 591 0 0 0 0 0 
P50 1 144 0 0 0 0 0 
P90 1 901 993 757 523 0 0 
Maximum 2 822 2 822 2 822 2 822 2 822 0 
Mean 1 200 266 171 118 63 0 
St. dev. 486 475 402 344 256 0 
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Figure 41: Probabilistic flow rate distribution of oil at day 0, 5, 12, 35, 55 and 72, respectively. 
At day 0, none of the killing mechanisms will have occurred. In reality, the flow rate will remain 
constant (equal to the flow at day 0), if it is not killed or reduced by a killing mechanism. This can be 
seen from the more or less constant maximum flow rate in Table 45. But the probability that the well 
has been killed increases with time. This affects the flow rate distribution, and increases the 
probability of having a flow rate of 0 m3/d. Coning, bridging and crew interventions will often occur 
within the early phase of a blowout. Coning has a 50 % chance of reducing the oil flow rate by 50 %. 
Bridging on the other hand has a 77 % chance of killing the well. Crew interventions will have a 70 % 
and 43 % chance of killing topside and subsea releases, respectively. Drilling of a relief well is 
considered to have a 100 % probability of success, and will kill the well after a longer period of time. 
As a result, the mean flow rate is reduced over time. Fig. 42 presents a curve of the mean flow rate 
over time (for each day), from start of influx to the maximum blowout duration for a probabilistic 
(mean) scenario. 
The mean flow rate will have a rapid initial decrease as a result of coning, bridging and crew 
interventions. Bridging and crew interventions will be more crucial to flow than coning, as these 
mechanisms involve a greater flow reduction. Bridging and crew interventions have an exponentially 
distributed time of occurrence, which gives the flow rate a similar initial decrease. Drilling of a relief 
well will reduce the flow rate distribution from day 40 to 72. 72 days is the maximum time to drill a 
relief well, at which the flow rate is 0.  
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Figure 42: Mean probabilistic flow rate over time. 
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